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ESSAYS



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
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# POLITICAL & LITERARY ESSAYS

SECOND SERIES

BY THE  
EARL OF CROMER



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## PREFACE

THE favourable reception given to the volume of Essays which I published last autumn encourages me to lay a second series before the public. The following essays appeared for the most part in *The Spectator*, *The Quarterly Review*, *The National Review*, and *The Nineteenth Century and After*. They are now republished with the consent of the editors of these various periodicals. In some cases a few additions and alterations have been made. I have also to thank Mr. Sidney Low and his publishers, Messrs. Smith, Elder & Co., for allowing the republication of an Introduction which I wrote to his work, entitled *Egypt in Transition*. Similarly, Mr. Stephen Paget and his publisher, Mr. H. K. Lewis, have kindly permitted the republication of an Introduction which I wrote to his book *For and Against Experiments on Animals*.

Since last Easter I have been prevented by ill-health from writing anything.

CROMER.

36 WIMPOLE STREET,  
LONDON, W.

# CONTENTS

## ENGLISH BIOGRAPHY

	PAGE
I. LORD LYONS . . . . .	3
II. LORD NORTH . . . . .	23
III. LORD CLARENDON . . . . .	33
IV. EDWARD BULWER . . . . .	40
V. WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM . . . . .	47
VI. THE MARQUIS OF WELLESLEY . . . . .	56
VII. THE YOUNG DISRAELI . . . . .	63
VIII. HENRY LABOUCHERE . . . . .	70
IX. AN IMPERIAL MASTER-BUILDER . . . . .	79
X. A PIONEER OF EMPIRE . . . . .	86

## FRANCE

XI. MIRABEAU . . . . .	95
XII. FOUQUIER TINVILLE . . . . .	102
XIII. MARIE ANTOINETTE AND BARNAVE . . . . .	109
XIV. FRENCH CIVILISATION . . . . .	117
XV. NAPOLEON AND ALI OF YANINA . . . . .	124
XVI. A FRENCH EMIGRANT . . . . .	132
XVII. FEMINISM IN FRANCE . . . . .	139

## GERMANY

XVIII. IMPERIAL GERMANY . . . . .	149
XIX. THE HOME POLICY OF GERMANY . . . . .	157
XX. THE OLD PRUSSIAN ARMY . . . . .	173

## ITALY

XXI. CAVOUR . . . . .	PAGE 183
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## INDIA, EGYPT, AND THE EAST

XXII. INDIAN PROGRESS AND TAXATION . . . . .	193
XXIII. REFLECTIONS ON INDIA . . . . .	206
XXIV. EGYPT AND THE SUDAN . . . . .	214
XXV. THE COURT OF PEKING . . . . .	226

## CURRENT POLITICS

XXVI. EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING ANIMALS . . . . .	237
XXVII. SOUTH AFRICA . . . . .	254
XXVIII. TWENTY-SIX YEARS' FINANCE . . . . .	261
XXIX. WHAT IS SLAVERY? . . . . .	370
XXX. A PEACE BOANERGES . . . . .	277
XXXI. WAR AND DIPLOMACY . . . . .	285
XXXII. CHARITY ORGANISATION . . . . .	292

## MISCELLANEOUS

XXXIII. GREEK IMPERIALISM . . . . .	301
XXXIV. NUMBERS IN HISTORY . . . . .	310
XXXV. ELOQUENCE AS A FINE ART . . . . .	318
XXXVI. POLITICS AND HISTORY . . . . .	326
XXXVII. FRANCIS RAKOCZI . . . . .	334
XXXVIII. THE MORMONS . . . . .	342
XXXIX. THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE . . . . .	349
INDEX . . . . .	357

# ENGLISH BIOGRAPHY

# I

## LORD LYONS<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," October 11 and 18, 1913*

LORD LYONS was not a man of genius. It cannot even be said that he possessed any very conspicuously brilliant talents. But he was a great official. In the opinion of some who were highly qualified to judge he was the greatest ambassador who has represented this country in modern times. The full and deeply interesting account of Lord Lyons's career, which has now been given to the world, amply attests the validity of this claim. It is greatly to be hoped that this "record of British diplomacy," as Lord Newton has very aptly called it, will be carefully studied by all classes, and more especially by parliamentarians and diplomatists. The general reader may rise from a perusal of these pages without once feeling a sense of shame at the manner in which the affairs of his country have been conducted. He may occasionally criticise his trustees for supineness or want of foresight. Armed with the wisdom which comes from a knowledge of after-events, he may indicate mistakes which have been made, and golden opportunities which have heedlessly been allowed to

<sup>1</sup> *Lord Lyons*. By Lord Newton. London: Edward Arnold. [30s. net.]

escape. But however much he may be inclined to carp at the principle—carried, it must be admitted, at times to excess by Lord Granville, who enunciated it—that “it is always safer, or at least generally so, to do nothing,” he will, if he be impartial, recognise that the adoption of this same principle has not infrequently saved his country from the committal of the many grievous errors which may arise from undue haste and premature activity. Notably, moreover, the general reader may comfort himself with the reflection that the action of his country, even if mistaken, has always been scrupulously honest and straightforward. The vivid searchlight thrown by Lord Newton on the recent history of British diplomacy does not reveal a single feature which calls for the reprobation of the moralist. The record is an honourable record. Throughout the whole period of which it treats, British policy was directed to no unworthy ends. It was controlled by men who may at times have shown want of skill or judgment, but who were always animated by high motives.

It is, however, to parliamentarians that the study of Lord Lyons's life and career may more especially be commended. The mere word “diplomacy” appears at times to evoke the wrath and to excite the suspicions of the democracy; neither is it altogether surprising that those suspicions should be excited. It is not necessary to search the records of eighteenth-century unscrupulousness in order to be convinced of the fact that, even in far more recent times, there is some justification for the popular idea that diplomacy is morally tainted. The action of such men as Cavour and Bismarck can only be defended on the ground that the end justifies



the means, and that the ends which each of these statesmen sought to attain—namely, the unification respectively of Italy and Germany—were noble. “If,” Cavour himself said, “we had done for ourselves the things which we are doing for Italy, we should be great rascals.” Turgot thought that the morality of any corporate body was always inferior to that of individuals. Things have changed since his day, and it may well be that, with the comparatively higher standard of public morality which exists at present and which is to a great extent the outcome of increased publicity, Parliament collectively would shrink from taking action to which an individual, working in the privacy of his cabinet, might assent. Even from this point of view, however, it may reasonably be held that, apart from any personal scruples of conscience, a sufficient deterrent is at present exercised on the questionable proclivities of any individual by the necessity, which certainly awaits him, of having to defend his conduct in public.

These, however, are not the sole grounds on which diplomacy is suspected. It is very generally held that the diplomatist belongs to an aristocratic caste, that he is devoid of popular sympathies, and that he is impelled by personal ambition to gain a triumph over some foreign rival even at the cost of unwittingly doing an injury to the real interests of his own country. Indeed, judging by remarks which are sometimes made, it would appear that, in the eyes of many, the action of diplomatists is generally useless and at times even hurtful, inasmuch as the agent, whose chief mission in life should be to preserve peace amongst nations, is alleged to have often displayed, whether from design or ineptitude, a natural or acquired tendency to foster discord

and to promote war. A recent writer in the *Round Table* says with great truth: "The Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service have often been denounced of late in England, especially during times of European crisis, as an oligarchy of chess-players, disposing of the lives of men according to the rules of a game devised in days when policy and war were conducted by kings and courts." The remedy for this state of things, it is held, is to bring diplomacy more under the direct control of Parliament. It is perhaps too much to hope that these delusions will be dispelled, and the futility and even danger of the proposed change exposed by considerations based on the career of Lord Lyons. Nevertheless, that career assuredly affords food for reflection. Public confidence in the collective wisdom of Parliament does not at present stand very high. Notably, the most ardent advocate of free institutions cannot deny that the House of Commons has of late signally failed in the performance of one of its most important and special functions—that of controlling public expenditure. Any thinking man may therefore well pause before he consents to assign to a very heterogeneous corporate body those extremely delicate and difficult duties heretofore performed by such men as Lord Lyons and the late Lord Ampthill, to whose remarkable capacity ample testimony is incidentally afforded in Lord Newton's book. A single instance may, indeed, be cited of a British diplomatist who in recent years is suspected of having used his influence in the direction of promoting war rather than peace. Lord Stratford is very generally credited with a high degree of responsibility in having brought on the Crimean War. Even, however, if it be assumed that this accusation is well founded, it cannot

be said that Lord Stratford urged his unwilling countrymen along a path which they had no desire to follow. The worst that can be said of him is that he did nothing to resist the clamour for war, which was at the time almost universal. In any case, Lord Lyons was a diplomatist of a very different type. He felt strongly that his principal mission in life was to preserve peace.

He represented his country at Washington during a period of very exceptional difficulty. It cannot be doubted that it was largely due to his wisdom and calm judgment that, on the occasion of the *Trent* affair, the calamity of war between England and the United States was averted. It will be as well to cite the opinion of his character given by an American, who, to judge from his writings, was animated by no very friendly spirit towards England. Mr. Chittenden, in his *Recollections of President Lincoln*, says: "Lord Lyons was a model Englishman. His substantial frame and broad shoulders furnished a suitable support to a head well provided with solid sense. An open face and clear blue eyes indicated the sincere and generous character of the man, and his contempt for falsehood and meanness. He would have been accepted as an umpire by any contestant who relied upon justice and merit alone. He had the traditional love of the Anglo-Saxon for fair play."

After serving for some five years at Washington, he was transferred to Constantinople. Short as was his experience of the East, his rapid insight and strong common sense enabled him at once to hit upon two of the main sores of Oriental diplomatic life. He saw the evils of the dragoman system. He resolved from the first "to do the business himself as much as possible without

dragomans." Further, he "refused to take part in the dirty work by which European speculators are apt to get concessions out of the Turks."

But the real work of his life still lay before him. For twenty years he laboured unremittingly in the cause of peace at Paris. During the greater portion of that period the Government of France was in a state of unstable equilibrium. The question of whether the Legitimist, the Orleanist, the Bonapartist, the Moderate, or the Red Republican should gain the upper hand was still unsettled. Moreover, the French were smarting under a sense of defeat, and when they had recovered their strength with a rapidity which evoked the admiration of the world and were able to cast off the humiliating patronage extended to them from Berlin, they became restless and sensitive to a degree which rendered them very unquiet neighbours. It is specially worthy of note, as conveying a lesson which our own democracy might profitably take to heart, that one, and perhaps not the least, of the dangers which threatened the peace of the world during that period when, as Lord Granville said, the British Foreign Secretary was "constantly jumping from one nightmare to another," was due to the fact that, amongst the ephemeral Ministers who flitted across the French political stage, few possessed any solid knowledge of foreign affairs or had had any diplomatic experience. In nineteen years, Lord Lyons had to deal with twenty-one different French Foreign Ministers. In circumstances such as these it was not easy, to quote another of Lord Granville's felicitous expressions, "to glide back into cordiality." Lord Lyons, however, contributed probably more than any of his contemporaries towards preventing the lack of cordiality, which unfortunately

prevailed during his tenure of office, from producing any irremediable estrangement between the two countries. Looking to his remarkable success as a peacemaker, it will be profitable to inquire into his methods.

Lord Lyons, his biographer says, "was essentially a diplomatist of the old type," and Mrs. Wilfrid Ward, who has written a very interesting account of the habits and character of her great-uncle, says that he "belonged to a generation of Englishmen now long passed away. He was not of the type that makes the successful servant of the democracy." It may be so. Yet it is permissible to hope that Mrs. Wilfrid Ward takes an unduly desponding view of the qualities which are most calculated to command democratic confidence and sympathy. In spite of the modern tendency to self-advertisement, the desire to acquire notoriety or cheap and worthless applause, and the alleged necessity of appealing to ephemeral passion or sentiment, there does not appear to be any adequate justification for adopting the pessimistic view that self-effacement, unimpeachable honesty, devotion to duty, and calm judgment have altogether lost their hold on the majority of Englishmen. They are virtues whose light may for a time be eclipsed, but which cannot be extinguished. Sir Edward Grey possesses many of those characteristics which distinguished Lord Lyons. His pilotage of the ship of State through a period of great difficulty and even danger has gained the confidence of all classes, including apparently that of his most democratic followers.

Lord Lyons, in common, it may confidently be stated, with all the members of the service to which he belonged, was a non-party man. He served with equal zeal and devotion under Liberal

and under Conservative Foreign Secretaries. Lord Newton gives an account of some discreditable attempts, made in the first instance by Lord Clarendon, and in the second instance, on two occasions, by Mr. Gladstone, abetted by Lord Granville, to drag Lord Lyons into the arena of party strife by urging him to vote in the House of Lords. It is satisfactory to learn that, although he had to succumb to Lord Clarendon's insistence, he successfully resisted the pressure of Mr. Gladstone. The writer of the present article can testify, from his personal knowledge, to the view taken by the late Lord Salisbury on this subject. Lord Salisbury deprecated voting by peers who were also diplomatists even when they were quite ready and willing to vote.

Turning to personal characteristics, it may be said that the two dominating features of Lord Lyons's method were reticence and caution. He was a great believer in the virtue of silence. "I suppose," he wrote, during the *Trent* affair, whilst the issue of peace or war was still in suspense, and the fever of excitement was at its height, "that I am the only man in America who has expressed no opinion either on the International Law question or on the course which our Government will take." After residing for five years amongst a people more distinguished for hospitality than for reticence, he was able to say that he had "never taken a drink or made a speech." On the other hand, he was a good listener. When the exuberantly communicative M. Thiers proposed to him that "England, Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Spain should unite with France to check the aggression of Prussia and Russia," he wrote to Lord Granville, "I thought my prudent course was to listen and say nothing, which, as you know, is easy with him,

for he talks too well for one to be bored with him, and is quite content to talk without interruption." Sir Edward Blount called on him on one occasion and remarked that he had been able to overhear a conversation which had just taken place between Lord Lyons and M. Blowitz, the correspondent of the *Times*. "You might," Lord Lyons remarked, "have overheard what was said by M. Blowitz, but you would not have heard anything said by me, for the good reason that I said nothing at all!" He carried reticence so far that one is almost tempted to exclaim, with Wycherley, that "the silence of a wise man is more wrong to mankind than the slanderer's speech." Lord Lyons, however, thought otherwise. "I never volunteer advice," he said, and it was possibly because he never volunteered it that his opinion was so frequently sought.

His caution was on a par with his reticence. "I could not imagine him," Mrs. Wilfrid Ward writes, "ever acting on impulse, even in the matter of going downstairs." Anxious Ministers and diplomatists endeavoured in vain to elicit from him a premature hint as to his own opinions, or as to the policy his country was likely to adopt. In 1866, being then at Constantinople, the Grand Vizier and Ali Pasha called on him. They were "in very low spirits about the Paris Conference." M. de Moustier, the effervescent and volatile French Ambassador, had been "constantly frightening them." Lord Lyons, writing to Lord Clarendon, said that he "was willing to comfort them, but that he was determined not to say anything which might be interpreted by them as a pledge either from his Government or himself." In 1880, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire suggested to Lord Lyons that he should see more of M. Gambetta, whose character, he thought, would be

found "an interesting study," upon which Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Granville, "The study will not be a new one to me, and I am not sure that too apparent an intimacy between me and Gambetta would be viewed without jealousy." To cite another instance, in 1880 the Pope (Leo XIII.) was desirous that some sort of British agent should be installed at the Vatican. The proposal aroused a storm of indignation in the House of Commons, which was not altogether calmed by the characteristically Gladstonian explanation that the English word "Agent" was not the precise equivalent of the Italian word "Agente." The subject was mooted to Lord Lyons by the Papal Nuncio in Paris, but he was far too wary to be drawn into any expression of opinion. "Monsignor Czacki," he wrote to Lord Granville, "is a very great talker, which makes it easy to say very little in answer to him, and I took full advantage of the facility for being conveniently silent which this afforded to me." Even at the request of his Sovereign he declined to abandon his habitual reserve. Lord Newton gives the answer which Lord Lyons sent to a wish expressed by Queen Victoria that he would state his opinion on the Treaty of Berlin. It is a model of respectful evasion. It is perhaps almost needless to add that not only was Lord Lyons constitutionally truthful, but also that he considered untruthfulness to be bad diplomacy. General Ignatieff, he said, "would be an admirable diplomatist if he were only a little more veracious." To these qualifications it may be added that Lord Lyons's irreproachable standard of conduct and morals in private life invested him with the authority which is always accorded to men of exceptionally high character. The sense of humour, which was strong within him, must



have been keenly gratified when he learnt that the chief entry on his *dossier* at the Paris Prefecture de Police was, "On ne lui connaît pas de vice."

Such, therefore, were the main characteristics of this eminent and typically British diplomatist. They secured the affection of those who served under him. They elicited the admiration and commanded the confidence of those under whom he served. They eventually led Lord Salisbury to offer him the post of Foreign Secretary, which he very wisely declined to accept. Is it probable that under any new dispensation it will be possible to find better guarantees for the preservation of peace and for the maintenance of the honour and dignity of England than those which can be secured by following the example set by Lord Lyons, and by respecting the traditions which he has bequeathed to his successors? Assuredly not. In spite of the advance of democracy, diplomacy "of the old type" still holds the field, and it will be an evil day for England when its practices and methods are abandoned.

The letters published in Lord Newton's work throw some very interesting sidelights upon the diplomatic history of the last half of the nineteenth century, but it cannot be said that they contain anything of a nature to reverse or seriously modify the judgments which posterity has already passed upon the main issues of the period. Attention may, however, be specially drawn to the very interesting correspondence, conducted through the medium of Lord Augustus Loftus, which took place between Prince Bismarck and Lord Clarendon in 1870. The efforts, now revealed for the first time, made by Lord Clarendon to preserve the peace of the world proved unsuccessful, but they do credit to himself and to British diplomacy.

Great as were the services rendered to his country by Lord Lyons at Paris, his conduct of British relations with the United States during the American Civil War was perhaps even more meritorious. It is especially interesting to note the main reason which, in Lord Lyons's opinion, prevented the calamity of a fratricidal war between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The whole of this episode is not one on which either Americans or Englishmen can look back with unmixed pride or satisfaction. The Americans were not unnaturally exasperated and disappointed at the sympathy shown in England for the cause of the Southern Slave States. They certainly exaggerated the amount of that sympathy. They mistook the utterances of the *Times* for the voice of a united people. The *Times*, President Lincoln told Sir William Russell, "is the most powerful thing in the world, except perhaps the Mississippi." The attitude taken up by the *Times* at that period in connection with American affairs was, indeed, little less than a national misfortune, but there was not anything like the unanimity of anti-Northern feeling which was generally supposed in America to exist. On the contrary, it is probable that the great majority of the people of the United Kingdom never wavered in their sympathies for the North. The Americans, however, greatly resented the action taken by Lord Palmerston's Government, at an early stage of the war, in acknowledging the Southerners as belligerents, and their exasperation was increased by a speech made, at a later period, by Mr. Gladstone.

Lord Morley says somewhere that it is more difficult for a man engaged in public life to shake himself free of a false reputation than it is to

acquire a true one. The remark is singularly applicable to Mr. Gladstone in so far as his conduct of foreign affairs is concerned. The idea which prevailed in his day, and which has to some extent floated down the tide of history, is that his behaviour, in dealing with foreign nations, was pusillanimous. A more incorrect appreciation of character has probably never been formed. Mr. Gladstone, indeed, rarely made an incursion into the domain of foreign affairs without doing more harm than good, but his mistakes were not due to pusillanimity. On the contrary, it is probable that a more courageous man than Mr. Gladstone never lived. Those who were most brought in contact with him were at times left under the impression that, if he once got astride of a principle which roused his moral enthusiasm, he was quite capable of pursuing it with an ardour which took no heed of consequences. His mistakes were due, not to pusillanimity, but rather to rashness, to ignorance of foreign affairs, and to inability to calculate the effect likely to be produced by his acts and language on people of other countries with whose aspirations and habits of thought he was unfamiliar. In the present instance, he gave the world a foretaste of that fatal and impulsive eloquence which was at subsequent periods to tell the savage dervishes of the Sudan that they were a nation "rightly struggling to be free," and to apostrophise the empire of Austria with the words "Hands off!" For reasons which appear by the light of after-events singularly inadequate, public opinion in England, after the defeat of the Northern army at Bull Run, rushed to the conclusion that the cause of the North was doomed. Even military men, until warned of their error by Sir William Russell,

whose experience and trained intelligence speedily led him to the conclusion that victory must ultimately lie with the North, appear for the moment to have forgotten that Providence is on the side of the big battalions, and to have thought that skill and heroism could atone for want of numbers. Hastily adopting these views, Mr. Gladstone gave a most unfortunate stimulus to the exasperation of the North by announcing that Mr. Jefferson Davis and his associates had not only created an army and a navy, but had also "made a nation." The explanation subsequently given, for a knowledge of which we are indebted to Lord Morley, does credit to Mr. Gladstone's candour, but is absolutely condemnatory of his foresight and judgment. "I really," he said, "though most strangely, believed that it was an act of friendliness to all America to recognize that the struggle was virtually at an end."

Whilst the political atmosphere was dangerously charged with electricity a particularly truculent officer of the United States navy forcibly removed from a British mail steamer two envoys from the Southern States who were proceeding on a mission to Europe. If, so far, America had had some reason to complain of England, the tables were now completely turned. The act committed by Captain Wilkes was manifestly not only illegal, but in the highest degree insulting. Unless his conduct was disowned and the envoys liberated, war was inevitable. Pending the settlement of the question, nothing could exceed the folly of a section of the American public. "Captain Wilkes," Lord Newton says, "sprang at once into the position of a national hero. Congress passed a vote of thanks to him; he was banqueted, toasted, serenaded, and shortly became an Admiral. A

member of the Government, Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, noted for his hostility to England, distinguished himself by officially congratulating Captain Wilkes on his heroic conduct."

In the midst of all this turmoil, the taciturn but very wise representative of England at Washington at once perceived the main source of danger. Even before the affair of the *Trent* occurred, he had written to Lord Russell, "One of the great difficulties I have to contend with in my endeavour to keep the Government within such bounds as may render the maintenance of peace possible is the persuasion which prevails even with sensible men that *no* outrage will compel England to make a war with the North." When the danger became imminent, Lord Lyons saw clearly enough that the main chance for preserving the peace lay in dispelling this delusion. With infinite tact, without the least semblance of menace, but with unwavering firmness, he intimated that whilst ready and willing to make a golden bridge for his opponents on all minor points, the only chance of avoiding war was to comply with the main demands which he was authorised to make on behalf of the British Government. His treatment of the subject was eminently successful. The voices of sober-thinking Americans began to pierce through the froth and bombast which lay on the surface of society. Mr. Seward, who was Secretary of State, and who had before been "disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity by displaying violence to England," was sobered in the presence of the reality of the danger. Henceforth, he became an advocate for peace, and his relations with Lord Lyons improved to such an extent that they eventually parted with mutual expressions of esteem and goodwill. The United States Govern-

ment yielded, and from that time forth, although Lord Lyons had to use all his tact and judgment to settle numerous difficulties, some of which were caused by the vagaries and culpable indiscretions of his own Consuls, all really serious danger of a breach between the two nations disappeared.

At no previous period of our history has the warning conveyed by the whole of this episode been of deeper import than at present. A school of politicians has grown up who appear to be scared by what is termed the growth of militarism to such an extent as to hold that the best means to ensure the maintenance of peace is to make but scanty preparation for war. The argument appears to be that the creation of armaments necessarily leads to the ascendancy of military influence in the councils of the State, and that when those armaments are once created, the temptation to make use of them for purposes of offence will be irresistible. There is just so much truth in this plea that the necessity of keeping soldiers and sailors in their places, as merely the executive arm to carry out the decisions of statesmen and politicians, should be very fully recognised. But to jump from this to the conclusion that it is preferable to incur the risks inherent in weakness rather than to rely on the security derived from strength, is assuredly not only one of the most illogical, but also one of the most dangerous delusions that ever entered into the heads of dreamy doctrinaires. It is instructive to learn what was the view entertained by Lord Lyons on this subject. His practical mind and sturdy common sense at once led him to have recourse to the time-honoured and profoundly true maxim that those who wish for peace should prepare for war. Recognising that, in the then

temper of the American public, words without deeds would produce but little effect, he begged the British Government, whilst the *Trent* affair was still under discussion, to strengthen the garrison of Canada, and, when the crisis was happily over, he wrote to Lord Russell, "I cannot disguise from myself that the real cause of the yielding was nothing more or less than the military preparations in England." Never did this ardent lover of peace do greater service in the cause which he had at heart than when he dwelt on the imminent risk of war and supported his words by insisting on preparations being made to meet that risk in the event of his pacific efforts proving unsuccessful.

When Lord Lyons arrived in Paris in 1867, the Second Empire was already tottering to its fall. The Prefect of Police was obliged to adopt artificial means in order to invest the Emperor with a spurious popularity. Detectives were dressed up as workmen, with orders to shake hands with the Imperial autocrat. Even if the *coup de grâce* had not been administered by the Prussian army, it is scarcely conceivable that the Napoleonic *régime* would have lasted for long. Lord Lyons recognised the defects of a system which received a fitting epitaph in General Fleury's remark, "Pourtant nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés." Thiers, as is well known, called the Emperor "une grande incapacité méconnue." Prince Bismarck said that he was "a muddle-headed fellow." Lord Lyons was far too cautious to indulge in epigram, but although he liked the Emperor, and believed in his friendship for England, he does not appear to have entertained any very high opinion of his ability.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that Lord

Lyons's correspondence confirms the general accuracy of the history of the final crash which has been given by De La Gorce and others. Prince Bismarck's treatment of France prior to 1870 was in reality very similar to that which he accorded to Austria prior to 1866. On both occasions he was bent on war. At a later period of his life he informed one of Lord Clarendon's daughters that "never in the whole course of his life had he been so relieved as when her father died," and he then proceeded to explain that "had Lord Clarendon lived, there never would have been a Franco-German war." Nothing could divert this man of iron will from his purpose, but in both cases he made very determined efforts, one of which was completely successful, to throw upon others the responsibility which in reality rested wholly on himself. So early as 1865, he said to the Italian Minister at Berlin, "*Soyez tranquilles, nous aurons la guerre, et je me fais fort d'amener la grande confusion qui l'assurera.*" Accordingly war ensued, and Austria was humbled. A very similar process was adopted in 1869-70, but in this case Prussian diplomacy was aided by the extraordinary rashness and folly of the French Government in its treatment of the Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne. The world in general—and notably Mr. Gladstone and the House of Commons, which latter body, in Lord Granville's words, got "very angry"—was led to believe that the responsibility for the war lay, not on the shoulders of the relentless Minister who pulled the strings from his office at Berlin, but on those of the excitable nation which had fallen a victim to his manœuvres. Prince Bismarck's proceedings, however open to criticism in detail at the hands of a moralist, may find some justification in the



eyes of a politician from the consideration that, looking to the views entertained at Paris on the subject of the incorporation of the South German States, the noble project of creating a United Germany could probably never have been realised save at the cost of war with France.

Limitations of space preclude the possibility of dealing adequately with the diplomatic history of the period which ensued after the close of the Franco-Prussian war. To those who can remember the circumstances of that eventful and, in many respects, highly critical time, the evidence afforded by Lord Lyons's letters constitutes a striking comment on the comical diatribes then frequently levelled against England by the inspired press of the Continent as being the principal disturber of the peace of Europe. The misrepresentations of English policy, which were at that time so frequent, were not due to spontaneous Anglophobia so much as to the spurious public opinion created by Prince Bismarck's desire to make England "the lightning conductor" of all the hatred and jealousy simmering on the Continent of Europe. Never has there been a more illuminating illustration of the fable of the wolf and the lamb. There was, indeed, one disturber of the peace. He sat enthroned, not in London, but at Berlin. The idea that a European coalition might be formed which would be hostile to Germany weighed like a nightmare on Prince Bismarck. Hence all his efforts were directed to sowing dissensions between other Powers, and notably between France, England, and Russia. Prince Bismarck may have been a bad European, but he was unquestionably a good German.

Lord Newton has been unable to resist the temptation to which so many historians and

biographers have succumbed, that, namely, of using the history of the past as a vehicle for presenting his own opinions on the affairs of the present. Notably, in spite of his affection for Lord Lyons, who was an orthodox Free Trader, he never misses an opportunity of anathematising those who are misguided enough to adhere to Free Trade doctrines. It may be doubted whether such an extremely difficult and complex subject as Retaliation can be adequately treated in a few *obiter dicta* let fall in the course of a discussion on wholly different subjects. This blemish does not, however, detract from the debt of gratitude which the public, and more especially the political and diplomatic public, owe to Lord Newton for compiling a most interesting contribution to contemporary history and literature. He has enlivened the seriousness of the subject of which he treats by occasional bright and amusing sallies. It was not, for instance, to be expected that the "guileless" Mr. Hammond, whose most unfortunate forecast of the course of European politics in 1870 will long live in the traditions of the Foreign Office, should escape a passing shaft from Lord Newton's quiver. He is described as "a man who seemed marked out to add to the gaiety of nations."

## II

### LORD NORTH <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," November 8, 1913*

IF any Englishman possessing a casual acquaintance with the history of his own country were asked what he knew of Lord North, the reply would probably be that he was a Minister who habitually wore the blue ribbon of the Garter—a practice which led a witty Frenchman to say to the Duchess of Gloucester, "Pourquoi l'a-t-il, lui ? Est-ce pour avoir perdu l'Amérique ?"—that even the thunderous oratory of Burke often failed to rouse him from the peaceful slumbers in which he was wont to indulge when seated on the Treasury Bench, that he was mainly responsible for the loss of the American Colonies, and that towards the close of a career chiefly distinguished for placidity of temper and political failure he entered into a short-lived and singularly unfortunate arrangement with his former political opponents, and thus gave rise to one of the most frequently quoted, and also one of the most frequently misapplied, of Lord Beaconsfield's pungent aphorisms. It is singular that up to the present time no biography should have been written of a Minister who presided over the

<sup>1</sup> *Lord North, 1732-1792.* By Reginald Lucas. London : Arthur J. Humphreys. [21s.]

destinies of England during one of the most momentous periods of her history—a period when, the Duke of Bolton said, “everything was at sea except the British fleet.” Mr. Lucas has now supplied this want. He is eminently fitted to deal with the subject. In the first place, he possesses one of the most indispensable qualifications of a biographer—a cordial but not excessive sympathy with the subject of his biography; to which may be added a very thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the history of the period with which he deals. Mr. Lucas’s tendencies are manifestly Tory. Now, although, as in the case of Irish affairs, Lord North occasionally showed reforming proclivities, no serious doubt can, from a Tory point of view, be thrown on the sturdy political orthodoxy of a statesman who at the close of a long and eventful career could say that “he did not remember a single popular measure he had ever voted for.” Mr. Lucas’s political sympathies, however, so far from being a defect, are a merit. It is, indeed, rather questionable whether his final verdict that Lord North “must be measured with the first-class men” will meet with the universal consent of historical students. It may be contrasted with the view expressed by that staunch old Whig, Lord Russell, who said that “every fault except personal dishonesty may justly be imputed to Lord North.” However this may be, there is certainly some force in the complaint made by Mr. Fortescue, another eminent and distinctly Tory historian, that, in dealing with eighteenth-century history, the Whigs have up to the present time had it rather too much their own way. The seeker after truth, even if he may not always fully agree, may therefore welcome the appearance of a Tory counter-blast; whilst even many

bred in Whig traditions will not be inclined to cavil at Mr. Lucas's meritorious attempt to dethrone Charles Fox from the exalted but undeserved pedestal on which he has been placed by the excessive adulation of those who have inherited his political principles. Mr. Lucas, moreover, possesses other qualifications no less indispensable in this particular case; notably, a keen sense of humour and a hearty appreciation of some of the really fine traits which, amidst much that is open to criticism, occasionally cropped up in the character of Lord North. Now that the passions of the moment have passed away, the most rancorous critic will hardly be disposed to deny some measure of posthumous fame to a man whom so good a judge of companionship as Gibbon described as "one of the best companions in the Kingdom," and of whom Wraxall said that he was "personally beloved" not only by his adherents but also by his political opponents. Some sterling and altruistic public spirit must also have animated the mind of a statesman sufficiently careless of his own reputation to have said that "he wished the time was come for his being abused for having made a disgraceful peace"; and who begged that "superlative jackanapes," as the scurrilous Walpole called Lord Auckland, to abuse him personally as much as he liked, but not to take a step which might injure public interests.

It cannot be said that Mr. Lucas throws any strikingly fresh light on the history of the period with which he deals, but he gathers together very lucidly the threads of the pitiful story which led to the disastrous war in America, and enables us to distribute political responsibility for the disasters. In a sense it may be said that the responsibility lay, not with any individuals, but

with the nation at large. To the present generation it may seem almost a mockery to talk of public opinion at a time when the press was more or less muzzled, when seats in Parliament "were advertised for sale like yachts and grouse-moors," when a "lonely mound" like Old Sarum sent a member to Westminster, when another member was a turnspit in the King's kitchen, and when Sir George Savile could say that "he had been elected in Lord Rockingham's dining-room." Nevertheless, Wraxall was probably right when he wrote "No influence of the Court could have kept the support of the House of Commons if the nation had been really opposed." Although failure eventually made the American war unpopular, the nation was in the first instance not opposed to the policy adopted by George III. and his Ministers. America required protection against foreign enemies. What could be more reasonable than to ask that America should bear a portion of the financial burden necessarily involved in that protection? The legal right to tax was practically unquestionable, and the total abandonment of that right was, at the time, an idea which would have been generally scouted by all classes. "To most of the politicians and statesmen of that age," Mr. Lucas says, "sovereignty and the right to tax were synonymous."

Although, however, the validity of the principle was ratified by the voice of public opinion, the question of whether the right of taxation should or should not be exercised lay wholly within the discretion of the Government. The political instincts and sound common sense of Sir Robert Walpole led him summarily to reject the idea of taxing the Colonies. George III. was less wise. On him more than on any other individual rests the responsibility for the adoption of the policy

which led to the American war. From the first moment he held that what the Americans really wanted was complete independence, and to the day of his death he maintained that the greatest political mistake he had ever made was, not the assertion of the right to tax, but the repeal of the Stamp Act, to which he reluctantly consented in 1765. In Lord North he found an instrument admirably suited to execute the policy of which he approved. Grenville was thoroughly wrong-headed but stubborn. He bored the King to distraction, but on one occasion, in 1783, he "succeeded, as no other Minister was ever destined to succeed, in bringing his Majesty into helpless and humiliating submission." North possessed far more judgment and political sagacity than Grenville, but he was pliant; and, moreover, his skill in debate enabled him to defend the King's case in Parliament with arguments which, though far from irrefutable, were always plausible. Lord North's letters to the King have most unfortunately been lost. They were lent to Lord Brougham, who mislaid them, and they have never been recovered. But enough may be gathered from the letters which the King addressed to North, and which have been preserved, to enable posterity to see that the luckless Minister lived under the iron rule of a relentless taskmaster. His personal views were often sound and statesmanlike, but, Mr. Lucas remarks, "putting opinions into practice was what he did not love." He acted persistently on the maxim which Ovid puts into the mouth of Medea, "*Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor.*" He was a weak man. His absence of moral strength of purpose contrasted strangely with the robust physical courage which he displayed on many occasions. "Vacillation," Mr. Lucas

says, "was his besetting sin." The masterful King, who was a shrewd judge of men, correctly gauged his character when he said that "Lord North was a man composed of entirely negative qualities, and actuated in every instance by a desire of present ease at the risk of future difficulty."

Mr. Lucas has very rightly judged that it is impossible to understand or appreciate the career of Lord North without a full comprehension of the character of the King. He has therefore drawn one of the best sketches of that remarkable monarch which have yet appeared. It is impossible not to admire the courage and strength of character of George III. "England was being smothered with enemies." The English generals, according to the classic saying which, Wraxall says, emanated, not from Lord North, but from Sir Robert Walpole, were a cause of fear to their employers rather than to their enemies; and, moreover, many of them, as in the case of Howe, had no heart for the work in which they were engaged. Admirals such as Saunders and Keppel allowed party politics to outweigh pride in their profession, and deprecated any increase of naval strength. Intrigue, dissension, and even disorder were rife at home. Yet the steadfast courage of the King never wavered. It is, moreover, impossible to withhold a tribute of respect for a monarch who roundly rated a clergyman for eulogising him from the pulpit, on the ground that "he went to church to hear God praised, not himself," and who was generous, or, at all events, wise enough to put his pride in his pocket and to accord the welcome of a gentleman to the first American Minister who was accredited to his Court. Nevertheless, the general impression derived from all we know of the character of the



King, as depicted by Mr. Lucas and others, is the reverse of pleasing, whilst even allowing for a certain amount of prejudice on the part of Whig historians, his claims to superior statesmanship, which have been advanced at times, can certainly not be substantiated. He did, indeed, express a wish that what he regarded as the political sins of Chatham should not be visited on the heads of that statesman's innocent family, for whom he was willing to provide; but the annoyance shown when Parliament voted a public funeral and monument in Westminster Abbey for his most illustrious subject shows a petty vindictiveness carried beyond the grave, which is unquestionably despicable. Of his duplicity there can be as little doubt as of the remorseless ingratitude which he showed to many of those who had served him well both in the field and in the Council Chamber; but it may be urged that gratitude is rarely a royal virtue, whilst the duplicity of the King was certainly no greater than that of Franklin, who has been honoured by posterity with a reputation of stern and stainless republican morality. In one capacity, to which both Sir G. Trevelyan and Mr. Lucas draw special attention, he certainly excelled. He was a consummate and very active electioneering agent. When a Windsor election was pending, he wrote, "I shall order the houses I rent at Windsor to stand in the parish rates in different names of my servants, so that it will create six votes," and Mr. Lucas adds: "His Majesty canvassed diligently. In and out of the mercers' shops he trotted, muttering in his hurried way, 'The Queen wants a gown, wants a gown; no Keppel, no Keppel.'" The late Lord Beaconsfield, with possibly an eye to the leading characteristics of his great rival and

opponent, once expressed a doubt whether "good men" could with advantage be trusted with the management of public affairs. The remark is cynical, and should perhaps not be taken too seriously. Nevertheless, the history of England towards the close of the eighteenth century affords strong grounds for holding that good intentions, honesty of purpose, and a high standard of morality in private life cannot supply the place of intelligence and sound statesmanship. George III. was good, but obstinate. Lord North was good, but weak. The combination of the two in power went perilously near wrecking the British Empire. The King's obstinacy was shown in holding to a faulty policy long after its folly and impracticability had been clearly demonstrated by the stern logic of facts. The Minister's weakness was shown in allowing himself for a long term of years to become the leading instrument in carrying out a policy of which he saw the unwisdom, in futile attempts to shake himself free from a bondage under which he writhed, and in querulous complaints that he should be held responsible for measures which did not originate when he was in power, but were really fathered by his predecessors, notably by the brilliant but wholly unprincipled Townshend.

The second great political episode in the career of Lord North was the formation of the famous coalition in 1783. This shameless arrangement, which has probably been more severely criticised than any political combination recorded in English history, was mainly engineered by Wedderburn—subsequently Lord Loughborough—"the pert prim prater of the Northern race," who formed the subject of Churchill's biting sarcasms, and who has been immortalised by an oft-quoted but singularly self-contradictory

phrase struck off in the heat of political controversy by Junius. When that mysterious author said that "there was something about Wedderburn that even treachery could not trust," he sacrificed the correctness of his trope to his love of epigram; he must have forgotten that treacherous people are naturally but little inclined to place any trust in the loyalty of others. Lord Beaconsfield's dictum that "England does not love coalitions" only gives utterance to a partial truth. Everything depends upon the basis upon which the coalition rests. There have in more recent times been coalitions of political opponents which have proved durable, and which have been beneficial to the public interests. They have been based on the fact that former opponents recognised the necessity of union in order to defend some political principle of first-rate importance, such as Free Trade or opposition to Home Rule in Ireland, as to which they were agreed. In 1783 no such principle was at stake. Love of office formed the real basis of the coalition. The death of Rockingham and the dislike generally entertained towards Shelburne afforded the opportunity for gratifying that love if only the rival claimants could bury the hatchet, and pass a sponge over the virulent vituperation with which they had but a short time previously denounced each other. A ship launched under such auspices deserved to be wrecked, and the wreck was speedy and complete. As to North himself, it appears that throughout his career it was his fate always to be dominated by some will stronger than his own. In deserting his former master, he merely exchanged one servitude for another. He became the tool of Fox, and when, after a short interval, the star of the young statesman who was to rule England for twenty-

two years rose on the horizon, he sank into political insignificance. The blindness which eventually afflicted him throws a piteous and touching veil over the declining years of one who was certainly not a great statesman, but whose career and character are, on the whole, more calculated to excite sympathy and kindly comment than sharp criticism or severe condemnation.

### III

## LORD CLARENDON<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," November 15, 1913*

LORD CLARENDON'S life covers the first seventy years of the last century. Some of the most important events with which he was connected during the close of his career are fresh in the memory of many who are still living. None the less, the period of his activity is from a political, and, although to a less extent, from a social, point of view so remote that it may almost be classed as ancient history. Lord Clarendon was already a sexagenarian when Lord Beaconsfield displayed the full power of his destructive genius. He was in his grave when Mr. Gladstone shattered to atoms whatever remained of the old party system. The former held that the best way to rehabilitate the Conservative Party was to annihilate Conservatism. The latter, to use an apt phrase of Lord Goschen's, rendered horizontal the cleavage of society which had formerly been vertical. From the time of his conversion to Home Rule, the political line of separation has coincided, broadly speaking, with that of caste and class. Armed with the enlightenment which

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Letters of the Fourth Earl of Clarendon.* By Sir Herbert Maxwell, Bart. 2 vols. London: Edward Arnold. [30s.]

comes from a knowledge of after-events, we can now see that which was hidden from the eyes of Lord Clarendon and most of his contemporaries. We can realise that whilst the Tory and Whig aristocracies were disputing for power and place under the impression that they differed widely on vital points of principle, their divergent views were in the main confined to the methods best adapted for giving effect to a principle as to which both were wholly agreed. That principle was that it was desirable to stem, so far as was possible, the rising tide of democracy. Lord Clarendon was a typical Whig, and a strong party man. "Allegiance to party," he said, "is the only strong political feeling I have." In some respects he was rather more liberal than many of his associates. So early as 1846 he was in favour of admitting Mr. Cobden into the Cabinet—a proposal which was at the time regarded by many as almost revolutionary. But his general political creed would have been pronounced thoroughly orthodox even by so steadfast a pillar of Toryism as Lord Eldon. "I consider," he said, "the Monarchy, the House of Lords, and the Established Church as bound up together, and the whole as the most perfect of the various imperfections called Governments." He objected strongly to the proposal made by Lord John Russell in 1858 to add a million to the number of electors, on the ground that such a measure would "swamp property and intelligence," and, as to the ballot, he considered that it was the "greatest of abominations." But in spite of the fact that Tories and Whigs were substantially, though perhaps unconsciously, aiming at much the same object, they fought with each other as keenly as if they had been separated by political principles as widely divergent as

those which divide, for instance, the present Lord Halsbury from a Socialist demagogue declaiming from a platform to a Hyde Park audience. Moreover, the politicians of the time appear to have been singularly tenacious of their several opinions. Within the same Cabinet the din of dialectical strife was frequently heard. The historical student becomes almost bewildered at the number of resignations or threats of resignation which Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell launched at each other and at their respective colleagues, whilst it is recorded in Mr. Delane's memoirs that Lord Palmerston informed him that "he had set the library chimney at Broadlands on fire in the process of burning Gladstone's letters of resignation." The Queen at one time pathetically remarked, "Lord John Russell may resign, and Lord Aberdeen may resign, but I *can't* resign. I sometimes wish I could!"

Lord Clarendon enjoyed most of those things which contribute to make life pleasant—rank and high position, an adequate though not abundant income, interesting work, the society of men and women of light and leading, and a home in which the domestic virtues were warmly cherished. He carried his good fortune beyond the grave. He has been singularly happy in his biographer. None but one who is himself *porphyrogenitus* could faithfully depict the proceedings and aspirations of the *porphyrogeniti* who then held sway in England. Sir Herbert Maxwell, with true literary instinct, very wisely decided not to resuscitate an oft-told tale from ponderous official despatches and worm-eaten memoirs, but to rely mainly on private written intercourse in order to present a vivid picture of Lord Clarendon and his times. The material was abundant. Lord Clarendon was himself a copious writer. His epistolary

style gained a high encomium from so good a literary critic as Charles Greville. But Lord Clarendon's letters do not stand alone. Sir Herbert Maxwell deserves the deepest gratitude of all lovers of literature for reproducing the vivacious utterances of his numerous female correspondents. Miss Jane Porter, for instance, was horror-struck at the idea of a railroad being run through the historic domains of Kenilworth, and implored Lord Clarendon in the name of "our Henrys, our Edwards" with their "knightly jousts" and "our queenly Elizabeth," to "say No!!! to the vile, sordid, levelling, and oblivion-making intentions of those wretched gnomes of the earth and their strange volcanic apparatus." But Sir H. Maxwell reproduces the correspondence of a more lively and discursive letter-writer than even this distinguished lady. Miss Emily Eden was a whole-hearted Whig, and never missed an opportunity of anathematising "those horrid Tories." Her letters, which are rarely dated, sparkle with genuine feminine wit. Allusion can here only be made to a few choice gems. At one time she expresses an earnest hope that "the wives of political men would hold their tongues or elope." At another, she meets a royal party out shooting in Richmond Park, and remarks that the Duke of Cambridge reminds her of "our dear lost Henry VIII., of course minus his six wives." She meets Mr. Gladstone, and writes: "He does not converse—he harangues—and the more he says the more I don't understand. . . . He is not frivolous enough for me; if he were soaked in boiling water and rinsed till he was twisted into a rope, I do not suppose a drop of fun would ooze out." After the Hyde Park riots in 1866, she writes to Lord Clarendon, "When we are hanging demagogues, would you mind a small inexpensive



gibbet for Layard ? ” and she gives utterance to the witticism, generally attributed to Lady Morley, that she “ could not forgive Nineveh for discovering Layard.” She had an interview with Charles Greville, and says that he “ was crosser than any number of tongs. If he had not been deaf his visit would have been charming from the finished perfection of crossness.” It is clear that so recently as the days of Lord Clarendon the eminently feminine art of letter-writing was not extinct.

Lord Clarendon occupied many posts of importance, but his fame rests chiefly on his career as a diplomatist. He had, indeed, many qualities which specially fitted him for the work of diplomacy, amongst others, an agreeable presence, perfect manners, and linguistic knowledge. When, on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s marriage, a communication from Baron Stockmar had to be considered, it was found that Lord Clarendon was the only member of the Cabinet who could read a German letter. Moreover, he had a natural talent for composing quarrels, and it was one that stood him in good stead, for, apart from periodical Cabinet dissensions, the relations between the Ministers and the Crown were at times subjected to a very severe strain. Lord John Russell complained in 1853 that he had passed five years engaged in “ a most harassing warfare ”—that of being “ umpire between Windsor and Broadlands.” It was not without good reason that Lady Clarendon proudly recorded in her journal, “ What good George does by his tact and good feeling, and how he smooths rough edges ! ”

Turning to the policy which Lord Clarendon favoured during the course of his career, it is very necessary to bear in mind the wise and charitable

maxim laid down by Goethe. "One need only," he said, "grow old to become more gentle in one's judgments. I see no fault committed that I could not have committed myself." In truth, it must be owned that in respect to many of the most important affairs with which he had to deal subsequent events have proved that Lord Clarendon was mistaken. Lord Palmerston made many mistakes, but, if for no other reason, he will be remembered as a statesman who contributed greatly to the accomplishment of one of the most beneficial world-reforms effected during the nineteenth century, namely, the making of Italy. Lord Clarendon showed no such political prescience. His sympathies during the Italian struggle were decidedly pro-Austrian. Neither did he believe in the possibility of creating an united Italy. Nevertheless, he rendered admirable service to his country on many occasions. The confidence which he inspired in the mind of Napoleon III. counted for much in maintaining good relations with France during a critical period, and his conduct of the negotiations at the close of the Crimean war was most skilful. When he erred, he generally did so in good company. In common with most of the statesmen of his time, he thought that the Southern States of America would gain their independence. His opposition to the construction of the Suez Canal was fully shared by Lord Palmerston. The anathemas which in writing to his sister he launched against "the old women in Downing Street" because they would not take vigorous measures to crush the Carlist revolt in Spain were merely the outpourings of a young and inexperienced diplomatist who had to discover, as many of his successors have subsequently discovered, that the British Government often has

no particular policy, and that occasionally their wholly negative and ambiguous attitude is not altogether devoid of wisdom. It is more difficult to account for or to excuse his despondent view as regards the future of India on the occasion of the Mutiny. "The Queen," he wrote to Lady Clarendon, "has not the same apprehension that I have of losing our Indian Empire; she believes that with time and money we shall reconquer the country. I don't." His pessimism, on this and on other occasions, contrasts somewhat unfavourably with the buoyant and boisterous confidence displayed by Lord Palmerston in the ability of the country to weather all storms and to make head against a sea of troubles. On the whole, however, Sir H. Maxwell is quite justified in saying that Lord Clarendon was "a single-minded, experienced servant of the State." The weighty influence which he certainly exerted was due in part to his abilities, but still more to his high character. The Athenian Isocrates told his countrymen that "nothing is so persuasive as a character which is felt to be upright," and all the world believed in Lord Clarendon's immaculate uprightness.

Sir H. Maxwell does not appear to have had access to the correspondence which took place between Prince Bismarck and Lord Clarendon prior to the war of 1870, and which is given in Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lyons*. The praiseworthy efforts then made by Lord Clarendon to preserve the peace of Europe do credit to his good intentions, but it must be admitted that the arguments which he used were not of a nature calculated to produce much effect on the inflexible Chancellor of Germany.

## IV

### EDWARD BULWER<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," December 6, 1913*

WHATEVER views may be held as to the character and career of Edward Bulwer, there can be but one opinion as to the merits of his biographer. Notably, Lord Lytton's life of his grandfather is distinguished for its sturdy moral courage. It required qualities of no common order to cast aside the tie of ancestry to such an extent as to present to the public a dispassionate and detailed account of the tragic domestic feuds which embittered the lives of his grandparents and cast a shadow on the early career of his father. But it was impossible to omit all allusion to these wretched quarrels, and if the story were told at all it was well that it should be told without reserve. It must have cost Lord Lytton much pain to have written many of the pages of this biography. The most considerate course a reviewer can adopt is not to revive that pain by dwelling on this distressful subject. This much may, however, be said. Lord Lytton remarks with truth that the whole episode "affords a study of human nature of the utmost value."

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Edward Bulwer, First Lord Lytton.* By his grandson, the Earl of Lytton. 2 vols. London: Macmillan & Co. [30s. net.]

Perhaps not the least useful lesson to be derived from that study is that the feelings of an angry woman are not likely to be soothed by the receipt of lengthy and discursive letters, however great may be their literary merit.

Bulwer's political and literary career is a more fitting subject for public comment. The biography of a man who said of himself that at the age of seven his "airy soul had hovered over Hippocrene, strayed through Corycian caverns, and inhaled the fragrance of the blossoms that fell from the garlands of the vine"; who studied metaphysics at the age of eight, and asked his mother whether she "was not sometimes overcome by the sense of her own identity"; who had lived with gipsies, was present when the gipsy queen had broiled hedgehog for dinner, and fell in love first with a gipsy beauty, then with Lady Caroline Lamb, and somewhat later with a young lady who was a member of an ancient French Royalist family; who at one time belonged to the "Rosicrucian Brotherhood," and entertained some quavering belief in magic; who in his old age became a Cabinet Minister; who was even considered as a possible candidate for the throne of Greece; and who was eventually buried in Westminster Abbey, cannot fail to present many highly interesting features. One of the most celebrated comic poems of ancient Greece relates the deeds of a man of whom it was said that "Many arts he knew, and he knew them all badly" (Πόλλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα). It would be flagrantly unjust to apply the whole of this withering epigram to Bulwer, for, in truth, although he never attained supreme excellence as a poet, a dramatist, a novelist, an orator, or a politician, he occupied a distinguished place in each of these different categories. But

in versatility he certainly vied with the hero of the *Margites*.

There was nothing very remarkable in his career as a politician. In his youth his tendencies were Liberal. He was attracted by Canning's foreign policy. He was intimate with Lord Durham and John Stuart Mill. He sympathised with the Radical wing of the Whig party. He subsequently admired Garibaldi and Mazzini. But, his grandson says, he "belonged essentially to an aristocratic age." He was wholly devoid of popular sympathies. He "wept and laughed at the follies of that noisy abstraction called the People." On the other hand, he had but little sympathy with the genuine Whigs, with whom he was unconnected by family ties. He was even warned by that typical Whig, Lord Melbourne, not "to give way to those thick-coming fancies to which poets and men of genius are generally subject." But during the early part of his Parliamentary career he supported the Whig party, and would probably have continued to do so had it not been that the wire-pullers, with that disastrous genius for the disruption of political ties which appears common to them in all ages, offended him and drove him into the political wilderness. Then he naturally gravitated to the Tory democracy. The glittering genius of Disraeli attracted him. They had literary tastes in common. Disraeli, indeed, told Lady Blessington so early as 1837 that Bulwer "was the only literary man he did not abominate and despise." Bulwer thought that "there was poetry in dress." Disraeli appears to have been much of the same opinion. Both anathematised Sir Robert Peel. Bulwer did not, however, at all relish Disraeli's Reform Bill of 1867, although under the stress of party pressure he was forced to give it a luke-

warm support. But it made a breach. When, in 1868, Disraeli "talked of old days and kept pressing his hand," he recorded that "he felt steely to him and his Government."

His oratory earned him the praise of so good and experienced a judge as Mr. Justin McCarthy. To the present generation, however, it seems somewhat turgid. His speeches were in reality literary essays committed to memory. It is impossible to repress a smile when we read that he passed a kindly censure on Swinburne for being wanting in "simplicity and calm." How far Bulwer's own style, whether in speech or writing, was simple may be inferred from the fact that when he wished to tell the students of Edinburgh University that Rome borrowed much from Greece, he said, "It (Rome) has not found its jewels in native mines, but it takes them with a conqueror's hand and weaves them into a regal diadem." Neither can the adjective "calm" be fitly applied to a style which, in dealing with the Crimean war, led Bulwer to say, "It is for all time that we wage our battle. It is that the liberties of our children may be secured from some future Attila, and civilisation guarded from the irruption of Scythian hordes." Russia, he said, on another occasion, is "a Power that supports the maxims of Machiavelli with the armaments of Brennus." The touch is that of Disraeli, but the pungent wit is absent. Bulwer had no sense of humour. As a Parliamentarian he did some creditable work in the persistent and eventually successful efforts which he made to free the press from taxation. As a Cabinet Minister his name was associated with some useful Colonial measures. In a letter addressed to Sir George Bowen in 1859 he laid down some excellent rules for the guidance of Colonial

Governors. He may share with Disraeli the credit of having been amongst the few who at that time appreciated the need and importance of social reform. But his heart was in none of these things. "I loathe politics," he wrote to his friend Forster; and although, in fits of despondency, he at times expressed an almost equal degree of loathing for that "hateful, bitter thing called Literature," and bade a popular authoress reflect that no one could "take third editions or Quarterly Reviews to the grave," there can be no doubt that Literature was the shrine at which he ardently and persistently worshipped, and that his posthumous fame must rest almost exclusively on the view taken of his literary work.

Victor Cousin said that "un homme sérieux n'écrit que parcequ'autrement il ne peut atteindre son but." It can scarcely be said that Bulwer's writings were in any marked degree didactic. It is true that in *Eugene Aram* and in some other of his romances he attempted to show how a criminal may be reformed by the development of his own character, but it may well be doubted whether any such philosophical purpose really constituted the mainspring of his intellectual and imaginative activity. When the prudery and conventionality of the time in which he lived found expression in bitter attacks on him for having apologised for, or even idealised, crime, he said, "Surely great crime is the highest province of fiction." This plea in his defence is in itself quite sufficient, and will certainly be accepted by a less conventional posterity. It may safely be conjectured that the main reason, apart from the necessity of adding to his income, why he wrote was because he could not help writing. His prodigious industry had stored his



mind with a vast accumulation of facts and ideas. His vivid imagination enabled him to reconstruct a picture of the society alike of Pompeii, of Rome in the fourteenth century, or of mediæval England. His mysticism led him to grope for something tangible amidst the twilight of the occult sciences—a subject upon which his opinions appear to have been far more rational than those which have at times been attributed to him. With an intellect and an imagination thus heavily charged, silence would have been insupportable to him. “His genius as an author,” as his epitaph in Westminster Abbey very truly says, “was displayed in the most varied form.” The *cacoethes scribendi* dogged him throughout his career. Sir Frederick Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford), who was his under-secretary at the Colonial Office, records in words which bring to mind Carlyle’s eulogy of silence in thirty volumes how “Sir Edward writes perfect volumes of minutes, and then tells me that he learnt two great maxims of life, one to write as little as possible, and the other to say as little as possible !”

Few authors have been attacked with greater virulence than Bulwer. The vocabulary of vituperation has been exhausted in condemnation of his style. It must be admitted that his frequent lapses from good taste, which his grandson is at no pains to conceal, give some colour to the sarcasm, extracted under great provocation from Tennyson, that “he killed the girls and thrilled the boys” with “dandy pathos.” His reputation, Professor Walker says in his *Literature of the Victorian Era*, “has sunk greatly since his death.” To the present generation he appears—albeit he was by no means wanting in manliness—to have been fitly described by Harriet Martineau

as "a woman of genius clothed by misadventure in a man's form." Yet those who, like the writer of the present article, can remember being one of the boys whom Tennyson describes as being "thrilled" some sixty years ago by Bulwer's writings, cannot forget the debt of gratitude they owe to the author of *The Last Days of Pompeii* and *Paul Clifford*.

One of the finest funeral orations recorded in history is that pronounced by an illustrious French Royalist over an equally illustrious political opponent—"Il était magnanime." Can this eloquent and pathetic tribute to real worth be paraphrased in the case of Bulwer? Can it be said of him, "Il avait du génie"? If so, all minor defects are condoned, and he may at once take his place amongst the immortals. The question will be answered by some with a decided negative, probably by none with a very confident affirmative. But if real genius cannot be attributed to him, it may certainly be said that he possessed talent which is closely allied to genius. This degree of posthumous fame may assuredly be accorded to him.

# V

## WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," December 20, 1913*

IN these days, when the biographies of minor stars in the political firmament are given to the world very shortly after their death, or even at times whilst they are still living, it seems passing strange that it was not till a hundred and thirty-nine years after the death of one of the most illustrious British statesmen of the eighteenth century that anything approaching a complete account of his career should have been published. Still more strange is it that the task should then have been undertaken by a foreigner. Experience has shown that the difficulties which beset an historian when he endeavours to depict the character and aspirations of some politician who is typically representative of a different nationality from his own may occasionally, though rarely, be overcome. The merits of Carlyle's history of the great Frederic are fully recognised by the Germans. But Carlyle's case was very special. He had a scheme of philosophy to propound, and he discovered in the founder of Prussia's greatness all the characteristics needed to serve as an object-lesson in order to commend his philosophic

<sup>1</sup> *The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham.* By Basil Williams. 2 vols. London: Longmans & Co. [25s.]

tenets to the world. The case of Chatham's biographer, M. de Ruville, is very different. No bond of sympathy, either national or based on community of thought and sentiment, united him with the subject of his biography. He therefore dwelt with undue insistence on the minor defects of a man whose careless inconsistency and almost arrogant contempt for the opinions of others afforded abundant material for criticism, whilst he failed to do justice to the real grandeur of character and intellect which lay behind the veil of these superficial qualities. In truth, none but a staunch English Imperialist could write a sympathetic and comprehensive history of one who, without disparagement to the claims of his Elizabethan predecessors, may rightly be regarded as the founder of modern British Imperialism.

Such an historian has now arisen in the person of Mr. Basil Williams. His *Life of Chatham* is altogether admirable. With infinite skill he enables us to understand the struggle which was constantly going on in this very remarkable man's mind. In a life which was full of contradictions and inconsistencies two features in Chatham's character were persistently manifested from the day when, as one of "Cobham's Cubs," he joined the "Boy Patriots" to the time when, sinking exhausted into the arms of his brother peers, he was carried home to read Homer's account of the death of Hector and to die. These features were that he was at the same time a democrat and a despot. Paradoxical as it may at first sight appear, the history of the world has shown, and is still showing every day, that the two characters are by no means mutually incompatible. Chatham's attitude on the subject of taxation in America, his sturdy defence of con-

stitutionalism in the case of Wilkes, his tolerance of dissenters—albeit, with characteristic inconsistency, he veered round to intolerance when dealing with Roman Catholics—and, generally, his desire to look to the sovereignty of the people as the basis of government, all attest his devotion to democratic principles. He unquestionably hated tyranny in any form, whether it found expression in the personal power of the King, the self-seeking pretensions of the Whig oligarchy, or the House of Commons itself. Tyranny, he said, in words which read like the wail of a modern Unionist over the introduction of single-Chamber Government, “is detestable in every shape; but in none so formidable as when it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants.” Yet, in spite of his democratic principles, Chatham never stooped to the employment of those arts by which from time immemorial democracies have been led. “It is not hard,” said one of the greatest thinkers of that age with whose literature this eighteenth-century statesman’s mind was impregnated, “to praise Athenians to Athenians.” It was left to opportunist politicians of the type of Bute to flatter the populace, and to further their own party interests by playing on the passions and prejudices of the hour. Chatham’s lofty independence of thought led him to reject any such methods. His defence of the unfortunate Byng, who was made a scapegoat because neither the Court nor the time-serving Ministers of the day had the courage to resist an irrational popular outcry, and his denunciation of privateering, although it appealed strongly to the material interests of the commercial community, who were amongst his warmest supporters, afford abundant proofs that he possessed the most rare of all the qualities necessary to a Minister who

draws all his strength from popular favour. He dared to make himself unpopular.

On the other hand, Chatham's despotic nature comes out in every act of his life. The man was by nature an autocrat. With all his professed deference to the national will, he was manifestly convinced that he, alone of his contemporaries, could interpret that will aright. The numerous, although at times rather half-hearted, attempts which were made to lure him back to power were generally wrecked either because he would not accept office save on his own undiluted terms, or because he would not co-operate with any save those whom he felt assured would be wholly subservient to his will. When he was at the height of his power and fame, his brother legislators were awed as he hobbled painfully to his seat in the House of Commons muttering some lines of Virgil. A gesture, or a mere flash from that eye which, Shelburne said, "cut like a diamond," was almost of itself sufficient to dominate the assembly. Neither was the effect of his overpowering personality confined to those who were actually brought in contact with him. His great antagonist Choiseul—who, when Chatham accepted a peerage, likened him to "a Samson with his hair cut"—fully recognised the disadvantage at which the French negotiator Bussy would be placed in discussing the terms of peace with so doughty an antagonist. "The poor devil," he said, "trembled before starting."

The terms, on the unconditional acceptance of which Chatham insisted as the price of his return to office after the downfall of his first Ministry, were by no means unreasonable. Moreover, the prescience he showed in forecasting the future course of action which would be adopted by the Spanish Government was so remarkable that it

can be no matter for surprise that he should have been tenacious of his own opinions. Further, it is now easy to see that national interests would best have been served if Chatham had been allowed to choose his own colleagues and subordinates. Nevertheless, this very tenacity of purpose and rejection of anything approaching to compromise resulted in the total failure of Chatham's later political career, and in the adoption of measures which were disastrous to the interests of the country which he loved so well. Those measures would probably have been prevented, or at all events greatly modified, had he shown a more conciliatory and accommodating spirit. The political defects of the Rockingham Whigs were glaring. But they were Chatham's natural allies. Personal interest as well as public duty alike pointed to the conclusion that he should have cemented that alliance instead of rejecting it until the propitious moment for co-operation had been allowed to pass. The moral of the whole of this very important chapter of history is that no statesman, however great may be his abilities and personal merits, can, under a party system, afford to treat party ties with absolute neglect. Chatham's attempt to govern without party proved a complete failure. It is not enough, under a representative system of government, that a politician should be right. It is equally necessary that he should so far convince others that he is right as to ensure their cordial co-operation. If he fails to do this, he may, indeed, play the part of the prophetess Cassandra, but never that of the constructive statesman Cavour.

This, however, was but one aspect in the career of a many-sided statesman. There were many others. Macaulay says somewhere that Cromwell

never allowed his country to be ill-used by any one but himself. The phrase might, without placing any great strain on historical truth, be held to represent a portion at all events of Chatham's political creed. Ardent patriotism dominated his whole nature, and inspired him with a prophetic instinct of the future destinies of his country. It found expression in irreconcilable detestation of the House of Bourbon, whose misdeeds he denounced with all the vituperative energy of "some Hebrew prophet preaching against Babylon." It led by a perfectly logical train of reasoning to an early recognition of the value of sea-power. It was the earnestness and fervour of this patriotism which inspired those lofty flights of eloquence which, although they are couched in a strain unfamiliar to modern ears, can never cease to quicken the pulse and warm the heart of all who believe in the greatness of England. That eloquence he merely used as a means to an end. He was far too great a man to attach undue importance to words. "I am not fond of making speeches," he said; "I never cultivated the talent but as an instrument of action in a country like ours."

Never did Chatham's indomitable courage show to greater advantage than when, in the early part of 1757, troubles thickened around him. His ally, Frederic, had been defeated at Kollin. Cumberland's operations in Germany had proved unsuccessful. An expedition sent to Rochefort ended in complete failure. In America Loudoun's inaction had led to the surrender of Ticonderoga. From India news arrived that a body of English men and women had been done to death in the Black Hole at Calcutta. But Chatham was not dismayed. "Nitor in adversum" was his motto. Eventually the wise



measures which he had introduced began to produce their effect. The Navy was largely increased. The youth of the Highlands—"Abie-tibus juvenes patriis et montibus aequos"—were sent to America to fight for their Hanoverian King instead of mourning over the downfall of the Jacobite cause and the disaster of Culloden—a statesmanlike measure which had been proposed so early as 1738 by Duncan Forbes. The American colonists were conciliated by the removal of some foolish and narrow-minded restrictions which had formerly placed them at a disadvantage compared to the officers of the regular army. A new spirit was breathed into the whole body politic. Then the tide turned. On the Continent of Europe the French sustained a crushing defeat at Rossbach. Bradstreet took possession of an important chain of forts which linked Canada and the valley of the Ohio. Forbes, a gallant officer called by the Indians "Head of Iron," reoccupied Fort Duquesne and changed its name to Pittsburg. Louisburg, the "Gibraltar of the West," was captured. Governor Lawrence gave some brilliant fêtes at which sixty thousand gallons of rum were drunk, and Miss Ann Pitt, who loved her brother, but was too genuine a Pitt to abstain from quarrelling with him, lit a bonfire outside his house at Bath and "distributed ten hogsheads of strong beer." These were but the prelude of other successes. India was won at Plassey, Canada at Quebec, and Hawke's defeat of Conflans's fleet secured the integrity of the United Kingdom. In four years the world-power of England was founded.

What was the secret of the marvellous successes achieved under Chatham's auspices during this eventful and epoch-making period? The subject is worthy of more complete treatment

than can be afforded to it on the present occasion. This much may, however, be said.

In the first place, diplomatists will do well to ponder over the results achieved by Chatham's straightforwardness, accompanied, it is true, by a somewhat unnecessary lack of the *suaviter in modo*, contrasted with the abortive and contemptible chicanery displayed by Choiseul. Nothing is more remarkable than the loyalty with which he supported the cause of his Prussian ally. It is true that his policy was to conquer America in Germany, but the conquest was not to be effected at the expense of Frederic. He persistently declined to obtain any English advantage by sacrificing German interests. How wise he was is abundantly proved by the fact that the subsequent desertion of Prussia by England under the Bute *régime* sank deep into the German mind, and has not been forgotten to this day. "More than a century later," Mr. Basil Williams says, "Bismarck attributed his distrust of England to the desertion of Frederic in 1762."

In the second place, he set his face resolutely against diplomatic arrangements which were unreal, and which, in the words of George Meredith, "merely shuffled on difficulties to the next Party in office, or generation." Again subsequent events have justified the wisdom of his principle. The Newfoundland fishery question, which he wished to settle, was only patched up for a time. After causing constant friction between England and France for a hundred and forty years, it was not till 1904 that the question was set at rest, and, it may earnestly be hoped, finally set at rest.

Turning to Chatham's attitude in administrative matters, it may be said that besides being an admirable man of business who could

not only grasp general principles but master details, he possessed in a high degree the true Imperialist instinct. In the first place, "he insisted on choosing as the commanders for his expeditions men whom he could trust for the tasks he set them ; but their staff he left to their own choice, and all other appointments to the ordinary rules of the service." In the second place, he inspired his subordinates with the utmost confidence. When General Hodgson was about to start for Belleisle, he was assured by Chatham that "he would be supported in all stretches of power whatever and against whomsoever." No Minister could now give any such assurance, neither is it at all desirable that he should give it. But the spirit in which Chatham acted holds good for all time, and constitutes the only method by which the distant agents of an Imperialist Government can be encouraged to show resource and resolution. Lukewarm support is destructive of all zeal and initiative.

The behaviour of all classes during the South African War, the heroism shown by individuals in such episodes as the wreck of the *Titanic*, and the life-saving operations in mines, show clearly enough that there is no need to despond in considering the national characteristics of living Englishmen. The spirit which Chatham called forth could still, if occasion arose, be evoked. At the same time, it is time to guard carefully against any signs of decay. Mr. Basil Williams's work might profitably be made a text-book in our schools. It would serve as some antidote to the vapid and colourless cosmopolitanism which, amongst certain sections of society, tends to usurp the place of an eminently virile and healthy, although possibly a somewhat insular and exclusive, patriotism.

## VI

### THE MARQUIS OF WELLESLEY <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," May 2, 1914*

THE chief interest of *The Wellesley Papers* lies in the fact that they constitute a record of the minor blemishes in the character of one who, in spite of many obvious defects, may fairly be entitled to take rank amongst the foremost of later eighteenth and early nineteenth century British statesmen. Those blemishes could not fail to be noted and chronicled by the ubiquitous class of minor politicians who at all times are to be found frequenting the back-alleys of social and political life. The vitriolic Creevey, when Wellesley became Foreign Minister in 1810, held that "a great calamity had been inflicted on England." Croker, anticipating the phrase in which Thiers described the Emperor Napoleon III. as "une grande incapacité méconnue," chuckled when, in 1830, Wellesley became Lord Steward of the Household, and wrote: "I don't think they will give any office of business to the most *brilliant incapacity* in England." Charles Greville thought Wellesley's appointment to Ireland in 1833 "ridiculous," but he was far too observant not to recognise brilliancy of intellect when

<sup>1</sup> *The Wellesley Papers.* By the Editor of *The Windham Papers.* 2 vols. London: Herbert Jenkins. [32s. net.]

brought in contact with it, and before long did justice to the administrative abilities displayed by the new Lord-Lieutenant. Lord Holland also showed a generous appreciation of the talents displayed by a political opponent, and noted that beneath outward appearances calculated to excite laughter there lay qualities which justified attributing to their possessor some considerable measure of what Aristotle called *Megalopsychia*. Lord Wellesley, he said, "was sometimes illogical, and I have known him pompous, empty, and unsatisfactory. Yet there was a smack, a fancy of greatness, in all he did; and though in his speeches, his manners, and his actions he was very often open to ridicule, those who smiled and even laughed could not despise him."

Few leading politicians have, indeed, in their personal behaviour laid themselves open to more justifiable criticism than Wellesley. He was, of course, accused of being autocratic—a charge which is invariably brought against all men of strong character who are willing to assume personal responsibility. Equally as a matter of course, his autocratic habits were believed to have been engendered by long residence in the East. Mackintosh called him "a sultanised Englishman." But, as in the case of Mr. Gladstone and many other autocratically minded statesmen, the masterful element in his character did not in any way preclude the adoption of Liberal principles. Wellesley, indeed, throughout his life was a staunch Liberal. His abhorrence of the slave trade was as whole-hearted as that of Wilberforce. He was a Free Trader and an advocate of Catholic Emancipation at a time when most of the caste to which he belonged favoured Protection and Protestant domination in Ireland. He eventually, although after some

hesitation, gave his support to Lord Grey's Reform Bill.

He quarrelled with almost every one with whom he had to deal, including his brother, the great Duke. As a colleague he must have been well-nigh intolerable. He professed the most undisguised contempt for Mr. Perceval, under whom he served. He nearly quarrelled with Canning, with whose political opinions he was in general sympathy; but it should be added that, in reading between the lines of the numerous letters which passed between these two statesmen, it is difficult to say which, in the competition for place and power, carries off the palm for self-satisfied egotism. His breach with Lord Melbourne was due to the fact that that easy-going, careless man of the world made against one of the most imprudent of men "a rude, unjust, and insulting imputation of imprudence," and offered him the humble post of Lord Chamberlain—an incident which led Lady Wellesley to "renounce *for ever* all her Whiggery," and to express with characteristically feminine strength of language her "indignation at the treachery, the baseness, the impudence of Lord Melbourne and his followers."

The main contest of Wellesley's life was, however, with the Directors of the East India Company. It has been said that the Franco-German War of 1870 was inevitable because the two nations resembled a pair of express locomotives rushing headlong towards each other on the same rails. The quarrel between Lord Wellesley and the Directors was equally inevitable, but the metaphor should be changed to this extent, that the fiery Governor-General resembled the express engine, whilst the Directors took the place of a humble but stolid goods train which blocked the way. The Directors, although in

some respects they governed well and wisely, and personified some phases of an eminently sane Imperialism, nevertheless in the main represented cautious commercialism. Lord Wellesley, on the other hand, represented an Imperialism of a very different type. The frame of mind foreshadowed in the numerous hexameter lines, all breathing an ardent and aggressive patriotism, which are now enshrined in the *Musae Etonenses*, was predestined, when occasion arose, to forsake the humdrum paths of lucrative commerce and to aspire to Imperial extension and domination. The personal ambition of the ruler, and, it should in justice be added, the foresight of the statesman, alike pointed to the conclusion that throughout India there should be but one paramount Power, Great Britain. If to this disagreement on an essential point of principle be added the considerations that no electric telegraph existed to facilitate control from London, and that Wellesley, like all true Imperialists, resented the tendency manifested in Leadenhall Street to neglect merit and to job appointments, it will be at once apparent that no element of discord was wanting. The quarrel was indeed acute. Wellesley's wrath was at one time like the blast of a tornado. In 1804 he wrote to Lord Castlereagh imploring him to "frustrate the vindictive profligacy of the Directors." He writhed under the "ignominious tyranny of Leadenhall Street," which he described as "a most loathsome den." After a further period of mutual vituperation, Wellesley was formally censured by the Directors and resigned his appointment. But the real victory lay with the vanquished. Before Wellesley left Calcutta he had built a magnificent superstructure, which endures to this day, on the foundations laid by his predecessors.

It is more difficult to excuse or to palliate the excessive self-laudation in which Wellesley indulged, and the overweening vanity which rendered him avid of fulsome praise from others. There was nothing mean about the man. He spurned the idea that he should receive any share of the Seringapatam prize-money; but he thought that the Government "would gain much credit by conferring some high and brilliant honour upon him immediately," and he boiled over with rage when he learnt that he was only to receive a "gilded potato," as he called an Irish marquisate. The account which his biographer (Torrens) gives of his first reception in England on his return from India is highly characteristic both of the individual and of British practices. He had evidently expected some sort of ovation. Instead of this, he was met by a few friends and relatives who gave him an affectionate welcome; but "the murk of the commonplace in the best room of the best inn in a half-lighted seaport town almost stifled him. . . . Ere dinner time was half over he broke out into the expletives of impatience that made the circle stare. . . . The disenchantment was complete. He rose early from table and withdrew saying he was ill and must be left alone." Even his mother does not seem to have recognised the ruling passion in her son's mind. She wrote him an affectionate but very brief note, which he received on landing, and in which not one word was said of his great services to his country, but it was merely intimated that if he happened on his way to London to change horses at Hampton Court, where she was residing, rather than at Kingston, she was quite ready to "have breakfast or some other refreshment ready for him." The episode reminds the writer of the present article of the characteristic-



ally British reception given to Slatin Pasha at Assouan when he at last escaped from his terrible imprisonment. The English officer commanding the troops went out to meet him a mile from town and said, "Are you Slatin?" On the reply being in the affirmative, he added, "Come and have luncheon." That was all. The individual Englishman is very far from being unfeeling, but he is at times highly undemonstrative.

Worse was to follow. Hardly had Wellesley set foot in England when every autocratic and aristocratic fibre of his highly-strung frame was severely tried on hearing that a "miserable attack of a low and obscure man" named Paull, who had an Indian grievance, was to be made on him in the House of Commons. A long delay, of which Wellesley very justly complained, ensued before the charges made by Paull and others were finally rejected, but it cost Wellesley some £30,000 to accumulate the information necessary to rebut them.

Wellesley thought, not only that his services had been insufficiently recognised, but that he had been "subjected to a species of persecution perhaps unparalleled in the modern history of England." To the day of his death he never ceased to clamour for redress. He asked for the Garter, which was somewhat reluctantly thrown to him as a sop, but it failed to satisfy him. On every possible occasion he advanced his claims for high office, and when they were rejected he humbled himself to accept the positions of Lord Chamberlain and Lord High Steward. One of the last acts of his life was to prepare a lengthy memorandum setting forth his eminent public services and submitting his claims for a dukedom. All was in vain. He never received the desired prize; but he eventually became reconciled to

the East India Company, who made him a grant of £20,000.

He had, indeed, some grounds for complaint, for although, as his relative, William Wellesley Pole, very wisely told him, he would have acted with greater dignity if he had not blown his own trumpet so loudly, there can be no doubt that his services to his country were of an exceptional character, and that they never received due recognition. Of the illustrious trinity—Warren Hastings, Wellesley, and Dalhousie—who built on Clive's foundation, the central figure is by no means the least deserving of praise. Moreover, he was more than an Indian administrator. Lord Holland, speaking of Wellesley's mission to Spain in 1809, justly observes that, "after indulging his bad taste in a few silly bravadoes, he showed in essentials much foresight"; and Wellesley's memorandum on the general state of Europe written when he was Foreign Secretary in 1811 is a masterly document which shows a strong grasp of the situation, and sets forth with statesmanlike precision the true justification for the intervention of England in the affairs of Spain. On the whole, Wellesley deserved well of his country, and posterity may willingly accord him the posthumous justice of burying his minor defects in oblivion and remembering only the fact that he was one of the master-builders of the British Empire.

## VII

### THE YOUNG DISRAELI <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," December 27, 1913*

MR. GEORGE TREVELYAN, in a recent interesting essay on the writing of history, says that the first and principal duty of an historian is to compile an accurate narrative of events. Carrying this order of ideas one stage further, it may be said that any one minded to deal with what may be termed the curiosities of politics might write a small volume on the far-reaching effects produced at times by incidents which appeared to contemporaries to be mere trivial or unimportant detail. A classical instance of this kind is the flight of the French Royal Family to Varennes. M. Lenôtre has shown that "Old-Dragoon Drouet" did not play nearly so important a part in that episode as Carlyle supposed, and we have it on the authority of one so well versed in Revolutionary history as the late Lord Acton that if Louis XVI. had not wasted a couple of hours at Étoges in order to dine with a member of his household named Chanilly, he would probably have got across the frontier. Had he done so the history of France, and possibly also that of Europe, would have been changed. Similarly, it may be said that accident contributed

<sup>1</sup> *Whigs and Whiggism: Political Writings by Benjamin Disraeli.*  
Edited by William Hutcheon London: John Murray. [12s. net.]

in no small degree to mould the thoughts and to give direction to the action of a British statesman of the Victorian era whose influence was not only at one time predominant, but has also survived his decease. Sir Robert Peel little thought that his refusal, in 1841, to find a place for one whom he deemed a minor and highly eccentric young politician would exercise a decisive influence not only on his own career, but also on the future of the Conservative Party, and therefore on the domestic history of England. Long before that period, however, blind Chance, the goddess whom the Greeks deified as "Saviour Fortune, the child of Zeus," had been busy with the fate of Disraeli. His frame of mind when he first entered political life was very similar to that of the eighteenth-century statesman for whom he entertained an unbounded admiration, and whom he certainly regarded to some extent as his mentor. Bolingbroke, Mr. MacKnight says, "went into Parliament, as so many young men even in our day go into Parliament, without any acquired political knowledge, and without any decided views except to make a speech and to become distinguished." In 1832, Mr. Hutcheon says, Disraeli was, politically speaking, "unlabelled." Whatever opinions he entertained were distinctly democratic. Toryism, he thought, was "worn out." He spoke slightly of those "patricians" of whose cause he was ultimately to become so doughty a champion. He was alarmed lest the Irish revenues of the Church of England should fall into "the ruthless and rapacious grasp of some bold absentee baron." On the other hand, personal interest speedily led him to the conclusion that Whiggism, if it were to serve as a stepping-stone to high position and fame, must be innate. A Whig, like a poet, was born; he could not be

manufactured. Conscious, therefore, of his own abilities, and realising that he must for ever remain outside the circle of a close corporation into which full admission could only be gained by the accident of birth and lineage, he was, from the outset of his political career, quite clear and consistent on one point. He would not "condescend to be a Whig." Hence, being excluded, either by conviction or self-interest, from both the Tory and the Whig camps, the only alternative apparently left was to join the Radicals. He was, in fact, invited by the Radical Lord Durham to stand for Aylesbury. He spoke publicly in favour of election by ballot and the repeal of the Septennial Act. It was at this stage of his career that Chance intervened in the person of the Tory Lord Lyndhurst. "Lyndhurst had ambitions, and needed Disraeli's pen; Disraeli had ambitions, and needed Lyndhurst's influence." The "powerful noble," whose advent had been foreshadowed in *Vivian Grey*, had evidently appeared on the scene. The alliance was concluded. Disraeli threw himself with ardour into the Tory cause.

He was far too intelligent not to read aright the signs of the times. He saw that the tide of democracy was rising, and that both the aristocracies who were then contending for place and power were wholly out of sympathy with democratic ideas. He rightly judged that they could not or would not combine. He noted that the Tory plan of stolid resistance to reform was doomed to failure, and that the Whigs' alleged sympathy with the democracy, which he regarded as by no means genuine but a mere opportunist posture, gave them a certain advantage over their antagonists. The remedy which at once suggested itself to his powerful and subtle brain was

that the aristocracy with which he was connected should outbid its rivals in the democratic market. Toryism, he said in a characteristic euphemism, which has virtually served as the apology for all demagogues in all countries and in all ages, "must occasionally represent and reflect the passions and prejudices of the nation, as well as its purer energies and its more enlarged and philosophic views." Hence the genesis of the Tory Democracy.

The idea was not merely plausible. It may be said to a certain extent to have been statesman-like. There was no sort of reason why the Whigs of seventy years ago, any more than the Liberals of the present day, should enjoy a monopoly as leaders in the cause of moral and material improvement. But the peculiar method by which Disraeli sought to give effect to his project, and to which he held with unswerving tenacity throughout all the vicissitudes of his eventful career, was foredoomed to complete failure. The inauguration of this method was heralded by a somewhat fantastic reconstruction of the history of England, which was given to the world in 1835 under the title of a *Vindication of the English Constitution*. The main feature of Disraeli's scheme was that the House of Commons should be decried and the House of Lords exalted. The former, he urged, was not really representative, albeit it was elected. The House of Lords, on the other hand, was "the most eminent existing example of representation without election." There was, indeed, no guarantee that an hereditary legislator would excel in wisdom, but the "legislative descendant of a great legislator" was quite as likely to turn out "a Moses or a Minos, a Numa or a Solon, a Saxon Alfred or a Czar Peter," as any representative returned to

Parliament by a "body of ten-pounders." An alliance was therefore to be made between the House of Lords and the people. The Tories were to become "the really democratic party of England." Disraeli's general conception of democratising the Tory Party eventually led to the enactment of the Reform Act of 1867, and that measure, which was his own handiwork, has culminated in the destruction of the hereditary Chamber the predominance of which formed the corner-stone of his scheme. The edifice was cleverly planned, but was essentially rococo. It has tumbled about the ears of Disraeli's political descendants.

It was, of course, a necessary part of Disraeli's plan that he should indulge in the most unmeasured diatribes against the Whigs. Mr. Hutcheon, whose work may be regarded as a supplement to that of Mr. Monypenny, reproduces the *Letters of Runnymede*, and other pieces in which the "lick-spittle, place-loving, pelf-adoring spirit" of the Whigs is denounced with an exuberance of vituperation which bears some resemblance to the language used by the eighteenth-century Junius, but to which the present generation is unaccustomed. Much of it is written in the vein of the *Eatonswill Gazette*. Disraeli was pre-eminent as a phrase-monger. Many of the expressions which he used in later days, when by long thought and practice he had carried the art to perfection, were singularly felicitous and have become classical. Mr. Hutcheon's pages, however, record for the most part the failures in phrase-mongering. Disraeli's style is euphemistically termed extravagant. It would be more correct to say that, inasmuch as it sinned against every canon of good taste, it was altogether execrable. He could not express

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the most ordinary idea in simple language. When he wished to allude to Sir Robert Peel's hurried journey from Rome in 1834 in order to form an Administration, he said that the Minister had been "summoned by the confidence of his Sovereign and the hopes of his country from the galleries of the Vatican and the city of the Caesars." Lord Grey, when out of office, is described as "wandering, like a dethroned Caliph, in the halls of Eblis." Allusion is made to Lord Palmerston as "the Sporus of politics, cajoling France with an airy compliment, and menacing Russia with a perfumed cane." Mr. Bickersteth was first educated for the medical profession and was subsequently created Lord Langdale. Disraeli, therefore, speaks of the "spick and span coronet falling from the obstetric brow of the baronial Bickersteth." Lord Campbell is likened to an "ourang-outang of unusual magnitude dancing under a banana-tree and licking his hairy chaps." The Whig Ministers are called "Gallomaniac apes." The English idea of equality is termed "sublime" and "celestial," but as to French equality it is said that "that blooming prostitute had shrunk by this time into a most shrivelled and drivelling harridan."

Solecisms and absurdities of this sort abound. It is clear that Disraeli devoted great attention to their elaboration and was often proud of his literary creations. With slight variants, he repeated several times and applied to successive contemporary statesmen the metaphor that "bad wine produces good vinegar." But these extravagances should not blind us to the fact that a vein of real prescience and acute political observation runs through Disraeli's utterances, however much it is obscured by the fantastic forms in which his ideas are presented. The weak points

of the Benthamite philosophy are indicated with a firm and reasonable touch. The danger of democratic tyranny, which was a favourite theme of Lord Chatham's, is foreshadowed in a manner which the present generation has good reason to know is not exaggerated. At a time when a marked tendency was exhibited throughout the world to neglect the fact that English institutions were the outcome of national character and traditions, a well-timed warning was given against endeavouring to plant those institutions in uncongenial soil, whether in the Old or New World. Amidst all this are to be found sweeping generalisations of a far more debateable character, as, for instance, that revolutions are never the work of a nation but always of a faction—a view which exaggerates the part played by the French Jacobins and unduly minimises the general effect produced by a long course of misgovernment. Nevertheless, the outpourings of this strange and singularly un-English man of genius, in spite of their virulently partisan character, can still afford some instruction to those who wish to meditate on the general principles which should dictate the government of nations. As for the merits and demerits of the Whigs, their case has been stated by Mr. Bagehot, who was a far more impartial political observer than Disraeli, in the following lines :

Perhaps as long as there has been a political history in this country there have been certain men of a cool, moderate, resolute firmness, not gifted with high imagination, little prone to enthusiastic sentiment, heedless of large theories and speculations, careless of dreamy scepticism, with a clear view of the next step, and a wise intention to take it ; a strong conviction that the elements of knowledge are true, and a steady belief that the present world can, and should, be quietly improved. These are the Whigs.

## VIII

### HENRY LABOUCHERE<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," November 1, 1913*

THE greatest compliment which the public can pay to an author is to read his books. It cannot be doubted that this compliment will be paid to Mr. Thorold. It is perhaps questionable whether posterity will think that Henry Labouchere played a sufficiently important part on the political stage to justify his life's work being told in a bulky volume of some five hundred pages; but the present generation, to whom the names of Labouchere himself and those with whom he was associated are as household words, will welcome a full biography of this modern Democritus, who passed through life with his tongue in his cheek, and devoted all the resources of a remarkably astute intellect, which had shaken off all conventional shackles, to the task of satirising the social and political world in which he lived. With the exception of the lengthy chapter on Socialism, which might perhaps with advantage have been abridged, no reader is likely to complain that Mr. Thorold has been tedious.

The life of this singular man affords, indeed, every element for the achievement of ephemeral

<sup>1</sup> *The Life of Henry Labouchere.* By Algar Labouchere Thorold. London: Constable & Co. [18s.]

biographical fame. Henry Labouchere was in his youth offered a place as croupier in a Mexican gambling-hell. He was at one time door-keeper at an American circus. He had lived amongst the Chippeway Indians, and was on intimate terms with "the great chief, Hole in Heaven." He had eaten cold donkey in the besieged city of Paris, and "greatly preferred it to anything else." He was at different times a subordinate in the diplomatic service, a theatrical manager, a journalist, and a member of Parliament. Even making due allowance for the apocryphal nature of some of the reminiscences recorded by Mr. Thorold, the life of a man so many-sided as Henry Labouchere affords every element for the achievement of ephemeral biographical fame.

He comes well out of the most severe and certain test which can be applied to the private character of any man. Those who knew him best loved him most. He seems to have been a devoted husband, an affectionate father, and a good friend. He often did many kindly acts, such, for instance, as interesting himself deeply about the children of the forger Pigott, whom he tracked down with remorseless but perfectly justifiable assiduity. These traits of his character should be borne in mind, but his public life, which alone can give him any permanent claim to renown, must be judged by his public acts.

Mr. Bennett, who knew him well, says that he was a man of "real genius." Whatever definition be given to that much-discussed word, its application to Labouchere will hardly be accepted by any save those whose minds are influenced by the ties of warm personal friendship. It is singularly inapplicable if, as a somewhat prosaic statesman would have had us believe, genius consists in an illimitable power for taking trouble.

For, in truth, if ever there was a man who "was everything by starts and nothing long," it was Henry Labouchere. He lay under the curse of Reuben. When Mr. Bennett says that "he quickly grew tired of everything he took in hand," the remark helps us more than any other portion of the appreciation given of Labouchere's character to understand why, in spite of his undoubted talent and moral courage of a kind, he was, if not a failure, at best but a mediocre success as a politician. Men of this type attract momentary attention by their brilliancy or eccentricity, but they are not amongst those who make history, or even amongst those who leave behind them any durable monument of their work in life. The most lasting title to posthumous fame to which Labouchere can lay claim probably is that, as a journalist, he dragged a number of contemptible swindlers from the hiding-places in which they had lurked and effectively warned the public against their proceedings. It is perhaps somewhat to be regretted that the opportunity was never afforded to him of passing from the stage of criticism to that of action. The Queen would not accept him as a Cabinet Minister, and it cannot be doubted that her Majesty's decision was dictated by a very keen and correct appreciation of character; for apart from the reason alleged by Mr. Gladstone—that Labouchere was the proprietor of *Truth*—there would have been something, to say the least, highly incongruous in having appointed a man to be an adviser of the Crown, who, as his later actions proved, had very strange ideas of his duty as a citizen. He explained to Mr. Krüger, on the eve of the South African War, how by "a little skilful management" he would be able to "give Master Joe another fall." Mr. Bright

objected to the Crimean War quite as strongly as Labouchere did to that in South Africa, but no one would have suspected him of advising Prince Menschikoff privately how the diplomacy of Lord Palmerston might best be defeated. The result of the Queen's very natural objection was that Labouchere remained a free-lance to the end of his days, and was thus never able to learn by actual experience that to the man in office the question of how human beings can be governed presents itself in a very different light from that which he has previously conceived when in opposition. It should be added that, as a critic, Labouchere spared himself as little as he spared others. He appears to have been imbued with the idea, which is a pose often adopted by men of a cynical turn of mind, of representing his own character to the outside world as much worse than it really was. For instance, writing of his youth, he said, "I was an abominable and useless liar."

Apart from the personality of the man, the main interest in Labouchere's biography consists in the fact that the candour of his biographer has thrown a vivid searchlight on the inner working of our Parliamentary institutions. It is useless to bewail the evils of the party system. Representative government cannot be carried on without party, and party naturally begets those "underground negotiations" conducted by Lobby politicians, of which Mr. Gladstone spoke with some scorn, and which appear to have been eventually deprecated by Mr. Chamberlain. Labouchere, in spite of the active part which he took in Parliamentary discussions, never really rose above the dignity of a Lobby politician. In the Lobby he was in his element. Sir Henry Lucy, who can speak with high authority on this

point, says: "His real influence was exercised beyond the range of the Speaker's eye. Nothing pleased him more than being engaged in the Lobby, the smoking-room, or a remote corner of the corridors, working out some little plot." Although, however, it is impossible to get rid of the by-products of the party system, it is well that the public should at times get an insight into its inner working, and thus be placed on their guard against any too ready acceptance of the views advanced by extreme political partisans.

Lord Acton, in his *Advice to Persons about to Write History*, lays down as a principle of universal application that "no public character has ever stood the revelation of private utterances and correspondence." In the lives of two eminent men—the late Duke of Devonshire and Lord Lyons—which have recently been published, practical illustrations have been afforded of the fact that this verdict errs somewhat on the side of severity. It would be more just and more correct to say that the conduct of no individual, whether engaged in a public or in any other career, can fairly be judged by a few *obiter dicta* let, fall in the course of conversation or correspondence. "Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim." This preliminary observation should be constantly borne in mind in considering the very interesting correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Labouchere on the occasion of the split in the Liberal Party which occurred in 1886. In forming a matured opinion on the negotiations which took place at that time, care should be taken not to attach undue importance to any casual expression used in letters which were not intended for publication, and which were written during the storm and stress of an



acute political crisis. The broad features of the views entertained by the negotiators should be considered rather than the language used in the expression of those views.

Starting from this general principle, it is clear that the attitude taken up by the two parties to the correspondence presents a striking contrast. At the outset they had much in common. Both were fervent Radicals. Both were strong party politicians. A moralist may perhaps be saddened by the reflection that a common animosity tends, perhaps more than anything else, to cement a political alliance; but, however regrettable it may appear, history has abundantly proved the accuracy of the fact. In the case now under consideration, this bond of union was not wanting. Labouchere overflowed with hatred for the Whigs, and Mr. Chamberlain, unconscious that in a near future he was to co-operate heartily with politicians of the most orthodox Whig type, yielded a ready response to the political chord which Labouchere never ceased to touch, and intimated that "he hated the Whigs more than the Tories." In spite, however, of the identity of sentiment and opinion which existed on many points, the two politicians in reality approached the question of Home Rule in Ireland from wholly different standpoints.

Labouchere was not a Home Ruler by conviction. In the early stages of the controversy he had expressed an opinion that Union between Great Britain and Ireland was "absolutely necessary for the well-being of both countries"; and at a later stage when, in writing to the *Times*, he belauded "the largeness and broadness of view" of the Irish leaders, he was simultaneously but privately expressing the opinion that "the Irish idea of patriotism is to serve the country at

a good salary, and to get places for cousins, etc." But under the stress of party exigencies he soon asked himself the question, "If the Irish wish for Home Rule why should they not have it?" The reason why he changed his opinion was that he wished to destroy the House of Lords and the Church, and generally to carry into execution an extreme democratic programme. To attain these objects he was prepared to sacrifice every other consideration. "For my part," he wrote to Mr. Chamberlain, "I would coerce the Irish, grant them Home Rule, or do anything with them in order to make the Radical programme possible. Ireland is but a pawn in the game. If they make fools of themselves when left to themselves, it would be easy to treat them as the North did the South—rule by the sword, and suppress all representation." As to the interests of the outlying portions of the British Empire, they were not to be considered for one moment. He warmly welcomed a suggestion made by Mr. Healy that the way to deal with the Tory Government was "to cook their goose on a side issue—Egypt, Burma, or what not." He appeared scarcely able to conceive that any politician could be animated by other feelings than personal ambition or party rancour. He constantly dangled before Mr. Chamberlain's eyes the brilliant prospect which, as leader of an ultra-Radical Party, lay before him if only "this damned Irish question" could be settled. As for Mr. Gladstone, Labouchere was willing enough at public meetings to dwell on "his noble heart and that sort of trash," but in reality he held that "the basis of Mr. Gladstone's action was an almost insane desire to come into office." With respect to Mr. Gladstone's views upon the Home Rule Bill, considered on its own merits, all he

could admit was that "the man has some feeling in the matter."

Far different was the attitude of Mr. Chamberlain. He was naturally very unwilling to break up the Liberal Party, but he held that the continued representation of Ireland at Westminster was a matter of such vital importance as to rank above party interests. To this view he steadfastly adhered throughout the whole of the discussion. It was in vain that prospects alluring to his personal ambition were held out to him. In vain was he adjured by Labouchere to "leave it vague, allowing some to think that you will vote for the Second Reading and others to think that you will not." In vain was it suggested, through the medium of Sir Charles Dilke, that "Mr. Gladstone should manage to dodge him (Mr. Chamberlain) into voting for the Second Reading." In vain did one of the greatest masters of casuistry that the world has ever known urge that "the retention of Irish members was a mere detail." All these manœuvres and specious arguments were brushed aside. Mr. Chamberlain stood firm, and, in company with the great Whig leader whose general principles had formerly been so abhorrent to him, he, for the time being at all events, succeeded in preserving the unity of the British Empire.

From that time forth the breach between the two whilom coadjutors was irremediable. Labouchere saw that the democratic paradise which he had hoped would be reached was unattainable. "In the pages of *Truth*, in the Reform Club, in the Lobby of the House of Commons, he constantly held forth, to all who would read or listen, on the 'crimes' of the man who had divided the Liberal Party against itself." Such a man was even worse than the hated Whig.

“ Nothing was too bad for ‘ Joe.’ ” But in spite of these tirades, and independently of the merits of the Home Rule question, it is impossible to read the correspondence now published by Mr. Thorold without coming to the conclusion that, whether Mr. Chamberlain was right or wrong in his opinions, his conduct throughout the negotiations was dignified and patriotic. Mr. Labouchere, on the other hand, never rose above the level of a wirepuller. His action constitutes in reality an unconscious but withering satire upon the party system and its inner working.

## IX

### AN IMPERIAL MASTER-BUILDER <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," April 4, 1914*

SIR MOUNTSTUART GRANT DUFF, in his pleasant and discursive Journal, quotes with approval the saying of an acute political observer to the effect that a man may do a great deal of useful work in the world if he is content to allow others to get the credit for it. It is somewhat humiliating to be obliged to confess that there is much truth in this aphorism, which, with humorous cynicism, concedes the point that sheer vanity is one of the principal motive-powers in the management of human affairs. But the career of Edward Gibbon Wakefield attests the fact that the laughing philosopher who in this pregnant sentence satirised the foibles of his fellow-men hit the mark. Wakefield's name is unfamiliar to the present generation. Yet the fine lines which a sixteenth-century epigrammatist wrote of Drake might, now that the Empire is held to be amongst the chief glories of England, be fitly applied to one whose political genius enabled him to forge the bonds which hold together the Anglo-Saxon race in two hemispheres :

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<sup>1</sup> *A View of the Art of Colonisation.* By Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Oxford : at the Clarendon Press. [5s. net.]

*Si taceant homines, facient te sidera notum ;  
Atque polus de te discet uterque loqui.*

When Wakefield first directed his attention to what was ultimately to become Greater Britain, the relations between the Mother Country and those of her sons who went to shift for themselves in distant parts of the world were conducted on no fixed principles. Colonisation—if that term can rightly be applied to haphazard emigration differing wholly in character from the original Greek conception of the word—was, indeed, carried on, but “in a slovenly, scrambling, and disgraceful manner.” The Ministers who had so far dealt with this subject were mere empiricists. No statesman had as yet arisen of whom it could be said, in the words which Wakefield applied to Sir Charles Metcalfe, that “God had made him greater than the Colonial Office.” English public opinion generally was either avowedly hostile to colonisation of any kind, or tolerated the system as a convenient, if egotistical, method for relieving the society of the Mother Country of some of her worst and most embarrassing by-products. “There were long experience without a system; immense results without a plan; vast designs but no principles.” As for the emigrants who were destined to be the early pioneers of British Imperialism, it may be said with truth that, even when they were not convicts, they consisted in a large measure of “beachcombers,” and other social waifs and strays of the type with which the writings of Stevenson and Louis Becke have made the present generation familiar. The only element representing the higher aspects of European civilisation who could at all temper the inevitable asperities occasioned by the first contact between grasping Europe and savage Polynesia were the

missionaries, and these latter, most unfortunately, from mistaken but by no means unworthy motives, evinced in the first instance marked hostility to the adoption of the only plan by which the cause they had at heart could be advanced.

It was to the creation of order out of this demoralising chaos that Wakefield turned his powerful intellect and untiring energy. Posterity, rather than his own contemporaries, has been able to take stock of the remarkable degree of success which he achieved in the face of obstacles well calculated to daunt and discourage any one but a pertinacious and convinced enthusiast. Dr. Garnett, whose *Life of Wakefield* is one of the most fascinating biographies of modern times, is fully justified in including Wakefield's name in the illustrious roll of British Empire-builders. The New Zealand Company which Wakefield founded, albeit its existence was of short duration, "laid the foundations of Empire broad and deep." Neither was it any exaggeration for Thornton Hunt to write: "There is no part of the British Empire which does not feel in the actual circumstances of to-day the effect of Edward Gibbon Wakefield's labours as a practical statesman."

The Clarendon Press, therefore, have done well to republish Wakefield's correspondence with the anonymous "Statesman" on *The Art of Colonisation*. The "Statesman" may perhaps have been Sir William Molesworth, but, whoever he was, his letters certainly convey an accurate picture of the confused and pernicious ideas current some eighty years ago on the subject of the Colonies. "I see," he wrote to Wakefield, "with everybody who reads the newspapers, that our Colonies cost us money, much trouble, and not a little shame, without rendering any

important service to us in return." He therefore sought Wakefield's advice as to how this deplorable state of things could be rectified. In reply, Wakefield expounded his plans in a series of letters which, although somewhat disfigured by vituperation of those, like Lord Grey, by whom he had been thwarted, are nevertheless productions of great merit, whether they be regarded from the point of view of the statesman or that of the literary critic. As is well known, the main mischief, in Wakefield's opinion, was that enormous grants of land had been heedlessly made, and that, owing to the scarcity of labour, they could not be utilised. The case of the settlement on the Swan River, in Western Australia, is typical of the system which then prevailed. A grant of half a million acres was made in London to one individual, Mr. Peel. The Governor took a hundred thousand acres, another person eighty thousand, and so on. Mr. Peel brought three hundred labourers with him to Australia. Seeing that they could readily obtain land for themselves, they, of course, all left him. "In six months after his arrival he was obliged to make his own bed and fetch water for himself and light his own fire." A tale which may perhaps be apocryphal, but which happily caricatures the system in vogue, is related of a land speculator, who, seating himself on the highest hill available, said: "I claim for myself all the land I can see, and all that I cannot see for my son John." Land and labour were, in fact, completely divorced from each other. Wakefield's plan, broadly speaking, consisted in uniting them again by exacting a reasonable price for the sale of unoccupied land. His scheme underwent many modifications; but Dr. Garnett is able to say: "No Colony that gave it a fair trial has ever definitely rejected it,



and if it is now tacitly laid aside in most of them, one chief reason is that it has mainly done its work." In addition to rendering this signal service, it may be said that the chief credit of putting a stop to the vicious system under which Australia became a human cesspool for the receipt of British refuse belongs to Wakefield. It was through his exertions that the transportation of convicts was made to cease. It is curious to read now that at the time the free Colonists, who looked merely to the question of the cheapness of labour, stoutly resisted this healthy reform.

But perhaps the most enduring achievement of Wakefield's life was that which was accomplished during what was only a passing episode of his career. When the Government of the day sent Lord Durham to Canada—mainly in order to get rid of a troublesome colleague—they little thought that they were taking a step fraught with the most momentous consequences to the future of the whole British Empire. He was accompanied by Charles Buller in an official, and by Wakefield in an unofficial capacity. In what degree each of these contributed to the composition of the epoch-making Report, which has rightly been called the Magna Carta of the British Colonies, is uncertain. But it is quite true, as Dr. Garnett remarks, that "Durham, Buller, Wakefield, might all be compared to Saul, the son of Kish; hunting the strayed asses of Canadian disaffection, they found the kingdom of Responsible Government."

The man who could thus direct British Imperialism in a channel destined to be so productive of results deserves to be classed as an Empire-builder as truly as those who added to the Empire by deeds of arms. Nor, indeed, can the claim of having actually extended the limits of that

Empire be denied to him. Had it not been for the course pursued by Wakefield, who forced a sluggish and reluctant Government into action, New Zealand would have been acquired by France, to be used as a convict settlement. The reason why his merits have been insufficiently recognised by the present generation of Imperialists is that the tools which he had to use, and the methods which he had to employ, differed widely from those usually associated with the work of Empire-building. His battle-fields were the lobbies and Committee-rooms of the House of Commons, and the offices of newspaper editors, amongst whom, it may be mentioned incidentally, Mr. Rintoul, the founder of the *Spectator*, was one of his warmest supporters. It was mainly Wakefield's pertinacity and ability as a Parliamentary engineer that ultimately secured the victory of his cause. His enemies, indeed, declared that his principal talent consisted in "skilfulness in handling puppets in high places," and his sympathetic biographer admits that he showed some want of scruple in the pursuit of his aims. But it was an absence of scruple ennobled by the cause which Wakefield had at heart. His objects were not personal. The historic company which he founded was got up "by men of great souls and little pockets," and when eventually it fell into the hands of "men with great pockets and little souls" Wakefield withdrew from any participation in its proceedings. Neither did he seek for fame. Although in reality he inspired the ponderous Parliamentary Reports which laid the foundations of our future Colonial policy, Wakefield's name is rarely mentioned in their pages. He was content to work behind the scenes, and to allow others to enjoy the triumphs which he had

planned. He was the Carnot of Colonial policy. He organised victory.

That Wakefield had to adopt the procedure for which he was at times so sharply criticised was in some measure due to the accidents and vicissitudes of his private life. Curiously enough, both Wakefield and his principal antagonist, Sir James Stephen, whom he unfairly stigmatised in his correspondence with the "Statesman" as "Mr. Mothercountry," were both brought up in an "atmosphere of aggressive philanthropy." Through all the incidents of his chequered career Wakefield carried both his philanthropy and his aggressive tendencies with him to the grave. He entered the Diplomatic Service, which his father's friend, the Radical tailor, Francis Place, designated as "a rascally employment." For a short time he posed as a man of fashion, but his career both in that uncongenial capacity and as a budding diplomatist was checked by his having to spend three years in Newgate in consequence of having abducted and clandestinely married a young and wealthy schoolgirl. The world benefited by Wakefield's imprisonment, for it was contact with his Newgate associates which led him to turn his attention first to prison and later to Colonial reform. But the taint of the conviction adhered to him for long, and probably prevented him from adopting a Parliamentary career, which would have enabled him to advocate his principles in a manner more calculated to command the attention and respect both of his contemporaries and of posterity. With all his faults, and they were numerous, he was unquestionably a man of genius, whose memory should survive in the hearts of all his countrymen, and notably of those who believe in the Imperial mission and destiny of their country.

## X

### A PIONEER OF EMPIRE <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," May 9, 1914*

It is not merely a difficult, but almost an impossible, task to draw a distinct frontier-line between the qualities required of a statesman and those necessary to an administrator. The purview of the former must obviously be wider than that of the latter. He must look to general causes and their effects. He must at times be content merely to sow the seed and to allow others to reap the harvest. Whilst the crop is germinating he will often experience disappointment and be subject to much misrepresentation. The administrator, on the contrary, deals with matters immediately in hand. He expects more rapid results, and, relatively speaking, takes account to a less degree of ultimate consequences. There is truth in this commonplace view, but it is none the less certain that the statesman who will not condescend to watch the working of his principles in detail is apt to degenerate into a mere doctrinaire; whilst the administrator who is so absorbed in detail as to fail to see the wood because of the trees can never rise above the level of a shallow empiricist. The place for the political thinker

<sup>1</sup> *The Life of Sir Frederick Weld, G.C.M.G.* By Alice, Lady Lovat. London: John Murray. [15s. net.]

is the study or the lecture-room, and from these points of vantage he may often, as in the case of Adam Smith, inspire statesmanship without being himself a statesman. The practical politician, on the other hand, will rarely make any permanent mark in public affairs unless he combines the two qualities—that of capacity to form a general conception of the goal which he seeks to attain, and at the same time a mastery of the detailed methods by the adoption of which it may be reached. In the very interesting *Life* which Alice, Lady Lovat has written of Sir Frederick Weld it is justly claimed on his behalf that he fulfilled both requirements, that he was not merely a skilful administrator, but a statesman of far-reaching and comprehensive vision who persistently subordinated his means to his end. The story of Weld's useful and strenuous career justifies the verdict passed upon him by Sir Hugh Clifford in the brief preface which he has written to Lady Lovat's work, to the effect that Weld may rank as a "Pioneer of Empire." It would perhaps be more strictly correct to say that he was a "Pioneer of Empire-building." He was not one of those who, by force or diplomacy, added to the extent of the Imperial Dominions. But he ranks high amongst those who checked the progress of Imperial disintegration at a period when disintegration was imminent. He bore a distinguished part in initiating the statesmanship by which centripetal were able to take the place of centrifugal tendencies, and a growing desire for separation was replaced by union and solidarity.

Frederick Weld was born of an old Roman Catholic family in the year 1823. He therefore attained to manhood during that mournful and materialistic phase of British policy which pre-

vailed before the true grandeur of Imperialism had been recognised. This was the period when despondent statesmen wanting in initiative, followed by an apathetic public, were oppressed with the Colonial burthen, and conceived that the only way to save the ship was to jettison the cargo. Eighteenth-century experience had shown that Colonies could not be retained by force of arms. The idea that their allegiance could be secured by bonds of self-interest and affection had not yet been born. The conclusion was, therefore, generally accepted, not only that the separation of the Colonies from the Mother Country was inevitable, and could be contemplated without dismay, but that it was an end desirable in itself. In 1841 so clear-headed a political thinker as Sir George Cornewall Lewis wrote an elaborate treatise, in which he proved to his own entire satisfaction that the Colonial relation was disadvantageous both to the Mother Country and to the Colonists themselves. It was perhaps not so much argument as that vague and somewhat casual political instinct, with which the British public are often thought by Continental observers to be endowed, which prevented effect being given to these pessimistic theories. But whatever may have been the causes, it is certain that as the century grew older a great revulsion of opinion took place. Mr. Macphail, writing from a Canadian point of view in the year 1909, said with truth: "The greatest feat of England in Empire-building since 1759 is that, during the past twenty years, she has won back her Colonies by the cords of affection alone."

Amongst those who helped to initiate and to encourage this beneficent transformation, Weld occupies a distinguished place. In the autumn of 1844 he left England for New Zealand with

a very small number of sovereigns in his pocket and an order on the New Zealand Company—the creation of Edward Gibbon Wakefield—for a few hundred acres of sheep-farming land. He took about four months to arrive at his destination, during which time he lived partly on “fried porpoise liver,” and enjoyed the excitement of the ship on which he sailed being chased by a pirate brig which showed Danish colours. His first experiences in sheep-farming in the Wairarapa Valley were attended by many difficulties. His land was inundated by floods. He was himself devoured by mosquitoes and nearly died of hunger. But he held on. Amongst other incidents of Colonial life, it may be noted that he employed “a little Maori, about ten years old, who was a young chief among his own people,” to cook his dinner. The political institutions then existing in New Zealand were of a somewhat rudimentary character, but the Colonists, *more Britannico*, had established a racecourse and formed a Jockey Club, of which Weld, who was a bold and capable rider, forthwith became a member.

A man of Weld's energy and force of character was not likely to wait for long before taking a leading part in the affairs of the Colony. Accordingly, in 1848, Sir George Grey offered him a seat in the Legislative Council. Weld declined the offer. He thought that the masterful Governor's methods were far too autocratic, and that the Constitution which he had introduced was a mere sham. “I dislike,” he wrote to his father, “the idea of acting as a puppet.” In 1856 true Parliamentary government, with Ministerial responsibility, was established, and eventually Weld became Minister for Native Affairs in Mr. Stafford's Administration.

It was about this time that war broke out with the Maoris. The difficulties of the situation were greatly increased by the fact that the relations between the Governor, Sir George Grey, and Sir Duncan Cameron, who commanded the troops, were very strained. Mr. (subsequently Lord) Cardwell, who then presided at the Colonial Office, was so convinced of the harm done by these dissensions that he had determined to remove both of these high officials, and to send Sir Henry Storks, who was at the time Governor of Malta, to assume both civil and military command. The writer of the present article, who was at the time on the staff of Sir Henry Storks, well remembers deciphering a telegram early one morning in the summer of 1865 which, it was expected, would request Sir Henry to proceed at once to New Zealand. It announced, however, that the departure of Sir Duncan Cameron had eased the situation. At the same time, Sir Henry Storks was asked to proceed at once to Jamaica, in order to inquire into the outbreak which had recently occurred in that island. By three o'clock that afternoon Sir Henry Storks and his staff were on their way to Marseilles.

It was not until Weld was himself called upon to form a Ministry that an opportunity was afforded him of showing the full measure of his statesmanship. It then became apparent that, whether in dealing with Colonists or natives, he was, as Sir Thomas Cockburn-Campbell subsequently said of him, "a true Liberal in the best sense of the word." The keynote of his policy was that a self-governing Colony should be taught to rely mainly on its own resources, courage, and energy. He adopted, therefore, the bold course of sending the Imperial forces back to England, and trusting to the unaided efforts



of the Colonists themselves to maintain their position against the Maoris. This policy ultimately proved a complete success, but it naturally involved an increase in the financial burthens thrown on the Colonists, and was, consequently, for a time unpopular. The drastic measure adopted about the same time of removing the capital from Auckland to Wellington was also resented by a considerable section of local opinion. These combined causes led to Weld's fall from power, but ere he fell he had laid the foundations of a statesmanlike policy which has stood the test of time.

In dealing with natives, whether in New Zealand or elsewhere, Weld followed the principles which have always been adopted by the best school of British Imperialists. Those principles lie half-way between the pernicious extremes of harshness and sentimentality, both of which are equally hurtful. In one of the first speeches he made in the Legislative Council he said: "The rule for managing the natives resolves itself into a simple axiom which I will give you. At all risks be just, at all risks be firm." Weld acted persistently on these principles throughout his career. In Western Australia, which when he was Governor depended largely on convict labour, he incurred great unpopularity by revoking the ticket-of-leave of "a rascally convict lawyer," and also by insisting on a Colonist who had killed a native being brought to justice. At Singapore he very wisely set his face against the policy of annexing the native States, and initiated reforms of the utmost benefit which were carried out by the native rulers themselves. A qualified authority, writing in 1884 to the *Times*, said: "The chief credit of the astonishing progress made by the protected States must be given to

the Governor, Sir Frederick Weld." The eulogy passed on him by Sir Frederick Dickson when he left Singapore was well merited. Sir Frederick Weld, he said, was "a high-minded English gentleman; one who never shrank from responsibility, and never deserted his subordinates; who never took to himself credit for anything any one else had done; who was unmoved by obloquy, and fearless in the performance of his duty."

Lastly, it may be said that he gave one true indication of his capacity for Imperial rule in that he did not hesitate to employ young men in important positions. He sent Sir Hugh Clifford, who at the time was only twenty-one years of age, on a special mission of much difficulty and delicacy to the Sultan of Pahang.

FRANCE

## XI

### MIRABEAU <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," September 27, 1913*

"I INCLINE to think," M. Barthou says, "that it is impossible to know Mirabeau completely." It is, in truth, no easy matter to grasp the most salient features in the character of this man of genius, of whom his father—the crabbed old author of the *Ami des Hommes*, who passed his life in alternately vituperating and admiring his erratic offspring—said, "He is all contrasts." This is how M. Barthou describes him: "Dazzling and bewildering, outspoken and a liar, boastful—a word which may suitably be substituted for the translator's 'braggadocious'—and sincere, an original and a plagiarist, a born and accomplished actor, he could descend from the most lofty speculations to the commonest trivialities and the most revolting obscenity." He was, in fact, in words which were applied to another member of his turbulent and "tempestuous" family, "a splendid exaggeration."

It is, however, well worth the while of the historical student to endeavour to estimate correctly the main characteristics of the only constructive statesman thrown up by the first

<sup>1</sup> *Mirabeau*. By Louis Barthou, Prime Minister of France. London: William Heinemann. [10s.]

volcanic eruption of French revolutionary fury. There can be no manner of doubt as to his talents, or as to the power which those talents enabled him to exercise over all with whom he was brought in contact. He is said by his biographer to have possessed an "all-conquering charm," which rendered him popular amongst men, and which, in spite of his prodigious ugliness, proved but too often fatally attractive to women. Goethe spoke of his "mighty nature," and Madame de Staël wrote: "The day after his death, no one in the Constituent Assembly could gaze unmoved at the place where Mirabeau used to sit. The giant oak had fallen, and there was nothing to distinguish the rest." His reputation was, indeed, for a while eclipsed when, in the days of the Convention, the papers found in a certain iron chest in the Tuileries revealed to an astonished and scandalised world that the man who had been the idol of the Revolution had allowed himself to be suborned by the Court. Then that Assembly, in which vice of various descriptions was not inadequately represented, "considering that without virtue no man can be great," emulated the conduct of those English Royalists who wreaked their vengeance on the bones of Cromwell, and ordered that Mirabeau's remains should no longer rest in the Panthéon, but should be removed in a wooden coffin to the "common burial ground." But the posthumous fame of the great orator and statesman survived this ignoble treatment. Posterity recognised, with Sainte-Beuve, that much might be forgiven to a sorely tempted man whose aims were lofty, and who pursued those aims with steadfast courage. Gambetta, who possessed some characteristics in common with the man whom he eulogised, eventually said that Mirabeau "was the most

glorious political genius that France had produced since the incomparable Cardinal Richelieu."

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature in Mirabeau's political career is that, albeit he was a Tribune of the People, he scorned to adopt any of those tricks and devices which have been the common property of all demagogues since the days of Cleon. He was the antithesis of that Jacobin leader who, speaking of his followers, said, "Je suis leur chef, il faut que je les suive." The aristocratic blood which circulated in his veins, as well as his own temperament, alike impelled him to lead rather than to follow. He inherited much of the wild and daring spirit displayed by his grandfather, of whom it is related that during an action fought in 1705, which involved the destruction of a bridge, "a bullet having broken his right arm, he tried to use an axe with his left, until a musket-ball cut the sinews of his neck and also the jugular vein." His own temperament is sufficiently indicated by the fact that, when the eleven hundred members of the States-General met, all were more or less conscious that the ship of State was drifting on to the rocks, but none had any very clear ideas as to how the danger could be averted. The condition of France at that time may be fitly described in the words which Livy applied to the Rome of his day—"Nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus." Mirabeau was the single exception. With unerring, statesmanlike instinct he saw the true nature of the disease, and prescribed a cure. He welcomed the convocation of the States-General. "In twenty-four hours," he said, "the nation had stepped forward a century." He was an avowed Royalist, that is to say, he loved the monarchy for the sake of France, not France for the sake of the monarchy. He was

also an ardent Liberal. He went to the meeting of the States-General, therefore, not as the adherent of any party, but with the fixed determination to dominate all parties and to force them along the political path which he himself wished to tread.

He possessed in a high degree one talent which is indispensable to any one who aspires to be a popular leader. He was a born orator. To the ears of modern readers, the glowing periods in which frequent allusion is made to Catiline, Pericles, the Tarpeian Rock, and other commonplaces of classical literature, may appear somewhat turgid. Moreover, in the preparation of his speeches he certainly owed much to the collaboration of others, notably of Etienne Dumont and the Swiss pastor Reybaz. But his inflated style suited the temper and disposition of those whom he had to address, whilst however much he may have plagiarised in the preparation of his facts, the fire and vehemence with which he presented them, and which often held a hostile but awe-stricken audience spellbound, were all his own. Barnave, who was no mean judge of eloquence, said that "no man of his time could approach him, and no orator, ancient or modern, has ever surpassed the force and beauty of his talent." His highly critical father, albeit he called his son at times both a liar and a villain, admitted that "pathos came as natural to him as coursing to a greyhound."

But Mirabeau prided himself more on his statesmanship than on his oratory, and posterity may justly confirm the verdict which he passed on his own capacities. Some thirty years before Louis XVI. perished on the scaffold, the Marquis de Mirabeau had addressed a grave and outspoken warning to that monarch's frivolous grandfather.

“Your power, Sir,” he said, “is nothing but the union of the will of a strong and active multitude with your will ; a disjunction of these wills would cut at the root of your power. That is the evil and the source thereof.” The son was no less prescient than the father. The main articles of the political creed which he adopted when the first mutterings of the coming storm were heard, and to which amidst numerous minor aberrations he clung with unflinching persistency until a premature death removed him from the scene, were embodied in a few pregnant aphorisms.

In the first place, he held that “the abolition of the feudal system was an expiation due to ten centuries of madness.” This brought him into collision with his own order. In the second place, he wished to save the Revolution from perishing by its own excesses. With true prophetic instinct he said, “It too often happens that public danger rallies men to despotism, and in the midst of anarchy even a tyrant seems a saviour.” These views naturally brought him into collision with the Jacobins. In the third place, though a child of that Revolution, to the outbreak of which philosophers had so largely contributed, he was no doctrinaire. “A people,” he said, “that had grown old amid anti-social institutions could not adapt itself to pure philosophical principles.” Never was the eminently practical tendency of his mind displayed to greater advantage than when he did his utmost to save the prejudiced and inexperienced theorists with whom he was associated from committing the fatal blunder of excluding ministers from the Assembly. In the fourth place, he persistently but unsuccessfully urged the King to action. “The monarchy,” he said, “is in danger rather from the lack of government than from con-



spiracy." Broadly speaking, it may be said that the whole of Mirabeau's political system was embodied in these four general principles.

Was there any chance that, had he lived, his ideals would have been realised? It may safely be conjectured that the chances of success were very small. The most skilful workman must be to some extent dependent on the excellence of his tools. In this case the tools were singularly unfitted to execute the work. Mirabeau was right in thinking that the most formidable danger of the situation lay in the character of the King. That character was accurately described in the famous remark made by the Comte de Provence: "The King's indecision passes all telling. To give you an idea of his character, imagine yourself with two oiled ivory balls and trying to keep them together." The Queen was made of sterner stuff. She so impressed Mirabeau at the historic interview, which must have cost the proud daughter of Maria Theresa dear, that, if we are to believe Madame Campan, he kissed her hand on parting and said, "Madame, the monarchy is saved." But, though driven by necessity to call in so hated a counsellor, the Queen never trusted Mirabeau, neither can she be blamed for her mistrust. In her eyes he must have appeared, a man whose infamous conduct in private life had shocked a society not distinguished for the adoption of any very high standard of morals, a venal demagogue who was prepared to put his talents up to auction, and a traitor to his own order. Moreover, all the evidence goes to show that throughout the negotiations with the Court both the King and the Queen were only playing with Mirabeau. Count Fersen, who is a thoroughly competent witness, puts the case very plainly. "Mirabeau," he wrote to the

King of Sweden, "is still paid by the Court. . . . It is worth while not to have him against us." It is also clear that King, Queen, and courtiers alike disbelieved in the necessity of such drastic reforms as those proposed by Mirabeau. Up to the last moment they looked forward with confidence to a counter-revolution. Mirabeau read the signs of the times far too accurately to indulge in any such delusions. "The Revolution," he said, "may no doubt disintegrate into anarchy; but it will never fall back in favour of despotism." It can, therefore, be no matter for surprise that Mirabeau's negotiations with the Court led to no practical consequences. He never anticipated any other result. "I shall probably," he said, "meet the fate of Cassandra; I shall always prophesy truly and shall never be believed."

It appears, therefore, improbable that even if Mirabeau had lived it would have been possible to control the Revolution. It is true that Mirabeau's death was Robespierre's opportunity, but it would be carrying the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy to the extreme of fallacious reasoning to infer that if Mirabeau had lived no Robespierre would have arisen.

## XII

### FOUQUIER TINVILLE <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," November 22, 1913*

"REVOLUTION," Mr. G. Trevelyan says with truth in his history of England under the Stuarts, "is the historian's touchstone, by which to try the quality of a race or age." Posterity, generalising after a lapse of more than a century, has pronounced the verdict that the French stood this supreme test well, and that they eventually emerged from the fiery ordeal to which they were submitted with their national life quickened and purified of the chief abuses which had made revolution not only inevitable but even justifiable. The wreck of the French social and political system brought the fine qualities of the nation into strong relief, and afforded opportunities to individuals of both sexes for the display of true heroism. Under the inspiring strains of the "Marseillaise," the young untrained conscripts of France flocked to the frontiers to repel the invaders of their country. Tyrannicide was justified in the person of Charlotte Corday, of whom the Girondist Vergniaud, albeit her act cost him and his companions their lives, was able to say, "She has taught us how to die." The story

<sup>1</sup> *The Public Prosecutor of the Terror.* By Alphonse Dunoyer. Translated by A. W. Evans. London: Herbert Jenkins. [12s. 6d.]

that Mlle. de Sombreuil drank a cup of blood to save her aged father from his impending fate is of very doubtful authenticity; but Cazotte's life was certainly spared, although only for a time, by the courageous intervention of his daughter, and more than one case occurred of a father, who had been arrested by mistake for his son, mounting the steps of the guillotine without making the smallest attempt to save his own life by revealing his identity. Neither was the display of qualities which command admiration confined to the victims. Napoleon had but little sympathy with the extravagances of the Revolution, but, a strong man himself, he appreciated strength in others. Madame de Staël called him "a Robespierre on horseback." He stated as his opinion that no men were so vigorous and efficient as those who had gone through the Revolution. He gave office to a hundred and twenty regicides, most of whom were Montagnards. The times were, indeed, such that, as in the days of Tiberius, the best guarantee for safety lay in complete obscurity. None but those of iron nerve would willingly take even the most humble part in public affairs. Sieyès, although, as was shown on the 18th Brumaire, a man of undoubted courage, never recovered from the shock which he received in only narrowly escaping from the clutches of Robespierre. Forty years later, when he was lying on his death-bed and was in the delirium of fever, he sent word to his porter to say that if Robespierre called he was to say that his master was not at home.

It was inevitable that amidst the convulsive throes of the Revolution heroism on the one side should be balanced by the display of human nature in its most ignoble and repulsive features on the other. Society was stirred to its depths,

and the scum came to the surface. Amongst those whose names have become by-words as representatives of cowardly and savage brutality not one has gained a more infamous notoriety than Fouquier Tinville, the Public Prosecutor under the Terror. The biography which M. Dunoyer has written of this man can scarcely be classed amongst those numerous efforts to white-wash the bad characters of history with which the literary world is familiar. To attempt the apotheosis of Fouquier Tinville would, indeed, be a hopeless task. But M. Dunoyer appears to think that this judicial murderer should not be denied the posthumous grace which he refused, when alive, to accord to his innocent victims, and that his defence should be heard. The facts on his behalf have, therefore, been stated. A consideration of those facts leads to the conclusion that no criminal in the dock or at the bar of history ever made a defence more flimsy or less conclusive.

It sometimes happens that a portrait of an individual is a very useful gloss on the written history of his career. M. Dunoyer has fulfilled one of the first duties of a biographer. He places on his frontispiece a very striking portrait of Fouquier Tinville. It requires no Lavater to read that physiognomy. The thin compressed lips, the puckered forehead, the raised eyebrows, and the staring eyeballs, which seem starting out of the picture with horror at the scenes they had witnessed, tell their own tale.<sup>1</sup> Craven fear is to be read in every lineament of this man's features. It cannot, indeed, be doubted that fear lest anything approaching to lenity would cost them

<sup>1</sup> There is a plaster cast of Fouquier Tinville's head in Madame Tussaud's exhibition, which leaves a somewhat different impression. The features and general expression are not displeasing.

their own lives was the feeling predominant in the minds of Fouquier and his atrocious associates. Like the senators of Rome in Juvenal's verse, they trembled by reason of their association with the great :

Proceres . . .

In quorum facie miseræ magnæque sedebat  
Pallor amicitiae.

Fouquier said at his trial that the threats to which he had been exposed restrained him from obeying the benevolent dictates of his heart. Amar and his ruffianly colleagues turned pale at the idea that the Dantonists should be heard in their own defence. "Anger and fright were painted on their faces, so much did they seem to fear lest their victims might escape death." Their fears were justifiable. No one was safe. For instance, the invaluable services rendered to France by Carnot, the "organiser of victory," constituted no guarantee for his safety. "At the first reverse," Robespierre said, "Carnot's head shall fall."

In sixteen months, Fouquier successfully prosecuted and sent to the scaffold two thousand six hundred and twenty-five individuals of both sexes. "Heads," he said, "were falling like slates." Yet he was not satisfied. He thought that "things would never go well so long as they did not guillotine a hundred a day." In the early days of the Revolutionary Tribunal some mock legal proceedings were instituted before sentence was passed, but after the attempt on the life of Collot d'Herbois had stimulated the ferocity of the Terrorists, all pretence of according a fair trial to the accused was practically abandoned. "Persons were no longer tried, they were condemned." The victims were of all classes. A warrant was issued for the arrest of the Duchesse

de Biron. There were two duchesses of that name. Which was to be brought? Fouquier soon solved that question. "Bring both," he said; "they will both pass through it." An usher was sent to summon some witnesses to appear against the Marquise de Feuquières. There was some delay in finding them. Fouquier could not wait. Before the witnesses appeared the unfortunate lady's head had been shorn off by the guillotine. Two poor chimney-sweepers were described in their indictment as "ex-nobles." They were sent to the scaffold, as also was a lad of sixteen whose sole offence was that he had thrown a red herring at a turnkey. In order to expiate the attempted assassination of Collot d'Herbois by one man, a batch of fifty-four persons who, without a shadow of evidence, were supposed to be incriminated, suffered the extreme penalty of the law. Sometimes jurors did not know of what crime those whom they had already sent to death were accused. One of them told Fouquier that he could ascertain if he liked to run after the cart which was conveying the condemned men to execution. "At this remark Fouquier burst into laughter." The Duchesse d'Abrantes relates in her memoirs that Madame de Montmorency, the Abbess of Montmartre, who was blind, deaf, and ninety years of age, was brought before the Tribunal, and adds: "When interrogated, Fouquier Tinville was obliged to scream to her, as she had been deprived of her ear-trumpet, and failing with all his exertions to make himself heard, she was condemned for having *conspiré sourdement*." Instances of this sort might be multiplied. They sufficiently disposed of Fouquier's plea that he was an unwilling instrument in carrying out the bloodthirsty laws enacted by others. "He appears to us clearly,"

M. Dunoyer says, "as a public official bent on keeping his place and the handsome salary it represented, at the price of every form of servility, even the basest, most criminal, and most dishonourable." To this crushing indictment may be added the fact that he was a drunkard, and was often under the influence of drink when in the execution of his terrible office. In comparison with the crimes of which only a few examples are here cited, the inhuman and wholly unnecessary cruelty of sequestering the last touching letters written by Marie Antoinette and the Princess of Monaco to their children may be regarded as almost insignificant.

M. Dunoyer does not, therefore, attempt to defend Fouquier, but he brings forward a few palliating circumstances in connection with his character and career. Fouquier, he says, "thorough instrument of the Terror though he was, was accessible to feelings of humanity and pity." "He was good to his wife and children, he loved them tenderly." He prevented ninety-four so-called "conspirators" of Nantes, against whom there were no witnesses, from being brought to trial. Occasionally, when officious friends complained of the detention of prisoners of whose innocence they were fully convinced, and urged that they should at once be brought to trial, Fouquier, knowing full well that trial and condemnation to death were synonymous terms, was merciful enough not to accede to their demands. On the other hand, when the prisoners had the audacity to ask that certain sums of money, which had been seized on them when arrested, should be restored in order to supply their immediate wants, he became irritated. "Give me the list of these beggars," Fouquier said; "I will make them pass through it to-morrow." The pleas



set up in partial defence of Fouquier were rejected by his contemporaries after a long and patient trial. They will certainly not be accepted by posterity. Amongst the many infamous characters hurled into prominence by the revolutionary volcano no individual appears to have excited more bitter animosity than Fouquier. The journalist Fréron, who was one of the most violent of the Thermidorians, demanded at the trial that "Fouquier Tinville should be sent to stew in the hell of blood which he had shed." When he was sent to prison, he was received by the other prisoners with wild shouts of rage. In order to afford him protection, he had to be confined in a solitary cell. The wretched man was eventually accompanied to the scaffold by the curses of those whose friends and relations he had sent to death, neither was their wrath assuaged when he had expiated his crimes. "The people howled, and asked his head to be shown to them. The executioner seized it and displayed it to the eager gaze of the public."

Psychologists, who are curious in observing the contradictions of human thought and action, may be interested in a fact recorded by Le Nôtre. On the death of Fouquier Tinville's wife, a copper medallion of the Virgin was found in her possession to which a card was attached with the inscription, "Il l'avait au cou lorsqu'il fit condamner la veuve Capet." In his youth, when he was a candidate for judicial employment under the French Government, he had received a certificate stating that he was "of good life, morals, and conversation, and of the Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion." Moreover, he was well educated. "He loved Latin quotations, having been an excellent student, and he sometimes allowed himself to be disarmed by them."

### XIII

## MARIE ANTOINETTE AND BARNAVE <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," January 17, 1914*

DURING the years 1791 and 1792 events in Paris were hastening to their tragic end. The spirit which eventually found expression in the disastrous Declaration of Pillnitz animated the Continental Powers of Europe. England, guided by Pitt, to whose wise statesmanship at this period tardy historical justice has at last been done, stood alone in holding that it was for Frenchmen, and Frenchmen alone, to decide how France should be governed. Constitutionals, Girondists, Feuillants, and the like were being gradually but surely crushed out of existence between the upper and the nether millstones—between the folly and perversity of the emigrants, and especially of the emigrant Princes, of whose proceedings a graphic account is given in M. Ernest Daudet's *Histoire de l'Émigration*, and the uncompromising violence of the Jacobin mob. As the last shred of hope that it would be possible to control the volcanic forces let loose by the Revolution disappeared, the chivalrous soul of the young Swede who had planned and executed

<sup>1</sup> *Marie Antoinette, Fersen et Barnave: leur Correspondance.* Par O. G. de Heidenstam. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. [2s. 8d.]

the abortive flight to Varennes was all aflame with one idea. How could the life of the King, and still more that of the Queen, whom he worshipped with a passionate love, be saved? Heedless of the warnings of Marie Antoinette, who with true womanly unselfishness feared for the life of one to whose devotion she was certainly far from indifferent, he resolved to visit Paris in disguise. He had an interview with the King and Queen and urged them to seek safety in flight. The weak, well-meaning King, with all his faults, was thoroughly honest and courageous. He had promised after Varennes to make no second attempt to fly. He would abide by his word. The high-mettled Queen scouted indignantly the idea that she should escape alone with her children. Whatever the risks might be, she would stay with her husband. Then, at a last interview which she had with Count Fersen on February 21, 1792, she consigned to his care a packet containing the correspondence which had recently passed between herself and Barnave. The King was less careful of the future than the Queen. He carelessly left in the drawer of a writing-table a document which at a subsequent period was sufficient to send Barnave and his coadjutor Lameth to the scaffold. The letters entrusted to Count Fersen eventually passed into the possession of his sister, Countess Sophie Piper, and have been preserved by her descendants. These, together with some other letters written, chiefly in America, by Fersen to his sister, have now been given to the world through the intermediary of M. de Heidenstam.

Of Fersen's own letters little need be said. It is clear that the Queen was much attracted by the handsome young Swede when, in 1779, he first made his appearance in Paris. Creutz, the

Swedish Minister, wrote to Gustavus III. : " *La reine ne peut pas le quitter des yeux.*" Fersen recognised the danger and fled from it. Three miserable years passed in America did not, however, suffice to extinguish the passion which had been aroused in his breast. On his return to Europe, his father endeavoured to arrange a marriage for his son, first with an English heiress, and then with Mlle. Necker, subsequently Madame de Staël. Both projects failed, and the young man, after the manner of disconsolate lovers, informed his sister, to whom he confided everything, that as the only woman he could ever love was beyond his reach, he would remain single all his life. He was irresistibly attracted to Paris, and as misfortunes thickened round the person of the Queen, and as her danger and isolation became more marked, his personal devotion waxed. Her rescue from the imminent peril which encompassed her became the sole object of his life. So far as this particular romantic episode is concerned, the revelations now made do not add materially to what was heretofore known.

It is otherwise with the Barnave correspondence. His letters, as also the answers sent to them, are deeply interesting. They throw a somewhat new light on the character of Marie Antoinette. Students of Revolutionary history scarcely need to be reminded that Barnave was one of the famous triumvirate who, in the early stages of the Revolution, exercised great, indeed almost predominant, influence, and of whom Dumont, the historian of Mirabeau, said, "Whatsoever these three have in hand, Duport thinks it, Barnave speaks it, Lameth does it." He was deputed, with Pétion, to bring the Royal Family back from Varennes. The Queen, in her distress-

ful journey back to Paris, tried to influence her captors. Pétion, all unconscious of the day when he too would plead in vain for mercy, and would only escape the guillotine by a tragic death which was probably self-inflicted—for his dead body was found "eaten by dogs" in a cornfield—proved wholly intractable. Not so Barnave. His generous and chivalrous nature, coupled with the comparative moderation of his political opinions, induced him to lend a ready ear to the pleadings of beauty in distress. Marie Antoinette resolved to take advantage of these favourable dispositions. Mercy Argenteau, the Austrian Ambassador, on whom she had been accustomed to rely for guidance and advice, had been recalled from Paris. In her complete isolation she had to look for help wherever it could be found. Accordingly, early in July 1791, she communicated with Barnave through an intermediary. "Je désire," she said, "fort pouvoir savoir par lui ce que nous avons à faire dans la position actuelle." The correspondence thus begun lasted until the end of the following December. Forty-four letters were exchanged. None of Marie Antoinette's letters were signed, but they are all in her own handwriting, which can easily be identified. There can be no doubt of their authenticity. Barnave's name is never mentioned. He is always called "2 : 1." There is some doubt as to the personality of the intermediary through whose agency the correspondence was conducted. He is always termed "1 : 0." M. de Heidenstam conjectures that this individual may have been the Abbé Louis, who subsequently, as Baron Louis, became Louis Philippe's first Minister of Finance.

Barnave and his associates succeeded in gaining the confidence of Marie Antoinette. In a

letter dated August 12, 1791, addressed to her brother, the Emperor Leopold, which is given in the invaluable collection of M. Feuillet de Conches, she apologised for entering into communication of any kind with those who, but a short time previously, had been numbered amongst her most dangerous enemies, and she adds : " Je ne crois pas me tromper sur leur sincérité." On the other hand, Marie Antoinette was not successful in her attempts to inspire confidence in the minds of the triumvirate. It was earnestly pressed upon her that the aristocracy, whom she had so far considered as the chief pillars of the monarchy, were in reality its most dangerous enemies ; that the King should place himself at the head of the party in favour of constitutional reform ; that every effort should be made to secure the return of the emigrants ; and that her own influence should be exerted to obtain the recognition of the Constitution by the Powers of Europe. Above all, it was strongly urged upon her that anything approaching to menace from abroad would be fatal to the Royal cause. Marie Antoinette was far too intelligent not to grasp the force of these arguments. She assented, but with what casuists call a mental reserve, to the Barnave programme. She pleaded, however, that she had been separated from her brother, the Emperor, for twenty-six years, and that her influence over his actions and opinions was greatly exaggerated. She appreciated more fully than Barnave and his coadjutors the temper of the emigrants, and especially the emigrant Princes, who wholly failed to realise the true condition of France, who cared nothing for the safety of herself or her husband, and whose motto was " Périsset le Roi, plutôt que la royauté." Actuated by these conflicting sentiments, she naturally wavered and

acted in a manner which threw suspicion on her sincerity. She accepted the Constitution, and assured Barnave that she was using her influence abroad in the sense in which he desired. But simultaneously (July 30, 1791) she wrote to the Duchesse de FitzJames that the Constitution was "un tissu d'absurdités impraticables," and added: "Je persiste toujours à désirer que les Puissances traitent avec une force en arrière d'elles, mais je crois qu'il serait extrêmement dangereux d'avoir l'air de vouloir entrer." On October 19 she assured Count Fersen, who resented her holding any communication with those whom both he and she called "les enragés," that he need be under no alarm. "Si j'en vois et que j'ai des relations avec quelques-uns d'eux, ce n'est que pour m'en servir." She can, indeed, scarcely be blamed if she hesitated to follow blindly the lead of the triumvirate, but her attitude was none the less calculated to shake even the hardy optimism of Barnave. Save on one point, however, she succeeded, after some personal interviews which were arranged at the risk of the lives of those concerned, in coming to terms with her friends. The exception was of a character similar to that which wrecked the fortunes of a latter-day representative of her house. She clung tenaciously to monarchical symbols. The facings on the uniforms of the King's guard must be yellow, and not tricolor. On this point Barnave was equally intractable. "Les trois couleurs," he said, "mettent le peuple avec le Roi contre les Jacobins. Le jaune met le peuple avec les Jacobins contre le Roi."

The negotiations, which were prolonged far beyond the time when their success was within the bounds of possibility, ended, of course, in

complete failure. Nevertheless, the correspondence now published reveals a somewhat new aspect of Marie Antoinette's character. It will no longer be possible for historians to depict her as merely a frivolous and foolish woman who coveted a diamond necklace, who was tossed hither and thither on the waves of a great political convulsion without at all recognising the gravity of the situation, and who ultimately redeemed her reputation to some extent by the calmness and steadfast courage with which she met her cruel fate. She was more than all this. Her correspondence with Barnave shows that she was a skilful negotiator and an acute politician. M. de Heidenstam says : " Nous trouvons en elle une femme politique, à l'esprit alerte, ferme et viril, au jugement sûr et pratique, qui sait dominer ses sentiments, qui a le courage d'aller à l'encontre des traditions dans lesquelles elle a été élevée dans le but de sauver la vieille monarchie française en l'accommodant aux idées nouvelles." The verdict is perhaps somewhat partial and exaggerated, but it contains a strong element of truth.

Another conclusion to be drawn from this correspondence is that it confirms the unfavourable view generally taken of the conduct of the emigrant Princes, and notably of that of the Comte de Provence. There was no element of greatness in the future Louis XVIII. But he appears to have possessed certain humble aptitudes. Comte Beugnot, who knew him well and made out the best case he could for his Royal master, said : " Au rôti, il découpait avec une rare dextérité." It appears, moreover, that although he never played whist himself, he was a frequent onlooker when the game was being played by others, and that he was an adept in criticising their



play. "Il signalait les moindres fautes, et pouvait nommer au dernier coup les cartes qui restaient dans les mains des partenaires." The times, however, unfortunately called for the display of more exalted talents than these.

## XIV

### FRENCH CIVILISATION <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," February 7, 1914*

DE TOCQUEVILLE once remarked that France would possibly always continue to inspire feelings amongst other nations alternating from the extreme of sympathy and admiration to the other extreme of scorn and hatred, but he added that there was one sentiment which foreigners would never be able to entertain. No European community, he predicted, could ever afford to be indifferent to the thoughts and actions of Frenchmen. The statement was true at a time when the French conscript tramped into every capital of Continental Europe, from Moscow to Madrid. It is scarcely less true now that French military glory and prowess have to some extent been eclipsed. During the nineteenth century ideas born in France, quite as much as French arms, shook every throne in Europe, and caused a ferment in every civilised and many uncivilised societies. Now, as ever, the trend of French thought and the internal political and social condition of France are of far more than academic interest to all Europe, and especially to her nearest neighbours. M. Guérard's thoughtful

<sup>1</sup> *French Civilisation in the Nineteenth Century.* By Albert L. Guérard. London: T. Fisher Unwin. [12s. 6d. net.]

and highly instructive work will therefore have performed a very useful function if it leads politicians in this country to take stock of the sentiments and aspirations now uppermost in French society. "Is France a wounded nation slowly bleeding to death, or still the pioneer of the Western world?"

Such is the very pertinent question which M. Guérard asks, and although he cautiously abstains from giving any dogmatic reply to his query, he furnishes us with a number of facts, accompanied by judicious comment, which go a long way towards enabling an opinion to be formed on this highly important point.

Although, in dealing with such matters, wide generalisations must almost always be imperfect, it is none the less true not only that each of the great nations of Europe possesses special national characteristics, but also that those characteristics are undergoing constant modification. The homely virtues which evoked the sympathy of the world in the days of Germany's comparative political insignificance are probably still displayed by a number of individual Germans, but they no longer constitute the leading attributes of German national character. A hard realistic spirit, the offspring of militarism and commercialism, has taken the place of the dreamy idealism of former days. The national spirit of modern Germany appears to foreigners to be accurately embodied in the following lines written by the poet Leuthold:

Nicht des Geistes, sondern des Schwertes Schärfe  
Gab dir alles, wiedererstand'nes Deutschland . . .  
Ruhm und Einheit, äuss're Macht und Wohlfahrt  
Dankst du dem Eisen!

The belief heretofore current on the Continent

of Europe that the English were an eminently practical and conservative nation certainly requires modification. So keen an observer as Lord Beaconsfield said that they were the most emotional people in Europe ; and M. Hanotaux, writing but a few years ago, described the English as " la race la plus politique et la plus imaginative du monde." As for English conservatism, there is, to say the least, some ground for suspicion that it depended more on institutions, which were the outcome of historical development and which have now been shattered, than on engrained national character.

In no country has national character undergone a more profound change during the last century than in France. Lord Morley in his *Life of Gladstone* says that " in politics it often takes more time to get rid of a spurious character than to acquire the real one." The remark is as true about nations as it is about individuals. The past history of France has in the eyes of foreigners invested Frenchmen with attributes which, generally speaking, they have ceased to possess. French sociability, indeed, still flourishes. It is still true, as has been well said by a patriotic Frenchman, that if France were to disappear " le monde y perdrait son sourire." But the idea formerly current, and not even yet entirely defunct, that the instability of French institutions, and the love of military glory which was supposed to be innate in every individual Frenchman, constitute an abiding menace to the peace of Europe, is, or ought to be, a thing of the past.

The Revolution gave currency to the opinion that the French were inspired by a restless love of change. It is too often forgotten that they clung for eight hundred years with unswerving fidelity to the Capetian dynasty. Students of

history are well aware that previous to the Revolutionary upheaval the taunt most frequently levelled in France against England was to contrast the instability of English with the solid stability of French political institutions. Subsequent to the Revolution, French conservatism was obscured and, to all outward appearance, in some degree stifled by frequent and, until recently, unsuccessful endeavours to attain stability. The unintelligent reactionary policy of Charles X. had to give way to the *bourgeois* monarchy of Louis Philippe, which, with all its commonplace virtues, never took any real root in the country, and this latter again yielded to the flashy Caesarism of a ruler who was not truly Napoleonic in anything but name. From an historical point of view, one of the most interesting portions of M. Guérard's work is that in which he passes judgment on the Second Empire. "Public opinion, in France and abroad," he says, "has not yet learned to judge the Empire fairly." He urges that the foreign policy of the "Imperial Hamlet" was based on the principle of nationalities, and that the ease with which France paid the crushing war indemnity exacted by Germany bears eloquent testimony to the material prosperity fostered by Napoleon III. It may be that the verdict of posterity on the Second Empire has erred somewhat on the side of severity, yet, even allowing for exaggeration and caricature in M. Daudet's account of *Le Nabab*, it is difficult to arouse any high degree of posthumous enthusiasm for a *régime* whose main characteristics were personified in a politician of the type of de Morny.

Throughout all these political convulsions, ending in the establishment of the present Republic, the broad features of the system under

which France was governed remained unchanged. "The permanent bureaucracy," M. Guérard says, "absorbed the shocks of repeated revolutions, and gave the national life of France a continuity that political history would not lead us to expect." Since the establishment of the Republic numerous Ministries have flitted across the political stage. But such changes have merely involved a reshuffling of the political pack of cards. There has been no fundamental change of system. France appears at last to have acquired institutions of a sufficiently stable character to enable the conservatism, natural to a people amongst whom property is highly subdivided, to assert itself. "Every general election for the last forty years has shown the steadiness of the electorate, moderate as a whole, slowly moving towards the Radical Left, without any of those sudden 'swings of the pendulum' and 'land slides' so frequent in British and American politics." "The army of social conservation," M. Guérard tells us, "is overwhelmingly strong. . . . The vast majority of the people are conservative without fanaticism."

No less profound has been the change which has taken place in the alleged thirst of the French for military glory. It was, in fact, moribund before the downfall of its creator. No more remarkable fact is recorded in the history of the Napoleonic Wars than the sharp fall of French Rentes which ensued when the false news reached Paris that Napoleon had gained a great victory at Waterloo, followed by a decided rise when the real truth was known. The people of Paris, M. Fournier says, "dreaded a success to Napoleon almost as much as a reverse to the army." M. Guérard characterises the "immense popularity of the Emperor" as "a posthumous legend."

Even without the revival of that legend the war with Germany was probably inevitable. The uses of adversity have been turned to good account by the French. The military strength of the nation has been quietly and unostentatiously restored, whilst the dignified foreign policy adopted of late years has afforded abundant testimony that that strength will not be exerted to further a policy of aggressive adventure, but will be reserved for purposes of legitimate defence. "A growing number of men," M. Guérard says, "in all walks of life see the criminal folly of militarism, and the possibility of checking its further growth. France is, next to America, the great Power in which the pacifist movement is strongest."

Side by side with the movement towards conservatism and pacifism, a great change is noticeable in the general intellectual attitude of Frenchmen. It is, indeed, difficult to believe that any advantage, whether dogmatic, political, or social, can have accrued to the cause of religion or morality from the sweeping condemnations issued by the Vatican in the early part of last century against men like Lamennais, Montalembert, and Lacordaire, who endeavoured to Christianise the French democracy, or by the anathemas launched at a later period by Pius IX. against all who held that "the Roman Pontiff can and must be reconciled and compromise with progress, liberalism, and modern civilisation." The ultimate effect of these utterances was to make Gambetta denounce clericalism as the true enemy of France, and, later, to lead to the abandonment of that Concordat to which Napoleon had made a somewhat reluctant people assent. Still less is it possible to doubt that the alliance between the Vatican and the anti-Dreyfusites, whose move-

ment was far more political than anti-Semite, was a fatal error. "Every victory of Dreyfus' cause was a defeat for the Church ; she had taken the wrong side, and had soon to pay the penalty." None the less, religion, of that Roman Catholic type which is alone adapted to the French temperament, has survived the narrow-minded follies of its own official representatives as it survived the previous attacks of Voltairean philosophers. Neo-Catholicism in France has found exponents in the persons of Maurice Barres, Henry Bordeaux, and others whose works appear to have supplanted the polished agnosticism of Renan and the cynical pessimism of Anatole France. The influence which these writers have exerted is fully discussed in an interesting article written by Dr. Georges Chatterton-Hill and published in the January number of the *Edinburgh Review*. In a word, it may be said that intellectual pessimism, which was the natural outcome of the Sedan disaster, and which to some extent found its counterpart in Germany after Jena, has given way to a healthy optimism, and no nation has any cause to despair when optimism prevails. Belief in its own destinies is the most priceless talisman which any nation can possess. In spite of a falling birth-rate, of alcoholism, of the deadening influence of that routine which is the outcome of a highly bureaucratic system of administration, M. Guérard is able to point with justifiable pride and absolute accuracy to the "indomitable vitality" of the French people. A nation so gifted as the French may be wounded, and even very sorely wounded, but it may be predicted with confidence that it will not succumb to its wounds.



## XV

### NAPOLEON AND ALI OF YANINA <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," February 28, 1914*

ALI PASHA OF YANINA, the turbulent clansman who, like his countryman, Mehemet Ali, braved the power of the Sultan and carved out a kingdom for himself, has enjoyed a degree of posthumous fame in excess of that generally accorded to those masterful adventurers of whom the East has been so prolific. The numerous stirring episodes of his chequered career, his daring, ferocity, and dissimulation, have formed the subject of countless tales and popular ballads. There is probably no Epirote or Corfiote child whose young imagination has not been excited by the pathetic story, told in tuneful verse by Aristoteles Valaoriti, of "The Lady Phrosine," who paid with her life the love she bore to Ali's son. The heroism of the Suliotes and the infamy of the traitor Botzaris, who handed over the rock, heretofore deemed impregnable, to "the man of war and woes," as Byron called Ali, have been recounted in endless lays and odes.

We know much of the personal appearance and general behaviour of this remarkable man. He

<sup>1</sup> *L'Albanie et Napoléon : 1797-1814.* Par A. Boppe. Paris : Librairie Hachette et Cie. [3fr. 50c.]

was visited by Byron and Hobhouse—the two “soi-disants mylords” of the French report quoted by M. Boppe. Hobhouse recorded that “Ali’s liveliness and ease gave us a very favourable impression of his natural capacity.” The comment made by Dr. (subsequently Sir Henry) Holland, who was probably a more observant physiognomist than Hobhouse, shows greater penetration. He visited Yanina in 1814, and noted in his journal that the expression of Ali was like “the fire of a stove burning fiercely under a smooth and polished surface.” The cruelty for which he has gained an unenviable notoriety in Epirote annals was partly inherited and partly due to the circumstances in which he was placed. His savage and masterful mother, Khamco, trained him to be a brigand. “Remember,” she said to him when he was a child, “that the property of others only belongs to them by the right of the stronger; why then should it not be yours?” She left as a dying legacy to Ali and his sister the task of avenging on some neighbouring tribesmen the indignities which she had suffered at their hands. Her behests were all too faithfully executed. In due time, when Ali had risen to power, the wretched Gardikiotes were slaughtered; and Ali’s implacable sister, Chainitza, who was denounced by a courageous Sheikh as a “daughter of Belial, the encourager of Ali’s crimes,” caused their wives to be driven to the mountains, where they died of hunger and exposure, and made a cushion of the hair of their heads. Testimony to the drastic methods by which Ali thought he could alone maintain his authority over the turbulent Albanians is borne by M. Pouqueville, the very intelligent French Consul who was sent by Napoleon to Yanina and who played an important part in Albanian affairs.

“Whenever,” M. Pouqueville wrote, “I have followed any of the roads previously travelled by Ali Pasha, I have never failed to observe some ditch recently filled up, or wretches hanging on the trees. His footsteps were everywhere imprinted in blood; and it was upon these occasions that, to display the extent of his power, he ordered executions as terrible as they were unexpected.”

An English *Life of Ali*, published in 1823, deals incidentally with the relations between Napoleon and the robber chieftain of Albania. M. Boppe, the Councillor of the French Embassy at Constantinople, is, however, to be congratulated on having again drawn attention to this little-known page of history. In a work which affords evidence of careful research, and which is singularly free from patriotic bias, M. Boppe gives a very full, lucid, and, it cannot be doubted, accurate account of the leading events which occurred during the seventeen years of the French connection with Epirus and the Ionian Islands.

There is a monotonous sameness about the history of the events which occurred when the East was first brought into close contact with modern Europe. Everywhere the same features are revealed. First come aggression on the part of the European and truculence, born of an exaggerated belief in his own strength, on the part of the Oriental. Secondly, the European holds out glittering hopes which are not destined to be fulfilled, or takes pledges which he eventually finds it inconvenient to execute, whilst the Oriental, gradually awakening to the fact that he is in the presence of a power which he cannot resist, falls back on intrigue, flattery, and dissimulation to enable him to hold his own.

Thirdly, the subtle Eastern becomes alive to the fact that these Europeans, who are all alike uncongenial to him and in whose friendship he sees almost as great a menace as in their enmity, are by no means a happy family, and that by playing on their mutual fears and jealousies he can hope to obtain something to his own advantage. Ali passed through all these successive stages. But throughout the numerous shifts and windings of his tortuous diplomacy he never had the least doubt as to the object which he sought to attain. He wished to pose as a modern Pyrrhus, and if, as Miss Durham has told us, that name is derived from an Albanian word meaning "valiant," he certainly possessed one of the qualities attributed to his ancient prototype. The main object of his ambition was to establish himself firmly on the coast of Epirus and, if possible, to acquire possession of the Ionian Islands, at all events of Corfu and Santa Maura. As a matter of fact, he succeeded in gaining possession of Prevesa and Butrinto—that dreary snipe marsh which legend relates was the birth-place of Judas Iscariot, and which, by a poetical licence, Virgil (*Aen.* iii. 293) has described as a "lofty city" (*celsam Buthroti urbem*). But what he most coveted, and what the people concerned most resented, was the possession of the little citadel of Parga, which has been celebrated in Byron's ode. "Θέλω τὴν Πάργαν! Θέλω τὴν Πάργαν!" was his never-ending cry to the French Consul. His wish was at last realised, but not by his personal exertions. As to the Ionian Islands, it was reserved for a statesman of a type very different from the Albanian robber chieftain to effect their political union with the mainland. Nearly half a century after Ali had fallen beneath the dagger of a hired assassin,

Mr. Gladstone arranged that the islands should be ceded to Greece.

Ali's first relations with the French were not commenced under good auspices. Napoleon thought that it would be in the interests of the French Republic to encourage the development of his power. The wily diplomatist who then presided over French foreign affairs made a more accurate forecast of the future. "Quelque désir," Talleyrand wrote in March 1798, "que ce Pacha ait d'affermir et d'étendre sa puissance, il est trop clairvoyant pour ne pas apercevoir que l'esprit républicain, introduit avec nos guerriers dans le pays qu'il gouverne et aux environnants, renverserait son autorité et qu'il serait la victime de sa propre ambition. D'ailleurs, il ne faut pas se fier trop légèrement à ces sortes de gens." Talleyrand's prediction was soon fulfilled. Whilst Napoleon was in Egypt, Ali attacked and defeated a small French force which garrisoned Prevesa. Nothing could exceed the brutality with which he treated his prisoners. After an interval, however, Napoleon's military prowess led to a complete change in Ali's views. Moreover, under the Treaty of Pressburg, Dalmatia became French. It would have been unwise to affront so powerful a neighbour. Moved by these impulses, Ali said to a French agent: "Qu'il a toujours eu les entrailles françaises . . . sur la tête de ses enfants il jure qu'il n'a jamais regardé la France que comme son amie; il est reconnaissant à la France de cette amitié dont il est plus que personne flatté, il est prêt à tout pour la reconquérir."

Napoleon found it convenient to forget the disaster of Prevesa. A political honeymoon then ensued. Nothing was in Ali's eyes too good for the French. He sent Napoleon the sword of the Grand Khan of the Crimea, whose defeat at the

hands of the Russians "avait été si bien vengé à Austerlitz." "Je n'ai d'autre appui que mon Empereur Napoléon et d'amis que les Français," were the words he used in pressing the French Consul's hands. "La scène," the latter reported, "est devenue extrêmement touchante. J'ai vu des larmes dans les yeux du Vizir." A curious popular ballad, which must have been composed at about this period, relates how Ali held out to the Greeks, whom he at times slaughtered and at times sought to conciliate, hopes that he would accord to them a liberty similar to that enjoyed by the French, whom, he alleged, they much resembled :—

Πρέπει λοιπόν, νὰ δώσωμεν συγχωρίαν μεγάλην,  
Ἐλευθερίαν ἐν ταύτῳ, ὡς ἔκαμαν οἱ Γάλλοι,  
Γιατὶ τὸ γένος τῶν Γραικῶν εἶναι καθὼς τῶν Γάλλων.

Napoleon met these advances in a spirit of reciprocity. The French Consul at Yanina was authorised to say that if Corfu fell into French hands it would be handed over to Ali.

This state of things did not last long. Under the arrangement made at Tilsit, Corfu was to pass into Russian possession. Ali's dearest hopes were thus frustrated. He veered round to the English and became bitterly hostile to the French. On the other hand, Napoleon, indignant at Ali's frequent acts of piracy, which had the effect of stopping supplies for the Corfu garrison, ordered his local officials to do whatever was possible to sweep "ce brigand" off the face of the earth.

Ali's subsequent attempts to run with the French hare and to hunt with the English hounds are fully and clearly set forth in M. Boppe's pages. Here it must be sufficient to state that he made strenuous efforts to side with those whose star he thought for the time being was in the ascendant. With the entry of the French into Madrid

his Gallophile tendencies increased. The impression made upon him by their entry into Moscow was still more profound. Eventually, although he was always careful not to move too far in an English direction, he came to the conclusion, on hearing of Napoleon's later disasters, that "*désormais la France n'était plus en état de s'opposer à ses projets.*" Accordingly French friendship, being no longer profitable, was cast to the winds.

Apart from the disasters which exercised so strong an influence on this opportunist Pasha, there could be but one end to Napoleon's Albanian and Ionian policy. At the battle of Aboukir the French Mediterranean fleet was destroyed, and without the command of the sea it was hopeless to expect that France could hold the Ionian Islands permanently. Parga, the apple of Ali's eye, after being occupied for a short time by the English, was handed over to Ali, much to the dismay of its terror-stricken inhabitants, one of whom had warned his fellow-townsmen of the risk involved in applying for English help on the following singular ground, which may be quoted as illustrative of the Albanian view of party government. "The King of England," he said, "has not that sword of justice in his hand, that he can, like Napoleon, Alexander, or the Sultan, decapitate the misgoverning Pashas of his distant provinces. On the contrary, his justice is feeble ; because, being surrounded by contending parties, he is compelled to lean for support upon one party to-day, and to-morrow upon another, and yet to pay regard to all ; while each party, in its turn, conceals as much as it can ; defends, and often praises, the blunders of its partisans ; so that a governor may treat you as slaves, and yet be fearless of punishment."

English names frequently constitute a stumbling-block to French writers. It requires some thought to discover the name of General Airey under the cryptic description of "Major-Général Marquis d'Ayret." Should M. Boppe's very interesting work reach a second edition it would be as well to rectify this venial slip of the pen.



## XVI

### A FRENCH EMIGRANT <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," April 25, 1914*

HISTORY records no more pitiful episodes than those connected with the adventures and experiences of the French Royalists who, when the storm of the Revolution burst upon them, sought refuge in the garrets and lodging-houses of every capital in Europe. A full measure of respect and admiration has been meted out to the brave men and tender women who, nurtured in all the luxury and frivolity of a society which expired with a smile on its countenance, mounted the scaffold with dauntless courage and perished with an expression of devotion to a lost cause on their dying lips. Rarely indeed did the haughty fearlessness which disdained to advance any craven plea for mercy in the presence of remorseless judges fail to assert itself in the last supreme moments. Pride of race impelled even that monstrous product of the age, Philippe Egalité, albeit he had been false to the cause of his family, to reply to the Revolutionary judges, who asked if he had anything to say in his defence : " Mourir aujourd'hui plutôt que demain ; délibérez là-

<sup>1</sup> *The Hero of Brittany, Armand de Chateaubriand, 1768-1809.* By M. E. Herpin. Translated by Mrs. Colquhoun Grant. London : Mills & Boon. [10s. 6d. net.]

dessus." Posterity has dealt somewhat more harshly with those who fled before the storm than with their comrades in misfortune who, at the imminent risk of their lives, remained in France to brave its fury. The impression most generally current as regards the French emigrants is that they were a race politically blind, who, when the hour of their triumph eventually sounded, showed by their conduct that they did not deserve the success secured to them by foreign arms. Broadly speaking, this impression seems to be correct. All the memoirs of the time go to show that the fall of Napoleon proclaimed to the world that the Royalist emigrants, like the Princes whom they served, had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing during their long and painful exile. The picture drawn with a master hand by M. Henri Houssaye of the pretentious ignorance displayed after the first Restoration, though perhaps slightly coloured by the Bonapartist sympathies of the author, may be regarded as substantially correct. Count Beugnot, whose evidence is not tainted by any such suspicions, bears testimony to the fact that the emigrants looked upon Louis XVIII. as a King whose manifest duty it was to continue unaltered the systems and methods of government adopted by his predecessors, Louis XV. and XVI. "C'était les blesser que d'essayer de les convertir ; il semblait qu'on profanât le sanctuaire de la fidélité." It is, moreover, impossible for any Englishman to read the opinions recorded by Rivarol, Cazotte, and many others without being struck by the apparent ingratitude displayed by the emigrants to the country which, more than any other, afforded them hospitality in their distress. The pages of contemporary Royalist literature teem with abuse of England. The

Quiberon disaster, for instance, which was in a great measure caused by the pusillanimity of the Comte d'Artois and the want of union amongst the French Royalists themselves, is generally ascribed, not merely to English mismanagement—a charge which, as Mr. Fortescue has shown, is not without foundation—but also to English egotism and treachery. Many and valid excuses may be offered for this conduct. The people on either side of the Channel had been nurtured for generations respectively on Gallophobia and Anglophobia. The poisonous caricatures which have been handed down to us afford a standard by which contemporary English knowledge of France may be gauged. The utterances of Napoleon show clearly enough the crass ignorance entertained by leading Frenchmen of English institutions and English habits of thought. Apart from the exasperation caused by poverty and exile, it must have been deeply galling to the pride of the French aristocracy to accept alms from those whom they had been taught from their childhood to regard as their hereditary and irreconcilable enemies. The sufferings of the emigrants are well calculated to excite pity. In some cases their steadfast devotion to a losing cause calls for an admiration which is stimulated by the fact that the Royal representatives of that cause were not only little worthy of respect or affection on personal grounds, but also appear to have displayed marked ingratitude to the followers who sacrificed their fortunes, and in some cases their lives, to further the Royalist cause. Armand de Chateaubriand, the hero of M. Herpin's biography, and the cousin of the celebrated René, died for his Sovereign. Yet when his only son was eventually presented to Louis XVIII., and recalled to that monarch's mind the heroism of

his father, the only reply he received "in dry tones" was "Yes; he did his duty."

The fortunes of the French emigrants passed through two very distinct phases. During the first phase, which may be said to have finally terminated with the execution of Georges Cadoudal in 1804, a Royalist restoration was by no means inconceivable. Napoleon was fully alive to the danger. Although his utterances at St. Helena must be received with great caution, he probably spoke the truth when he said: "Si alors encore la politique anglaise avait permis qu'un prince français se mît à la tête de La Vendée, c'en était fait du Directoire, et la Restauration eût renversé ce Gouvernement débonnaire aussi facilement que Napoléon le fit deux mois après, à la journée du 18 Brumaire." It was not, however, English policy, but the want of energy shown by the French Princes themselves, that stood in the way of decisive action. The Comte d'Artois, indeed, had no scruples whatever in abetting the attempted assassination of Napoleon. Fouché, to whom moral scruples were a wholly unknown quantity, thought it quite natural that plots of this nature should be formed. Roederer relates that, speaking of the English, Fouché said: "C'est leur jeu de payer ici des hommes pour tuer le Premier Consul. Moi, j'en use bien ainsi pour les hommes dangereux de La Vendée. Quand j'y veux faire tuer un homme, je dis à un de mes gens: 'Voilà 200 ou 300 louis, apporte-moi telle tête.' Pourquoi les Anglais ne feraient-ils pas de même?" But none of the Princes appears to have been at all eager to encounter any personal risks. M. Vandal, speaking of a possible descent on La Vendée, says: "Le Comte d'Artois paraissait désigné, mais ce prince n'aimait pas le danger.

Le Duc d'Angoulême se tenait dans l'ombre de son père. Le Duc de Bourbon ne paraissait nullement pressé de quitter l'Angleterre."

By the time Napoleon was firmly established in power the Royalist cause had become hopeless in so far as it depended on any organised movement within France itself. Nevertheless, the emigrants continued to delude themselves with false hopes, and, with wholly inadequate means, to make attempts to effect a reaction. It was in one of these attempts that Armand de Chateaubriand lost his life. M. Herpin's biography brings out very clearly the causes which frustrated the puny efforts of the Royalists during this period. In the first place, discord reigned in their own ranks. "The private ambitions, jealousies, and intrigues did more than anything else to weaken the valiant efforts made to restore the fallen Monarchy." In the second place, many of the agents employed by the emigrants were arrested, and, in order to save their own lives, revealed all the Royalist plans to the ever-vigilant Fouché. In the third place, no effective public opinion in favour of a Restoration existed in France.

The last point is perhaps the most important. In 1809, Chateaubriand made his way to Brittany, carrying with him a paltry sum of fifteen hundred louis. His object was to obtain information which was to serve as a preliminary to a Royalist rising. He was clandestinely lodged in the house of an old friend of his family, M. de Boisé-Lucas. He persuaded the son of his host, whose name was Maxime, to proceed to Paris in order to spy out the land. Maxime reported: "The mass of the people have entirely forgotten the Princes. They have fallen into such discredit that, even if the throne became vacant, I do not think it would enter anybody's head that they ought to be asked

to occupy it. The Press has never even alluded to the reception accorded to Louis XVIII. in England; and the country at large is mainly ignorant of the fact that he is living there." Maxime accordingly announced his intention of abandoning the Royalist cause and soliciting employment under the Imperial Government. The only question for Chateaubriand, then, was how he could in safety effect his return to Jersey. He remained hidden for some weeks in a closet in M. de Boisé-Lucas's house, during which time he occupied himself principally in composing "some sonnets on love and beauty, wine and youth." He eventually attempted to escape, but was driven back to the French coast by stress of weather, and arrested on landing. His capture coincided with Napoleon's return from Spain, whence he had been hastily summoned, mainly in order to check the intrigues of Talleyrand and Fouché. Then followed the historic interview at which Napoleon accused Talleyrand of treachery, and the latter, pale but smiling, replied: "What a pity that such a great man should be so ill-bred." Fouché was also under suspicion. Some victim was required in order alike to appease Napoleon's wrath and to clear his own character. The arrest of Chateaubriand was adduced as a proof of the veteran intriguer's loyalty. A Court-Martial was therefore ordered to assemble under the presidency of General Hulin, the same officer who had sent the Duc d'Enghien to his death. Chateaubriand, Maxime de Boisé-Lucas, and some of their more humble associates were condemned to death as spies. The opportunist Maxime, whose devotion to the Royalist cause evidently sat very lightly on him, was pardoned, and throughout his subsequent life always declared that he regarded the Emperor

as his "second father." A petition from Chateaubriand was presented to Napoleon through the agency of the Empress Josephine. The Emperor, M. Herpin says, "read it attentively. All at once he frowned and threw it into the fire. The letter demanded mercy or justice. It ought to have been mercy only that was asked for. 'He wants justice,' said Napoleon, with that look on his face always a presage of a bad day; 'very well! He shall have it.'" In a few days Chateaubriand, then forty-one years of age, was led out to execution.

Mrs. Colquhoun Grant's English translation of M. Herpin's book would be none the worse for a little revision. For instance, both the translator and the proof-reader must surely have been wool-gathering when they passed the following passage for the press. Speaking of certain papers now lying at the British Museum, it is said: "These papers were seized by Fouché, but as it involved many people in England it was carefully preserved there."

## XVII

### FEMINISM IN FRANCE <sup>1</sup>

*"National Review," November 1913*

THE fact that "feminism" figures in Murray's dictionary and is defined as "the qualities of females" justifies the statement that the word has been incorporated into the English language. But Murray adds that its use is "rare." The language would be enriched if the use of this Gallicism became more common, for, in truth, the French nation, with that genius for rapid generalisation with which they are saturated, have at once perceived that "Female Suffrage" is merely a means to an end, and therefore a very incomplete definition of the series of ideas and aspirations which find favour with the suffragists. Those aspirations clearly point to the dethronement of virility in the councils of the State and the substitution in its place of all those "female qualities" which are embodied in the expression "feminism." It is true that moderate suffragists in this country occasionally wince under the yoke imposed on them by their more extreme associates. They hold that feminism is an exotic plant, and is not destined to cross the Channel. They are under a profound delusion.

<sup>1</sup> *Le Suffrage des Femmes*. Par Théodore Joran. Paris : Arthur Savaète. [4 francs.]



The difference between the "hyenas in petticoats"—to borrow a phrase of Horace Walpole's—who have from time to time disgraced the annals of France, and the incendiary viragoes who have recently gained an infamous notoriety in England, is merely one of degree and opportunity. These latter, and not the moderates, are the real fuglemen of the movement. Once let the Parliamentary vote be acquired, and feminism, in a more or less extreme form, will follow as a natural consequence. It is all the more certain to do so because the moderate suffragists themselves often exhibit, although in a far less prominent degree than the extremists, those defects of character and intellect which render it undesirable that direct political power should be conferred on women.

A short time ago the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences offered prizes for the best essay on the question of whether electoral rights should be conferred on women. One of these prizes was won by M. Théodore Joran.

M. Joran tells us that "political feminism is a pure product of the Revolution." Historically the statement is not quite correct. There were Pankhursts in Ancient Rome. Appian (iv. 5. 32) tells us that a Roman matron, by name Hortensia, addressed the triumvirs in the following words: "Why should we pay taxes when we have no part in the honours, the commands, the statecraft for which you contend against each other with such baneful results?" It is, however, a fact that that strange revolutionary Marquis and mathematician, Condorcet, was the first in modern times to give a stimulus to the feminist movement. Amongst the leading revolutionists the doctrinaire Sièyes could alone be found to share his views. They were rejected

not only by the royalist Mirabeau and the terrorist Robespierre, but even by Gracchus Babœuf, who was the first propounder of socialism as a practical policy and who has been described as "a fanatic for equality."

M. Joran then shows us how interest in feminism waned when the fury of the Revolution was spent; how an attempt was made to revive the question in 1848, but, as was natural with a people so gifted with a sense of humour as the French, a proposal made by a member of the Assembly "amidst the loud laughter of his colleagues," to give municipal votes to women, was "enterrée sous le ridicule"; how, to the great disappointment of the feminists—who, in France as in England, constantly endeavour to identify the two wholly separate ideas of feminism and feminine talent—George Sand absolutely refused to afford them the least support; and how an extremely pretty young Frenchwoman, who in defiance of the law stood as a municipal representative at Paris in 1907, obtained a thousand votes in her favour from the gallant Parisians, who regarded the whole thing as a capital joke, although another lady, presumably less favoured by nature, had only secured fifty-seven votes in 1881. M. Joran also carries us to other countries. He tells us at length the story with which we are in this country only too sadly familiar, of suffragist outrages conducted under the auspices of "Lady Pankhurst"; of how in Italy a congress of feminists "gave rise to the most picturesque spectacle of intolerance ever known," and effectively cured many ladies who attended it of their "fever for emancipation"; and of how, directly the Chinese Republic was proclaimed, the suffragists of Peking followed the example of their English sisters and proceeded

to smash windows—a truly singular illustration of the fact that one touch of nature makes the whole feminist world kin.

It is unnecessary to follow all the arguments which M. Joran adduces to justify the faith that is in him. They are familiar to most of those in this country who have paid special attention to the subject. Briefly, it may be said that M. Joran considers that “anarchy, collectivism and antimilitarism” constitute a “social trinity” in close connection with the feminist movement. It would, of course, be unjust to associate all feminists, whether French or English, with the ravings of such a woman as Louise Michel; but with the proceedings of our English “militants” fresh in our memory, who can deny the close connection between anarchy and the suffragist movement? whilst the most cursory acquaintance with current literature is sufficient to establish the fact that in the eyes of many of the most prominent suffragist leaders, socialism and feminism move in many respects on parallel lines. Further, an acquaintance with that literature fully justifies M. Joran’s contention that the triumph of feminism ultimately means “war on marriage,” and would be destructive of family life, a point which is apparently not fully realised by those divines in this country who, with excellent intentions but very questionable wisdom, support a movement which constitutes a grave menace to the cause of religion and morality. Amongst the many delusions cherished by some of the excellent women who have enrolled themselves under the suffragist banner without, it may confidently be asserted, being fully aware of whither they are going, none is more striking than the belief very generally entertained by feminists that women will profit if a great exten-

sion were given to facilities for divorce. In no country are the domestic virtues more cherished than in France—a point which is often unduly ignored in this country by those who acquire entirely false conceptions from the perusal of a certain class of French literature which only represents one, and that by no means the most characteristically national, aspect of French society. M. Joran thinks—and it is greatly to be hoped that he is right in thinking—that the feminist movement in France will split on the rock of French love of family. Further, in common with all thoughtful anti-feminists, he dwells upon the leading characteristics of women and holds that those characteristics disqualify them from political life. He quotes with approval the words of M. Thomas, who in 1772 published a remarkable essay in which he said : “ Read history ; you will find that women always display an excess of pity or an excess of vindictiveness. They are wanting in the calm strength which tells them when and where to stop. They reject all moderate views (*tout ce qui est modéré les tourmente*). ”

It will be interesting to turn from these general considerations to an examination of the actual condition of the feminist movement in France. There is at present no question of granting Parliamentary votes to women, but a proposal based on English lines will shortly be submitted to the Chamber to allow them to vote at municipal elections. It may at first sight appear somewhat strange that in democratic France strong exception should be taken to this measure, which has been already adopted in England with fairly beneficial results. The explanation given by M. Joran is that the circumstances of the two countries differ widely. We cannot, unfortun-

ately, claim to so full an extent as M. Joran seems to imagine that municipal affairs in England are treated wholly on their own merits, and that political differences of opinion are non-existent factors at our municipal elections. But it may well be that they play a less important part than is the case in France. An eminent French lady, Mlle. Augot, shares M. Joran's views. "The municipal vote," she says, "is already a political vote."

M. Buisson, who has charge of the measure about to be submitted to the Chamber, has obtained the adhesion of one hundred and fifteen deputies. Of these, forty are members of the Right. It would appear that in France, as in England, a certain number of Conservative members of Parliament think that conservatism would gain in strength if the franchise were bestowed on women. M. Joran does his best to destroy this strange but hardy delusion. The remaining seventy-five members favourable to the feminist movement are socialists. As regards the state of public opinion generally, M. Joran gives an interesting analysis of the replies sent by a number of eminent men to a circular issued in 1910 by M. Jean Finot, the editor of *La Revue*, who is himself apparently a warm sympathiser with the feminist movement. As is the case in England, a certain number of Frenchmen who stand in the first rank of the intellectual life of their country are in favour of giving votes to women. Thus M. Faguet, after laying down the principle that women are much more virtuous than men—a view which depends largely on the construction placed on the very elastic term "virtuous"—goes on to say: "That is sufficient for me. They, rather than men, ought to make the law." M. Raymond Poincaré, now President

of the Republic, says with laudable caution that "Before granting the suffrage to women, men would act wisely if they altered the electoral law which applies to men"—an oracular statement which leaves us rather in doubt as to his opinions. Mr. Ruskin said that he was not in favour of granting votes to women, but would like to take them away from a number of men. Possibly M. Poincaré is of a similar opinion, but we must not enter into the realm of conjecture. Many of those who have replied are, however, evidently much opposed to adult suffrage. M. Frédéric Passy does not see why a woman any more than a man should be restrained from talking nonsense ("émettre des sottises"). M. Andrieux thinks it impossible that women should make a worse use of the vote than that which is already made by men. M. Maurice Faure gives an answer worthy of the Sphinx which reads rather like a paraphrase of Corneille's celebrated epigram on Richelieu. "J'en pense," he says, "trop de bien pour en dire du mal, et j'en augure trop de mal pour en dire du bien." Finally the opinion of the late M. Ernest Legouvé, who had made a special and very sympathetic study of the woman question, as regards the part played by women during the Revolution, may be cited. It would suffer in translation. "Hors ces jours d'ivresse sublime, hors ces actions toutes de cœur qui sont la poésie de la politique, mais non la politique même, l'intervention des femmes fut ou fatale, ou inutile, ou ridicule." Moreover, M. Legouvé, on being asked to stand as a feminist candidate for the Assembly, said that he "was too much a friend of women" to do so.


Passing from the ranks of these distinguished men to the general public, it is possible to speak with confidence as to the attitude of most French-

men, and still more of most Frenchwomen, on the subject. M. Joran says: "The attempts of the militants to galvanise the female public have been wrecked on the rock of general indifference (*se heurtent à l'indifférence générale*)"; and another competent witness, M. Elie Halévy, professor at the School of Political Sciences, speaks of the "perfect apathy which the immense majority of women show to the proposed reform." On the whole, it does not appear very probable that the English suffragists will meet with much sympathy or support from their French sisters. The truth, however, is that, as the figures collected by the Anti-Suffrage League clearly show, the same apathy which prevails in France exists in reality in England; but there is this notable difference between the two countries, that whereas in England a small number of mischievous agitators have succeeded in giving a fictitious importance to the question, their French counterparts have been either unwilling or powerless to produce similar results. M. Joran thinks that female suffrage is not good for Latins. So far it would appear that the majority of his countrymen and countrywomen share his opinions. It is permissible for one who is not a Latin to add that neither is the system good for Teutons.

Finally it may be remarked that in one respect women are treated more liberally in France than in England. They are allowed to practise as lawyers, but it is most reasonably provided that they cannot become judges. The conservatism of the Bar has so far prevented this concession being made to Englishwomen. The grounds on which it is withheld are, however, far from convincing.

## GERMANY





## XVIII

### IMPERIAL GERMANY <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," February 14, 1914*

It is greatly to be hoped that Prince Bülow's book on *Imperial Germany* will be carefully studied in this country. It is a most characteristic and also a most important work. It is characteristic because it may confidently be asserted that no ex-Minister, save one of North German nationality, could or would have published such a book. Prince Bülow is an ardent patriot, and patriotism is necessarily exclusive and egotistical. But a French or English ex-Minister, similarly situated, however deeply imbued with the idea that foreign policy should be dictated by the interests of his own country, would not improbably have endeavoured to throw a more or less transparent veil of cosmopolitan sympathy over any extreme display of egotism. Prince Bülow has done nothing of the kind. In dealing with Italy we do, indeed, come across a faint trace of idealism. We are told that although Italy has regarded her relations with Germany from a "common-sense point of view," such has not been at all the case with Germany. The latter Power has allowed herself to some

<sup>1</sup> *Imperial Germany*. By Prince Bernhard von Bülow. London : Cassell & Co. [16s. net.]

extent to be guided by sentiment. But with this exception the blunt realistic truth is brought prominently forward without the least attempt at concealment. Prince Bülow is no believer in emotional diplomacy. He deprecates "exaggerated expressions of friendship." He is desirous to let all concerned know that Germany cannot "be trampled on with impunity," a fact of which the world has for a long time past been very fully aware. But the reader rises from a perusal of Prince Bülow's pages without any strong conviction that, should the necessity arise, Germany would not readily trample on others. It is, at all events, abundantly clear that whenever any German interest is involved no moral obstacles will be allowed to stand in the way of furthering German views by all the resources of a diplomacy which is not over-scrupulous, supported by prodigious force in the background. Thus the question whether during the Boer War it would or would not have been wise to take "the opportunity of dealing the secret opponent of our [German] international policy a shrewd blow" is calmly discussed. Prince Bülow manifestly thought that the proposal was well worthy of consideration; but it was rejected for various reasons, one, and probably the most convincing, of which was that at that time the German could not hope to compete successfully with the British Navy. Had the decision been in an opposite sense, the morality of the proceeding would, without doubt, have been defended on the ground that in the chequered course of English history greater outrages on public morality had been committed, such, for instance, as Bute's alleged desertion of Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century and the destruction of the Danish fleet in 1801.

The form in which Prince Bülow's views are presented is, therefore, somewhat calculated to grate on the minds of those who had hoped that a higher tone of public morality than that which previously prevailed was being gradually infused into international policy. His work is a valuable object-lesson on the theme recently developed by Lord Morley that "the State is force." Germany is quite ready to be friends with other nations, provided that they do nothing to conflict with German interests, but she will not go out of her way to seek their amity. *Oderint dum metuant* is Prince Bülow's watchword.

Far more important than the form is, however, the substance of what Prince Bülow has to say. He may be deficient in international geniality. He is certainly not wanting in frankness. We have here a very lucid and, it cannot be doubted, a perfectly truthful account of present German aims and policy. To all foreign nations, and to none more than to England, this statement should be of the utmost value. It is of far greater value than any similar utterance delivered by an English ex-Minister. If an English statesman, free from the trammels of office, were to write a book of this sort, it would, indeed, attract much attention, but it would be regarded as an individual expression of opinion. We should think it not merely possible, but highly probable, that before long some other equally qualified authority would combat the views which he had expressed. In our undisciplined English society there is room for a great variety of opinion—a point which Prince Bülow recognises insufficiently, or he would not have attached such great importance to the somewhat hysterical utterances of a few English newspapers and minor politicians in the past on the perfectly ridiculous text *Delenda est*

*Germania.* Far different is the case in Germany. It may confidently be asserted that Prince Bülow expresses the opinions of the vast majority of his countrymen, and that, should any occasion for action arise, they will move to the orders of his official successors in support of those opinions with the precision and regularity of a Prussian battalion on the parade ground.

What, therefore, is the corner-stone of German foreign policy? First and foremost it is based on a hardy belief in the alleged irreconcilability of France. Not only is Prince Bülow convinced that the policy of revenge survives in full vigour amongst Frenchmen, but he even contemplates the possibility of "a return to such times as those of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I.," when France indulged in wars of conquest. It is not only natural but perfectly justifiable that Germany should wish to guard against this danger, albeit Prince Bülow probably exaggerates its nature. All the evidence available points to the conclusion that the hold on French public opinion of the policy of revenge has been greatly loosened, and that the present generation of Frenchmen are eminently pacific. To onlookers whatever danger exists would appear to arise, not so much from a renewed attempt to adopt a policy of adventure on the part of France, as from the possibility that in some of the minor diplomatic incidents, which must frequently occur in the relations between neighbouring States, the German aspect of the case may be pressed with a harshness calculated to sting to the quick a highly sensitive nation proud of its past and confident in its future. The hand of German diplomacy is grievously heavy.

As regards England, Prince Bülow says: "The direction of English policy depends primarily on the way in which the distribution of power in

Europe reacts on English naval supremacy." The fears caused by the rise of the German Navy drew England towards France. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was, Prince Bülow thinks, conceived in a spirit hostile to Germany. This view is certainly erroneous. The origin of that Agreement is to be found in the fact that both nations simultaneously appreciated the danger lest the frequent bickerings which occurred in Egypt and elsewhere might sooner or later seriously imperil their own friendly relations *inter se*. They therefore resolved to terminate them. In doing so they, without doubt, incidentally inflicted a check on German policy, for it had for a long while past been the persistent object of German diplomacy to keep the two Western nations asunder. The case of England is, however, in Prince Bülow's opinion, wholly different from that of France. "France," he says, "would attack us if she thought she were strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital economic and political interests against Germany except by force." Nevertheless, Prince Bülow is convinced that no conflict with England will take place. He ridicules the idea that England need stand in any fear of German invasion. He insists on the peaceful intentions of Germany. He holds, as he is perfectly justified in holding, that the trend of the Triple Alliance so far has been to preserve the peace of the world.

There need not be the smallest hesitation in accepting Prince Bülow's peaceful assurances, or in believing that the German Navy has been created, not for aggressive purposes, but "as a means of national defence and to strengthen our [German] national safety." More than this, there is every reason to suppose that so long as

German policy is guided by statesmen who exhibit the adamantine, albeit somewhat frigid, common sense displayed by Prince Bülow, no serious risk of a conflict will occur. Apart, however, from the fact that Anglo-German cannot be considered altogether apart from Franco-German relations, and that an unprovoked attack by Germany on France would almost certainly draw England into the struggle, it is impossible to feel completely assured as regards the future.

In the first place, it is to be observed that the political conditions under which the two countries are governed differ very widely. In England public opinion is supreme. Its liability to change affords in itself an ample justification for Prince Bismarck's reluctance to conclude an English alliance. But there is one point on which the opinion of the modern English democracy is absolutely fixed. It desires above all things peace. No Ministers, however powerful, and no Press campaign, however skilfully conducted, would reconcile the present electorate of the United Kingdom to an unprovoked attack on another nation. Far different is the case in Germany. The German, Prince Bülow tells us, "has always accomplished his greatest works under strong, steady, and firm guidance, and has seldom done well without such guidance." Which constitutes the greater danger to the peace of the world—the undisciplined nation which stubbornly refuses to be guided, or the disciplined people who yield implicit obedience to their guides? From a mere academic point of view, it may be difficult to give a confident reply to this question. In the one case, there is a risk that a wave of popular passion may sweep away the scruples of a peace-loving Minister, as happened to Lord Aberdeen in 1854. In the other case, the peace

of the world is made to rest on the very uncertain basis of the wishes and judgment of one or more highly placed individuals. It is, however, probable that those who, on the one hand, realise the very pacific tendencies of the present British democracy, and who, on the other hand, have watched the vagaries of German militarism, as displayed, for instance, in the recent Zabern incident, would look to the former rather than to the latter system as an efficient antidote to ultra-warlike proclivities.

In the second place, it is worthy of special note that the attitudes from which questions involving peace or war are generally regarded in the two countries lie as the poles asunder. It is futile to exhume the musty records of eighteenth and early nineteenth century diplomacy in order to make a forecast of the course which, in any given circumstances, England would now pursue. A vast change has since those times come over British public opinion. The immense majority of the English people hold, apart from any consideration based on the material advantages of peace, that war is wholly unjustifiable save as a last resort to remedy some specific cause of grievance occasioned by the action of a foreign Power. A wholly different view is apparently entertained in Germany. Not only is it a fact that an extreme school of German militarists maintains that even an unnecessary war is from time to time desirable to strengthen the virility of the nation, not only does militarism of one type or another reign supreme and is supported by a strong and learned body of civilian opinion, but also the principle is recognised that war can and ought to be made on some foreign Power, not by reason of any special cause of grievance which it may have occasioned, but to attain some



object connected with internal policy. It is admitted, almost in so many words, by Prince Bülow that the Franco-German War was created by Prince Bismarck in order to secure the unification of Germany. The necessity, from the German point of view, need not in this case be challenged. The diplomacy may have been in the highest degree astute. But the fact in itself gives cause for reflection on the part of other Powers. Prince Bülow tells us that "there is absolutely no ground for the fear which the building of our Navy has aroused, that with the rise of German power at sea the German love of battle will be awakened." That this statement is made in all sincerity cannot for a moment be doubted. Nevertheless, with the experience of the past before us, we cannot feel any very strong assurance that the incidents of German internal policy will not again necessitate an attack on some foreign Power. Should that necessity arise, it cannot be doubted that an adroit diplomacy could and would manufacture occurrences tending to show that the war was forced on the reluctant and peace-loving population of Germany.

Such being the state of affairs, the obvious duty of this country is, whilst sparing no efforts to maintain peace, to prepare for the eventuality of war. To reduce the British Navy, with Prince Bülow's ruthless but perfectly rational code of international morals staring us in the face, would be an act of madness. "Little-Navyites" might with great advantage read Prince Bülow's book.

## XIX

### THE HOME POLICY OF GERMANY

*"The Nineteenth Century and After," March 1914*

THE very interesting work recently published by Prince Bülow on Imperial Germany<sup>1</sup> is divided into two parts, one of which deals with foreign and the other with home policy. The former of these has naturally attracted most attention in this country. The latter, however, is for many reasons well worthy of study by others besides Germans. In fact, the two subjects are intimately connected. They react on each other. Together they form an united whole. Prince Bülow deals at some length with fiscal affairs, which cannot be altogether separated from the foreign policy of his country. But with this exception he scarcely mentions any subject save in its bearings upon the position of Germany as a world-power. He indulges in some gentle reproof of the German love of abstract reasoning, and appears to agree with the remark made to him by an English friend to the effect that practical politicians can get on very well without any very definite "conception of the Universe"—that *Weltanschauung* to which Lord Morley alluded in his recent address at

<sup>1</sup> *Imperial Germany*. By Prince Bernhard von Bülow. Cassell & Co. 1914.

Manchester. He tells us, indeed, somewhat apologetically, that on one occasion, when combating Socialist arguments, he himself "spoke of a difference in the conception of the Universe"; but he does not let us know what his own conception is, and it may be inferred that this rare lapse into abstractions was quite exceptional. On the other hand, he leaves us in no manner of doubt as to his conception of practical German policy, whether in the domain of foreign or home affairs. Prince Bülow may be regarded as a sort of German Hector—*εἰς οἰωνὸς ἀριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πατρὸς* is his motto. "The highest political morality," he says, "is patriotism." The merits or demerits of the various groups into which political society in Germany is divided are, therefore, to be judged wholly by a patriotic standard, and by none other. Are their views in conformity with the "national idea"? Do they consider that the preservation of German unity, under the hegemony of Prussia, is in itself an aim of such supreme importance that all other aspirations must be made subservient to it? Are they—and this is perhaps the most important point—prepared, at whatsoever sacrifice, to place funds at the disposal of the Government sufficient to maintain both an army and a navy of such a strength as will enable Germany to speak with authority in the Councils of Europe? The temporary aberrations of any party, be it Right, Centre, or Left, which can answer these questions in the affirmative, may be treated with kindly indulgence. Their methods may be faulty, but their intentions are praiseworthy. By persuasion, and even at times by more drastic methods, they may be made to see their errors. But their sympathies must not be altogether alienated. There is always a hope

that the prodigals will return. Very different treatment is to be accorded to those who, like the Social Democrats, reply with a decided negative to all of Prince Bülow's test questions. They are to be located in the last circle of his political Inferno. They have placed themselves "outside the national life" of Germany. There can be no question of coming to terms with them until such time as they "make peace with the monarchical form of government" and cease "to wound feelings that are sacred to the great majority of the German nation." They must, therefore, be combated, not necessarily by violent means, which Prince Bülow very wisely deprecates, but by the adoption of whatever methods are best calculated to render them impotent for evil. Prince Bülow's programme has not merely the merit of being readily comprehensible. It is also manly and straightforward. A Minister tossed hither and thither on the waves of genuine democracy might even view with something approaching to envy the logical precision with which the still surviving reign of absolutism enables his German counterpart to trace the main lines of national policy.

Prince Bülow, as a prelude to his description of the state of parties in Germany, makes some interesting general remarks on the strong and weak points of German character. He is apparently of opinion that, by some unfortunate omission, one fairy godmother was not invited to the festival held to celebrate the birth of this gifted nation. The Germans are the most learned nation in the world, and also the best soldiers. As philosophers, poets, and musicians none can vie with them. They now hold the foremost places in physical sciences and most technical spheres of action. The rapidity of their recent

industrial development has astonished the world. Yet still one thing is wanting. Prince Bülow had a conversation with the late Ministerial Director Althoff on this subject, and that distinguished man said to him, "in his humorous way," "There must be a weak point somewhere. How can you wonder that we are political asses?" Political talent, Prince Bülow thinks, has been denied to Germans. The history of German home policy, with rare exceptions, has been "a history of political mistakes." Yet there is something to be learnt from the German past. So long as national unity was preserved and "the will and power of the Emperor" reigned supreme, some check was placed on the vagaries of the loosely connected tribes and princes of the mediaeval Empire, which, by reason of this control, was able to thrive. It only succumbed in its struggle with the Papacy because the politicians of Rome succeeded in rousing opposition to the Emperor. Since that time the Germans have always been separatists. The party system, which came into being when parliamentary institutions on a limited scale were introduced, has invariably "possessed a specifically separatist character." The welfare of the country has been too much forgotten in the animosities of parties towards each other.

Prince Bülow is far too logical not to probe this wound and thus discover the seat of the disease. It cannot be doubted that his diagnosis is perfectly correct. "In States not governed by Parliament," he says, "the parties feel that their primary vocation is to criticise." The sense of responsibility amongst party leaders is thus weakened. Since they know that under no circumstances can they have an opportunity of

themselves acting on the principles which they advocate, they can give a free rein to irresponsible criticism without running the risk that they will be confounded by the failure of those principles when they are adopted under their own auspices. Moreover, Prince Bülow not only recognises the true nature of the disease but is also fully alive to the most effective remedy which can be applied to it. "In countries ruled by Parliament," he says, "the great parties and groups of parties acquire their political education by having to govern." Any such system is inapplicable to Germany. Inasmuch as the first article of Prince Bülow's political creed is to maintain Germany's position as a world-power, which he thinks can only be done under "strong, steady, and firm guidance," he altogether rejects the idea that the critics should be given any opportunities to guide or to govern. He therefore falls back on the mediaeval conception of the monarchy, under which he holds that Germany's greatest triumphs will in the future, as in the past, be achieved. He will have nothing to say to a system under which the executive government must stand or fall according to whether it can or cannot command a parliamentary majority.

It would be presumptuous on the part of any foreigner to pass judgment on Prince Bülow's forecast of Germany's destiny. It may well be that under the special conditions now existing in Germany the system which he advocates is better suited to the country than any other. But one point appears abundantly clear. It will be impossible for Germany to derive at one and the same time the advantages both of a parliamentary and of an absolutist system of government. If it be essential, in order to secure German unity and to maintain German world-

power, that the present system, which relegates Parliament to a relatively inferior position, should be continued, then it will follow almost as a natural consequence that the irresponsibility of party politicians, which is born of that system, will be an abiding thorn in the side of its absolute rulers. Unity may possibly be secured for a while in the presence of some great national danger. The defects of the system may be mitigated by skilful treatment such as that recommended in Prince Bülow's very able disquisition on the management of German parties. But it is difficult to believe that they will disappear altogether. The main lines of the policy which finds favour with Prince Bülow may be pursued with success, but its course will be marked by a spasmodic fire of criticism from groups who are unwilling to subordinate their special needs to the necessities of the main political current.

The title by which Prince Bülow's outcasts from German political life are designated is worthy of notice, inasmuch as it brings into prominence a feature which is special to German political life. They are called Social Democrats. The definition is sufficiently comprehensive to rally under one banner those opposed to Democracy and those opposed to Socialism. In other countries the terms Socialist and Democrat may be considered as synonymous in this sense, that although there are many Democrats who are not Socialists there are probably few, if any, Socialists who, forgetful of the tyranny of which their creed admits, would not call themselves Democrats. In Prussia the case is altogether different. In all civilised countries there is generally some ideal which dominates the public mind, irrespective of the partisan proclivities of the individual. In France such an ideal is furnished by the principle

of Equality which, far more than Liberty or Fraternity, has been the national heritage of the Revolution. In England devotion to parliamentary institutions under the nominal sway of a constitutional monarch has become a dogma universally accepted. In Prussia loyalty to the house of Hohenzollern is the national shibboleth. Prince Bülow, therefore, in deprecating any attempt to adopt a policy of conciliation towards the Social Democrats, puts forward a very remarkable plea which, however valid for the purpose for which he uses it, shows how deeply Socialist ideas have struck root in German soil. He says that "hundreds of thousands" of Prussians would join the Social Democratic party if they were not restrained by that loyalty to the King "which is bred in the bone of every Prussian and bequeathed to him by his remote ancestors." Hence the adoption of a policy of conciliation, which might be deemed an act of political wisdom in Southern, would be suicidal in Northern Germany. It would, indeed, be a hazardous experiment to carry political syncretism to the extent of endeavouring to combine such incongruous elements as Royalty and Social Democracy as that phrase is understood in Prussia. Failure has generally attended any such unnatural alliances. Lamartine did not gain much by conspiring with the extremist Blanqui, albeit he excused himself on the ground that he had only conspired "*comme le paratonnerre conspire avec la foudre*." Even had not the Prussian army intervened, Napoleon the Third practically signed the death warrant of his system and his dynasty when he called in Ollivier and endeavoured to liberalise the Second Empire. There was much worldly wisdom in the aphorism of that Austrian Archduke who,



during the French Revolution, said, "Mon métier à moi c'est d'être duc."

Prince Bülow maintains that the principles of the Social Democratic party are, in their political aspect, of a wholly revolutionary character. In so far as the extremists are concerned, he is certainly justified in holding this view. Thus Mr. Belfort Bax, an English Socialist,<sup>1</sup> has explained that "for the Socialist the word frontier does not exist; for him love of country as such is no nobler sentiment than love of class. . . . Hence everything which makes for the disruption and disintegration of the Empire to which he belongs must be welcomed by the Socialist as an ally." It is but a few years ago that the Italian, Malatesta, who represented the last phase of Anarchism *furens*, said at a Congress held at Berne: "Our single aim must be to destroy the State; it will then be for the free and fertile action of the natural law of society to accomplish the destinies of humanity." No less revolutionary is the ultra-Socialist programme in its effect on public and private morality. Mr. Belfort Bax, after describing Christ as "a semi-mythical Syrian of the first century," goes on to explain that "Christian morality sets up a forced, to the vast majority impossible, standard of 'personal holiness,' which, when realised, has seldom resulted in anything but (1) an apotheosised priggism (*e.g.* the Puritan type); or (2) in an epileptic hysteria (*e.g.* the Catholic saint type)."

There are, of course, several gradations of Socialism. The comparatively mild State Socialism to which the late Sir William Harcourt referred when he said "We are all Socialists now" differs widely from both Collectivism and

<sup>1</sup> *Religion of Socialism*, p. 126, by Belfort Bax.

Communism, and these latter differ *inter se*. Both, indeed, are based on the fundamental economic error of Marx, to which, most unfortunately, Ricardo lent the weight of his authority, that value is always in proportion to labour. But Communism is more extreme than Collectivism. The latter involves State ownership of all means of production and the distribution of the products by the State to workmen in proportion to the quantity and value of their labour. Communism goes a long step further. Communists require that all private ownership should be suppressed; not only the work and the remuneration of every member of society, but even personal requirements would, under their system, be regulated by authority.<sup>1</sup> It would appear from what Prince Bülow says that German Socialists generally adhere to one or other of these two extreme types. "The Social Democrats," he says, "aim at the destruction of differences in wealth by the suppression of private property and the nationalisation of the means of production."

Prince Bülow is by no means inclined to underrate the strength of the movement which he seeks to restrain. The figures which he gives are, indeed, sufficient to show that the adherents of Social Democracy are very numerous in Germany. In 1884 the Social Democrats only secured 550,000 votes at the elections. At each successive election there has been a notable increase. In 1912 no less than 4,250,000 voters polled in favour of Social Democratic candidates. Moreover, it appears that, whereas 2,530,000 workmen belong to the Social Democratic Unions, only 1,315,000 belong to non-Social Democratic

<sup>1</sup> *Collectivism*. By Leroy Beaulieu. Translated by Sir Arthur Clay, Bart. Pp. 4 *et seq.*

Trades Unions and Associations. The forces of Socialism are formidable, not only by reason of their numerical strength, but also from the fact that they are thoroughly well organised. Those habits of implicit obedience to orders, which have extended from the army to the nation, and which have been fostered to protect the State and facilitate its government, have now, by the irony of events, been perverted into a danger. Speaking of the manner in which the Social Democrats are organised, Prince Bülow says :

No nation in the world possesses or has ever possessed a like or even a similar party organisation. The clubs of the Jacobins, which were spread like a network over France, were only a pale prototype of our Social Democratic organisation. The provincial clubs obeyed the Paris Central Association only so long as this was a power in the State, and were closed later on, without difficulty, at a hint from the Directoire Government. The strong web of the German Social Democratic Party would not be so easy to tear.

What are the forces that can be marshalled to resist the Social Democrats ? They are numerous and important, but they are disunited. The corner-stone of Prince Bülow's policy is to unite them. This is the dream of all moderate politicians. We know in this country something of the obstacles which stand in the way of its realisation. The centrifugal forces at work are generally sufficient to overcome the attraction towards the centre. It may be, however, that the task is in some respects less difficult of accomplishment in Germany than it would be in England, for the element of competitive place-hunting is absent. The fact that, under the German constitution, the establishment of a parliamentary majority will not open the door to office, is, as has been already shown, in one

connection a source of embarrassment. On the other hand, it facilitates coalition in the face of a common danger to this extent, that personal ambitions can, in some degree, be eliminated from whatever negotiations take place with a view to securing common action.

In considering the methods best adapted to secure the object which he has in view, Prince Bülow naturally turns for guidance to the precedents established in the days of Prince Bismarck. That masterful statesman's plan was very simple. He took his majorities in the Reichstag wherever he could get them. On the other hand—and the qualification is essential to the full comprehension of his method—"he never dreamt of considering the wishes of a majority unless they tallied with his own. He made use of existing majorities, but he never let them make use of him." Prince Bismarck's procedure is, however, no longer possible. He could treat all conventional ideas and processes with a scorn equal to that displayed by the Emperor Sigismund at Constance for the elementary rules of the Latin Grammar. He "could break all rules, and could expect success from an extreme and bold action." His successors cannot do so. Some other method must, therefore, be tried. "The Government must try to create majorities for its tasks." In other words, an attempt must be made by a mixture of firmness and persuasion to establish an anti-Socialist coalition without making any concessions which would render the executive government more dependent on Parliament than is at present the case. Prince Bülow discusses at length how this political miracle may best be accomplished.

He is himself a non-party man with strong Conservative tendencies. More especially he is

a supporter of the principle, which constitutes the main plank of the Conservative platform in Germany, that protection should be afforded to agriculture. The arguments which he sets forth in support of this policy are well deserving of study. They differ widely from those which we are accustomed to hear in England. M. de Laveleye, in a work written many years ago, said, "The formula of the German Socialist is 'The social question is a stomach question' (*Die Sociale Frage ist eine Magenfrage*).” Hence, it might perhaps be thought that the best way to combat Socialism in Germany would be to provide the people with cheap food. Prince Bülow regards the question from a point of view which is not only totally different but is also highly characteristic of German thought and national life. He quotes with approval Count Moltke's well-known saying that "War is an essential element of God's scheme of the world," and he then lays down the general principle that "every State department should be organised as if war were going to break out to-morrow. This applies to economic policy as well." Prince Bülow's main criticism on Free Traders is that they "base all economic policy on an imaginary permanent peace." It is essential, he thinks, that, in the event of war, German home agriculture should be in a position to provide a sufficient amount of foodstuffs for home consumption. It will decay unless it is protected in time of peace. Hence, protection is necessary, not so much on purely fiscal or economic as on political and military grounds. Without it, the position of Germany as a world-power would be imperilled. On the other hand, protection must not be pushed so far as to preclude the possibility of making advantageous commercial treaties with other

countries. Both ends can only be served by moderation on the part alike of Free Traders and Protectionists, such as was eventually displayed when the Tariff Law of 1902, which Prince Bülow claims to have been a great success, was under consideration.

Prince Bülow, of course, considers that in the struggle with the Social Democracy, the Conservative party constitutes the Old Guard, on whom implicit reliance can be placed. "The forces which animate the Conservative party," he says, "are those which made Germany great, and which our country must preserve in order to remain great and become greater." Nevertheless, he has not always been in agreement with the Conservatives. They "went astray in the year 1909." The separatist taint showed itself to this extent—that they, in the first instance, opposed the financial policy of the Government. Prince Bülow, however, evidently thinks that this was merely a venial and temporary deviation from the right path.

In spite, however, of his Conservative sympathies, Prince Bülow is far from entertaining feelings of hostility towards the Liberals. He recognises the merits of their political principles. "We Germans," he says, "do not want to be deprived of the lusty defence of individual freedom against State coercion, and this Liberalism has always represented." Moreover, the co-operation of the Liberals is essential to make head against the common enemy—the Social Democrats. "The really fruitful periods of our home policy were those when the Right and the Left co-operated." There is no reason why they should not co-operate. "No one seriously believes that a middle-class Liberal differs from a middle-class Conservative in his conception of the

Universe." We are familiar with language of this sort. It would be a hazardous conjecture to assume that mid-Victorian statesmen of the type of Lord Palmerston ever troubled themselves much about any "conception of the Universe," but it is certain that, in all essentials, their political principles did not differ very widely—a fact which, however, did not contribute much to common action amongst Whigs and Tories.

The Centre Party, which constitutes the citadel of Roman Catholicism, stands in a wholly different position. They have in the past strayed very far from the right path. At one time they made an unnatural alliance with the Social Democrats in order to defeat the Colonial policy of the Government, and even went so far as to tamper with the military prerogatives of the Emperor. It was mainly by reason of the attitude adopted by the Centre Party that a dissolution became necessary at the end of 1906. The result was that the nation rallied to the "national idea" and inflicted a crushing defeat on the combined forces of the Centre and Social Democratic Parties. Since then the Centre has not opposed any of the Army, Navy, or Colonial Bills of the Government. Prince Bülow evidently hopes that the lesson will be taken to heart in the sense of checking the particularist tendencies of the Centre for the future.

It cannot be doubted that the co-operation secured between Liberals and Conservatives in 1907 resulted in a crushing, albeit only temporary defeat of the Social Democrats. In spite of the enormous increase in the number of Socialist votes, the number of Socialist members returned to the Reichstag sank from eighty-one in 1903 to forty-three in 1907. Prince Bülow thinks that this election was "of great and lasting

value," as it showed that the power of the Social Democrats was by no means irresistible. Since 1907, however, there has been a relapse to separatist tendencies. In 1912 no less than 110 Socialist representatives were sent to the Reichstag. Commenting on this singular reaction, Prince Bülow says: "The comparison between 1907 and 1912 tempts one to ask where the blame lies. I will leave this question unanswered."

The general conclusion to be drawn from Prince Bülow's analysis of the situation would appear to be that the German State machine, in so far as it depends on the Government being able to command a majority in the Reichstag, is in a condition of somewhat unstable equilibrium. It depends mainly on the careful manipulation of a number of quasi-independent and, more or less, discordant parliamentary groups. The difficulty of securing common action amongst these groups is manifestly very great. Even Prince Bismarck was foiled in the attempt. "The man who got the better of the separatism of the State could not master the separatism of parties." It would, however, probably be altogether erroneous to conclude that, by reason of this source of embarrassment, the general principles by which Germany is governed are likely to undergo modifications of a nature seriously to affect the position of the country in the Councils of Europe, and it is this point which naturally most interests foreigners. Apart from the fact that there is probably in Germany, as in England, a massive body of common sense which, should occasion arise, would check any extreme manifestation of ultra-Socialist folly, it must be borne in mind that behind the Reichstag lies the army and the militarist spirit, which is deeply imbued with the national as opposed to the Social Democratic



“conception of the Universe.” These constitute a ballast sufficient, probably, to right the ship in the event of any serious squall. Nevertheless, all appearances seem to favour a steady rise in the number of Social Democrats. Their progress would, indeed, be checked if they resorted to violence and thus afforded an opportunity to their opponents to adopt strongly repressive measures. Prince Bülow, however, appears to think that they will “not be stupid and criminal enough to resort to open rebellion.”

Apart from the fact that the internal condition of Germany is a matter of far more than academic interest to the rest of Europe, it is to be observed that the picture which Prince Bülow draws of the state of German parties may very profitably be studied by the politicians of this country. It cannot be doubted that Socialism, though generally of a somewhat different type from that which exists in Germany, has made great advances in England during the last few years. Karl Marx predicted that the English would be the last nation to adopt Socialist principles, but that, if those principles once took root, they would blossom more fully in England than in any other country. The methods which we can adopt to combat the evil must, of course, differ widely from those pursued in Germany, but it may well be that, under the force of circumstances, older party distinctions will tend to disappear, and that there will before long be but two camps—the Socialists and the anti-Socialists. The time, indeed, is almost ripe for some statesman of commanding influence to arise who would be able to rally all the anti-Socialist forces of the country under one flag.

## XX

### THE OLD PRUSSIAN ARMY <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," February 21, 1914*

THE military operations which took place between the battle of Jena (October 14, 1806) and that of Eylau (February 8, 1807) have not secured any very abiding place in the general history of the Napoleonic Wars. Many of those who have only a casual acquaintance with that history are probably scarcely aware that an important action was fought at Pultusk. Nevertheless, this period was one of great importance. It is especially noteworthy because during these few months an opportunity was allowed to slip by of anticipating Leipsic and Waterloo, and thus of shortening by more than eight years the prolonged agony through which the whole of Europe was then passing. Napoleon was at that time thought to be invincible. But the actual force of which he disposed was far from being commensurate with the task which he had set himself to perform. He had to overawe the hostile population of Northern Germany and to keep watch on Austria, whilst at the same time he was about to attack the stolid battalions which the Emperor Alex-

<sup>1</sup> *Jena to Eylau.* By General Field-Marshal Freiherr Von der Goltz. Translated by Captain C. F. Atkinson. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. [7s. 6d. net.]

ander could put in the field on their own ground and amidst the rigours of their own climate. To meet these requirements he had, according to Thiers, three hundred thousand men, of whom no less than one hundred and ten thousand were German, Dutch, and Italian auxiliaries. This force was none too numerous even although it was led by one whom Clausewitz called "the incarnate genius of war." So good an authority as Jomini was of opinion that if, after Napoleon had crossed the Vistula, Austria had launched a hundred thousand men from Bohemia on the Oder, "the power of Napoleon would have been ended." But Austria, still staggering under the crushing blow inflicted at Austerlitz, remained passive and allowed the opportunity to escape. This period also marks the zenith of Napoleon's military fame, and, it should be added, the nadir of his blood-guiltiness. He was intoxicated with his own success. "L'orgueil de Napoléon," De Fezensac says, "sa confiance en sa puissance, avaient été portés au comble par la conquête de la Prusse. Rien ne lui semblait impossible, et, dans ses vastes projets, il ne connaissait plus de limite que celle de sa volonté." It was open to him, after Jena, to have concluded an honourable and highly advantageous peace. The King of Prussia, in spite of the entreaties of his high-mettled and courageous Consort, was at his feet, but not even the most humiliating concessions could satisfy Napoleon's boundless ambition. "Je veux," he said subsequently to the Emperor Alexander, "que la Prusse ne soit plus une puissance dans la balance politique de l'Europe." In writing to Marshal Mortier he spoke of his relations with the Shah of Persia and of a march to the Indus as "no longer chimerical." Hence he refused all overtures. His behaviour to the

defeated King of Prussia was brutal—"bourru et grossier," Princess Antoine Radziwill calls it in her memoirs. The callous indifference with which he viewed the sufferings he caused, whether his victims were German and Russian peasants or those devoted French conscripts who were torn from their homes in sunny France in order to lay down their lives on the frozen Russian plains in a cause in which they were in no way interested, may be judged from a characteristic episode recounted by Count Chaptal. "Napoléon," Count Chaptal says, "se promenant sur le champ de bataille d'Eylau, couvert de vingt-neuf mille cadavres, les retournait avec le pied et disait aux Généraux qui l'entouraient : 'C'est de la petite espèce.'" It can be no matter for surprise that the wound left in the national mind of Germany rankled deep, and that, when the hour of vengeance at last came, fiery old Marshal Blücher, who was himself obliged to surrender to the conqueror after a gallant struggle, was with difficulty restrained by the Duke of Wellington from destroying the bridge at Paris whose name commemorated the supreme disaster of Germany.

Although, however, the importance of the operations conducted immediately after the battle of Jena have been somewhat ignored by the general historian, they have always been regarded with great interest by students of the art of war. Höpfner, who is the classical military historian of this period, says that all the measures adopted by Napoleon during the first act of the Polish Campaign, which may be said to close with the battle of Pultusk on December 26, 1806, were admirable (*musterhaft und massgebend*). The late Major Adams, who contributed so much to encourage the study of military history in this country, and whose memory is still green amongst

old Staff College officers, chose the operations in question as a subject on which to deliver some highly interesting lectures. Captain Atkinson has therefore earned the gratitude of all English students of the art of war by providing them with an excellent translation, accompanied by numerous very complete maps, of Field-Marshal Von der Goltz's history of these operations. The Germans excel as military historians, not only on account of their painstaking accuracy, but also because they never allow their patriotism to get the better of their professional judgment, or to belittle their opponents. Field-Marshal Von der Goltz does ample justice to Napoleon's military genius and to the achievements of the troops under his command. His most scathing criticisms are reserved for his own countrymen, especially for Massenbach, whom he appears to regard as the evil genius of the Prussian Army.

After Jena the demoralisation of that Army was complete. The besetting sin of a bureaucratic and highly centralised administration made itself felt. The superior officers were paralysed. Duke Eugene of Württemberg, to name a single example, "like all other Prussian officers, hungered for specific orders. . . . He dared not form an independent resolution on his own responsibility." Acts of skill and heroism on the part of individual officers could not avert the impending disasters. One by one the remaining Prussian corps laid down their arms. Magdeburg and other important points were captured by the French. Practically all that remained of the fine Prussian Army was about twenty-five thousand men under General L'Estocq, who were cooped up in Eastern Prussia, and eventually placed at the disposal of the Russian Commander-in-Chief. Napoleon, therefore, turned his atten-

tion, in so far as military operations were concerned, almost wholly to Russia.

The line of the Vistula had, contrary to the advice of L'Estocq, been abandoned by the Russian army. Napoleon at once seized the advantage thus offered to him. He crossed the river in the hope, probably, that he could at once deal a crushing blow to the Russian army, and thus terminate the war. In this he was disappointed. Amongst other reasons, Nature was against him. He had to deal with what he himself called "the fifth element"—the mud of Poland. His own half-starved troops were exhausted. After the battle of Pultusk, therefore, which yielded no decisive result, he went into winter quarters, content with having established himself firmly on the right bank of the Vistula.

He was not allowed to remain quiet for long. The days of eighteenth-century warfare, when commanders went comfortably into quarters at the beginning of winter with a view to commencing war again after an orthodox gentlemanlike fashion in the spring, were past. The Russian General Bennigsen assumed the offensive in the middle of January. Napoleon at once resolved to break up his winter quarters, and to reply to the challenge by a heavy and annihilating counter-attack. His plan was to cut the Russian communications. It would very probably have succeeded had not a letter addressed to Bernadotte, which revealed his project, fallen into the hands of the Cossacks. Bennigsen at once altered all his dispositions. After eluding several attempts of Napoleon to bring on a general action, he was at last brought to bay at Eylau. The endurance even of Russian soldiers has a limit. They could march no more. Von der Goltz quotes at length a pathetic account of their pitiable condition

given by a German officer then serving in the Russian army.

The battle of Eylau was "one of the sternest of the century. The horrors that it brought with it, the efforts that it exacted from man and beast, surpassed anything that this war had hitherto seen, and, indeed, anything that the French army had experienced in all their previous campaigns in Europe." It has often been described at length. Here it will be sufficient to say that Napoleon's general plan was to turn the Russian left flank, whilst at the same time their centre was to be kept fully engaged. Before the turning movement was completely developed Augereau's corps was launched against the centre, with the result that in twenty minutes it was annihilated. "As an independent unit it disappeared from the army list." The flank movement, however, which was subsequently conducted by Davout, succeeded. The French penetrated to the left rear of the Russian position, which was thus seriously jeopardised. It was then that the episode occurred which, in writing the work under review, Field-Marshal Von der Goltz has wished to bring into special prominence.

On the morning of the battle L'Estocq's Prussian division lay at some villages situated a few miles north-west of Eylau. Orders were at once sent to bring it up. By a forced march over some very difficult ground, during which L'Estocq was harassed by the corps of Ney, which was on his track, he managed to arrive on the battlefield of Eylau at a critical moment. Sweeping round the left of the French and the right of the Russian position, he drove back Davout's men, and thus saved the Russian army. Night came on, and although L'Estocq was anxious to advance and continue the combat, he was not allowed to do so.

Field-Marshal Von der Goltz does not ascribe any fault to Bennigsen ; on the contrary, he says : “ If we probe to the bottom, therefore, we see that Prussia’s chance of victoriously reasserting herself was lost, not by Bennigsen’s lack of confidence and daring, but by our own faint-heartedness, by the narrowness of our whole political and military conception of war and national defence.” L’Estocq was himself an officer of the old school, and it is probable that the greater share of the credit of his undertaking is due to the fact that he had on his staff a man of military genius, Scharnhorst. But however this may be, there can be no doubt that the manœuvre was brilliant. Höpfner says that L’Estocq’s “ tactics are a model of the way in which a flank march in the face of a near and powerful adversary should be conducted.”

Field-Marshal Von der Goltz claims that the regeneration of the Prussian Army dates, not from the events of 1813, but from this action of L’Estocq, which vindicated the ancient military fame of Prussia. He would appear to have made good his case.



## ITALY

## XXI

### CAVOUR<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," March 7, 1914*

MODERN ITALY, during the long agony of her making, was prolific of heroes. Such were Poerio, who refused to purchase release from a loathsome dungeon by asking pardon of the contemptible ruler who represented "the negation of God erected into a system of government"; the saintly Ugo Bassi; the workman Antonio Sciesa, who died rather than give the names of those who had instigated him to distribute a revolutionary proclamation; the poet Mameli, whose song "Fratelli d' Italia" resounded through all Italy, and who met a soldier's death at Rome in 1849; and many others. Their name is legion. At first sight, however, it seems somewhat incongruous to apply the term "hero" to the statesman and diplomatist who was the real maker of Italy. Heroism is usually associated in our minds either with martial achievements or with some act calling for the display of remarkable physical courage. Heroes are generally held to be distinguished more for the rashness which takes no heed of consequences than for the staid mental

<sup>1</sup> *Cavour and the Making of Modern Italy: 1810-1861.* By Pietro Orsi. "Heroes of the Nations" Series. London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. [5s. net.]

equilibrium which balances risks and chances. Tennyson, speaking of Garibaldi, the most typically heroic of modern Italians, said that he "had the divine stupidity of a hero." Yet the real signification of this Greek word, which is synonymous with the Latin *vir*, fully justifies its application to statesmen. It was originally used to describe men illustrious in any walk of life. Homer (*Od.* viii. 483) calls the minstrel Demodocus a hero, and even the unwarlike Phaeacians are (*Od.* vii. 44) honoured with a similar title. No solecism is, therefore, involved in the inclusion of Cavour's Life in the "Heroes of the Nations" Series.

The tale has often been told before. The personal reminiscences of De La Rive, published in 1862, as well as the more recent works of Bolton King, Thayer, Trevelyan, the Countess Martinengo Cesaresco, and many others, have rendered English readers thoroughly familiar with the parts played severally by the makers of modern Italy. Yet Signor Pietro Orsi's brief but graphic biography of one whom the reactionary Count Metternich sorrowfully described as the "only diplomatist left in Europe" is to be welcomed. The tale is, in fact, one of undying interest. At a moment when all the resolve and determination of Ulstermen are being evoked to resist the forces of national disruption, it is especially desirable that attention should be drawn to the fact that the three greatest world-events of the latter half of the nineteenth century—the Civil War in America, the Italian struggle, and the great Franco-German conflict in 1870—all had for their object the agglomeration of units bound together by natural ties of affinity. National aspirations, which have afforded the driving-power to most of the great political

movements of modern times, assumed their most noble and attractive form in the Italian upheaval. Sentiment, nurtured by the tradition of a glorious past, and reason, which clearly indicated the justice of the Italian cause, combined to secure the sympathies of the liberal world. Nowhere were the sympathies evoked more lively than in England; neither is there any more honourable page in English history than that which records the very effective help rendered by the statesmen of the mid-Victorian era to the cause of Italian unity. Its value was fully recognised by the Italians themselves. When the first Italian Parliament assembled at Turin in 1861, King Victor Emmanuel said that the "grateful memory" of England's assistance would "endure imperishably."

Perhaps the most notable feature of Cavour's career is that he affords a rare example of a statesman of essentially moderate views who dominated and guided an acute political crisis, and eventually secured the triumph of his own principles. History records many instances of moderate politicians who have performed admirable services in the direction of attempting to avert a coming storm. It has also frequently occurred that when the storm was over, and the full fury of revolution had spent its force, moderate men have again been called into council, and have successfully assuaged the violence of extremists on either side. But it has usually happened that whilst the full blast of a political hurricane lasted moderation has been banned from every quarter. Counterparts to the Girondists may be found in the historical records of almost every country which has been the subject of political convulsion. The course of events in Italy constitutes an exception to what may fitly be called the normal

course of revolution. More than this, Cavour's own opinions show a rare departure from the normal course pursued by politicians. Mr. Frederic Harrison has remarked that he was an instance of a statesman who "grew less and not more conservative by experience."

Throughout his life he was an earnest but moderate Liberal. In his youth he described himself as "an honest member of the *juste milieu*, eager for social progress, but determined not to purchase it at the cost of political and social subversion." Acting on these principles, he rejected the views of the idealist Mazzini, with whom, curiously enough, he was never brought in personal contact, and justified Mr. Trevelyan's verdict that "mankind has been better served in the long run by lovers of justice than by zealots." He curbed the extravagances of that brave, blundering, but withal very lovable hero, Garibaldi. He was, of course, loathed by the Vatican, and, on the other hand, he was mistrusted by Victor Emmanuel, who chafed under the control of his masterful Minister, who, under the influence of fears for his own spiritual welfare, occasionally developed clerical tendencies, and who, Mr. Thayer says, strongly resented Cavour's strenuous opposition to his marriage with the corporal's daughter who eventually became the Contessa di Mirafiori. Accused by some of being a revolutionary firebrand, Cavour was denounced by others as "the greatest reactionary in the kingdom and the greatest enemy of the revolution," whose sole desire it was to "sell his country," at one time to France and anon to England. Amidst all this turmoil Cavour steadily pursued his way with his eyes fixed on the goal which he wished to reach—the unity of Italy under the rule of the King of Sardinia. The principles which guided

his conduct were stated in 1852 in words which might almost serve as a *vade mecum* for all rational statesmen. "There are," he said, "times for compromises and there are times for decided policies. I believe that there is neither in history nor in statesmanship any absolute maxim. If ever the time for a resolute policy, and not for compromise, shall come, I shall be the first to adopt it; because I feel that I am by character more inclined to it. But the wisdom of the statesman lies in discerning when the time has come for one or the other." Lord Salisbury once laid down much the same principle to the writer of the present article when he said that a statesman was somewhat in the position of the steersman of a boat lying outside the mouth of some African river, inasmuch as he had to wait for a high wave to carry him over the bar. Manzoni said of Cavour that he had "all the prudence and all the imprudence of a true statesman."

In spite of his persistent moderation, Cavour always remained loyal to those genuinely liberal sentiments which, albeit he was born and reared in a conservative, not to say reactionary, atmosphere, he imbibed in his youth, and to which he steadfastly adhered up to the moment when, pressing the hand of the courageous priest who braved the ignoble thunders of the Vatican to attend the great Minister in his dying moments, he murmured, "Frate, Frate, libera chiesa in libero stato." "Believe me," he said to a friend who was indignant at the line of conduct adopted at one time by the Italian Chamber, "the worst of Chambers is still preferable to the most brilliant of the antechambers of Sovereigns."

His career has often been compared to that of

Bismarck. But, in truth, save that both aimed at the consolidation of a number of scattered national units, the analogy is false. The task which Cavour had to perform was far more difficult than that of the German statesman. The methods adopted also diverged widely. The cause of Bismarck was that of autocracy. Cavour fought under the banner of constitutional liberty. Moreover, as Signor Luzzatti, at one time Prime Minister of Italy, very truly said, "the Germans sufficed to liberate Germany. The Piedmontese diplomatists had to gain the material aid of France for the redemption of the country without diminishing its autonomy or its prestige."

Cavour's task was, indeed, of such superlative difficulty that none but a man of the most undaunted courage and endowed with the highest gifts of intellect could have accomplished it. He had to create a war, for he well knew that the sword was the only instrument by which Italy could be freed, and at the same time he had to convince Europe, and notably his shifty Imperial patron and ally at Paris, that he was not responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. He had to temper the untoward zeal of the Mazzinists, to utilise Garibaldi without being subservient to him, and at the same time not to yield one inch to the clericals. He had to calm the jealousy entertained by the Southern States against Piedmont, and gradually to foster the idea throughout Italy that unity under one King was to be preferred to confederation. Amidst these and other perplexing problems, his judgment on all the main issues which he had to decide was never once at fault. The Italian expedition to the Crimea, which appears, from what M. De La Rive says, to have been first suggested to him by his niece,

the Countess Alfieri, and which was violently attacked by his own countrymen, was a master-stroke of diplomacy. It received its justification when General Simpson, who commanded the English army in the Crimea, issued a general order in which, speaking of the battle of the Tchernaya, he said : " In this battle the Sardinian army has shown itself worthy to fight by the side of the greatest military nations of Europe." This was all Cavour wanted. His object had been achieved. Equally far-seeing was his conduct when, having secured only a partial grip of the wavering French Emperor, he told the late Lord Ampthill in December 1858 that he "would force Austria to declare war," though here he was aided by the extraordinary infatuation of the Austrian Government, which led them to fall blindly into the trap laid for them by an adroit diplomacy. But perhaps Cavour's statesmanship never shone more brightly than when, in September 1860, he invaded the Papal States, and thus prevented Garibaldi from obtaining the whole credit for securing the unity of Italy. This, Mr. Trevelyan says,


"was the crowning act of Cavour's life, and the greatest example of his political genius. He was hemmed in on all sides, and he laid all his enemies at his feet by this one stroke. It destroyed the league of reactionary Italian Powers that threatened the newly formed kingdom in the North, it liberated the populations of the Centre, it garnered Garibaldi's harvest in the South, it decided the rivalry between himself and the Dictator before it could grow into a fatal quarrel, it restored the prestige of the Monarchy, as at once leading and controlling the revolution, and it made a united Italy stretching without a break from the Alps to Palermo."

The life of this remarkable man deserves to be carefully studied by all—by Italians because he



made them a nation, by politicians of other countries because his career carries with it the most valuable lesson in sound, courageous, and pertinacious statesmanship which the history of modern Europe affords.

# INDIA, EGYPT, AND THE EAST



## XXII

### INDIAN PROGRESS AND TAXATION

*"Quarterly Review," October 1913*

IT would be a sheer impossibility to attempt to deal at all adequately in a single article with the vast mass of material contained in the decennial report on the condition of India recently presented to Parliament. Apart from considerations based on differences of race, religion, language, climate, and geographical position, we are, at the very outset of the report, met by a statement of fact which, in itself, should be sufficient to make the most self-confident critic pause before he attempts to generalise, or to treat India as a single national unit. We are told that the total population of the country consists of about 315,000,000 persons, spread over an area of 1,833,000 square miles. Obviously, there can be but little similarity between the economic conditions existing in provinces like Bengal and Madras, with a population of respectively 578 and 477 to the square mile, and those in sparsely populated districts such as the Central Provinces, with a density of 68 to the square mile, or arid Beluchistan, where the population does not exceed five to the square mile. Further, while it is possible, without incurring the charge of adopting a misleading political nomenclature, to

speak of a South African, an Egyptian, or an Irish question, the merest tyro in political life would hesitate ere he spoke of an Indian question. There are, in fact, a round score or more of Indian questions, all of which bristle with special difficulties of their own. All, therefore, that can here be attempted is to select one of these numerous questions, and to deal briefly with some of its leading features.

Of late years public attention has been mainly directed to alterations in the machinery adopted for carrying on the government and administration of India. It may, however, be confidently asserted that, looking to the general welfare of the masses, no change in that machinery has produced, or, indeed, is at all likely to produce, anything like the beneficial effect which has resulted from the closure of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver twenty years ago. The generation has now almost passed away which can remember the happy days when an Indian Civil Servant, by lodging Rs. 1000 with a bank at Calcutta or Bombay, could feel assured that £100 would be placed at the disposal of his wife and children who were residing in England. That halcyon epoch came to an end when, after the Franco-Prussian War, Germany demonetised her silver and the Bank of France was no longer prepared to exchange the precious metals at a fixed ratio. Then followed a period of acute controversy on currency matters, ending in a theoretical victory for the bimetallists and a practical victory for the monometallists. The latter were obliged to admit that the precious metals could not be considered as commodities, like wheat or coal, whose price depended solely on supply and demand. The former were forced to admit that, however sound their economic

theory might be, it was practically impossible to give effect to it. During all this period India suffered acutely. The individual with a fixed income was naturally hard hit if he had to remit money to England, because the rupee was low; but the country in general, and the Government which presided over its destinies, suffered not so much because the rupee was low as because its value was unstable. How, indeed, could a Finance Minister settle his Budget when he was liable, in the course of the year, to see all his calculations upset by a brusque and profound change in the standard of value? What prudent capitalist would embark in any fresh industrial enterprise when, for a similar reason, his estimate of profit was at best but a hazardous conjecture? It was clear that so long as the foundations of Indian finance reposed on a shifting and bottomless quicksand the economic development of the country would of necessity be arrested. This disastrous period of doubt and uncertainty was brought to a close in 1893, when Lord Lansdowne, acting on the very competent advice of Sir David Barbour, closed the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver, with the object of eventually introducing a gold standard.

It is now the fashion to decry the views held by the older economists. Carlyle led the attack on that "dismal science" whose tenets he was at no pains to understand. Mr. Gladstone, albeit in his action he to a great extent belied his words, banished political economy to the planet Saturn; and it would be almost an insult to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer to suppose that, in elaborating any of his quixotic schemes for the subversion of the financial system of his country, he has ever deigned to glance at the pages of Mill or Bastiat. Nevertheless, in spite of the outward

contempt with which this Cinderella amongst the sciences is at times treated, political economy has an awkward way of vindicating its own majesty. A sure reward awaits those who, in spite of occasional obloquy and misrepresentation, conform to its leading precepts. A slow but certain Nemesis, as Socialists and Protectionists—if, *quod Dis non placeat*, they should ever have their way in this country—will eventually learn, dogs the steps of those who violate its leading principles. The principle adopted in respect to the Indian currency in 1893 was, from an economic point of view, thoroughly sound. Its authors met with their reward, but it did not come immediately. It was not until 1899 that the rupee acquired a stable value of 1s. 4d. Lord Curzon generously recognised how much he owed to the measure adopted by his predecessor. Speaking of the commercial and industrial advance of India during his Viceroyalty, he said: “The improvement dates from the closing of the mints by Lord Lansdowne and Sir David Barbour, and, though it is in my time that the fruits have been mainly reaped, the seeds were sown by them.”

Two years ago Sir Theodore Morison published a very useful little volume in which he gave an interesting summary of the recent industrial development of India. This movement unquestionably received a powerful stimulus from the wise measure to which reference has just been made. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, but for the adoption of that measure, it is almost certain that no considerable industrial development could have occurred. The decennial report now carries on the tale to a somewhat later date. Everywhere the same story is told. Railways have to a very great extent conjured away the

spectre of famine, and have profoundly affected the conditions of rural life. "Old customs based on ideas once appropriate to the village economy, but now no longer applicable, are beginning to lose their force. The theory of the self-contained village, with its dependent fringe of non-cultivating artisans and servants, is breaking down." Hand industries, especially weaving, show singular vitality, although it is almost inevitable that they should eventually disappear. In 1903 there were 2460 factories in existence throughout the country, employing 662,000 workmen. In 1911 the number of factories had increased to 3099, and the number of workmen employed to 920,000. The capital invested in the important jute industry has increased from £4,500,000 to nearly £8,000,000. It is earnestly to be hoped that it will not be crippled, as some propose, by the imposition of a heavy export duty. Some £17,000,000 are invested in the production of tea, involving an annual wage bill of between £1,700,000 and £2,000,000, practically the whole of which is spent within the province of Assam. Iron and steel works, "with exclusively Indian capital of over £1,500,000 and an Indian board of directors," have been started in Bengal. As regards carpet-weaving, the report makes the somewhat ominous remark that it is "an important jail industry." The wisdom of the policy adopted in the matter of jail industries by the Government of India is, indeed, very questionable. Generally speaking, however, the facts adduced in the report give evidence of wise administration, which has resulted in a widespread improvement in the economic condition of the country. Thus, in the United Provinces, it is said that "a very marked change is in progress in the standard of life of the upper and middle



classes, which may be summarised as a gradual approximation to European standards adapted to local conditions." In the North-West Frontier Province there has been a general advancement of prosperity, and "the people now affect more commodious and better furnished houses." In the Central Provinces "the economic development of the province has certainly been the most striking feature of the decade." In Madras "the people are becoming alive to the necessity of some new measure of industrial life. There is a strongly marked tendency to industrialism on a small scale. . . . Trade statistics show immense development." As regards Bombay, it is said that "on the whole the decade has been a period of general prosperity, of a wider distribution of wealth, and of the expansion of industry and commerce."

All this is very satisfactory so far as it goes. The transition from agriculture to manufactures, though as yet on a small scale, is probably proceeding as rapidly as the special conditions of the country render possible. It may well be doubted whether, on any showing, the industries concerned stand in need of any artificial help in the shape of Protection. This question need not, however, be discussed at present. The main fact to be borne in mind is that at least 65 per cent of the population of India are still employed in agricultural pursuits; and that, taking the Census definition of a town as a place with a population of 5000 souls and over, about 90 per cent of the people live in villages, and only 10 per cent in towns. It may confidently be predicted that it will take years, if not generations, before any very marked alteration occurs in these proportionate figures.

The danger of generalising about things Indian

has been already indicated. But there are some exceptions to the rule. One generalisation which can safely be made is that the population generally is extremely poor. The other is that, both on political and economic grounds, taxation must be light. Some years ago Sir David Barbour, after a very careful examination of this question, came to the conclusion that the average annual income per head of population in India was Rs. 27. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald gives it at £2. Whichever figure be taken as correct, the fact is very striking; for Mr. Ramsay Macdonald is evidently justified in saying that if £2 be the average there must be considerable sections of the community whose incomes fall below that figure. The incidence of taxation per head of population, exclusive of the land revenue, has varied during the last decade from 1s. 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. in 1903-4 to 2s. 1d. in 1912-13. Two shillings a year does not appear to us to be a very heavy tax; but consider what it means to a man who has only £2, or perhaps less, on which to live for twelve months. It is the equivalent, and even in reality much more than the equivalent, of a tax of £5 levied on an Englishman with an income of £100 a year. If this consideration stood alone, it would be sufficient to justify the assertion that the fiscal system of India must of necessity be based not only on light, but on very light taxation. But it does not stand alone. Political considerations point to a precisely similar conclusion. The wise words of Lord Lawrence hold as good to-day as they did half a century ago. "Light taxation," he said, "is the panacea for foreign rule in India."

Arguments of this sort, it may be said, are mere commonplaces; but they are commonplaces which, albeit generally recognised in theory,

are very apt to be forgotten in practice, especially by democratic assemblies. For some years past we have seen the members of the British House of Commons blindly agreeing to huge expenditures without any very definite idea of how the liabilities which they so lightly incurred were to be met, but with probably a vague hope animating the breasts of many individual members that any increased taxation would not fall on the classes which these members specially represent, but would be paid by other classes in whose welfare they are less personally interested. India has recently been endowed with institutions which, in fact and perhaps even still more in spirit, involve no inconsiderable step in a democratic direction. Demands for increased expenditure on sanitation, education, and other matters are cropping up on all sides. It may well be that the representatives of Indian opinion, whose claims to be regarded as representatives, it may be incidentally remarked, are not of any very assured validity, may lend a too-ready ear to these demands, and forget that there may be even worse evils than the continuance for a while of insanitary conditions and ignorance or illiteracy.

There never was a time, therefore, when it behoved both the Government of India and the Secretary of State to offer a more resolute opposition to reforms, however laudable in themselves, if those reforms would involve increasing the burthen of taxation on the poverty-stricken masses of India. The importance which the people themselves generally attach to these reforms must at best be more or less a matter of conjecture. That they would strenuously object to being taxed in order to carry them into execution admits of no manner of doubt. In spite of recent changes, it is difficult to believe that the

India described by Sir John Strachey and Sir Alfred Lyall has altogether passed away. The former, writing twenty-five years ago, said: "The vast masses of the people remain in a different world from ours. They hate everything new, and they especially hate almost everything that we look upon as progress"; and very similar testimony was borne by Sir Alfred Lyall. There could not be a more grievous error than to suppose that the incipient industrialism, of which the decennial report furnishes satisfactory evidence, has as yet resulted in any such accretion of wealth as to increase in any notable degree the taxpaying power of the community in general. It can have done nothing of the sort. The industrial movement has so far only scratched the surface of society. Years, possibly generations, must elapse before the mass of the population of India becomes, from a fiscal point of view, different from what it now is; and the present position of the people is that, by reason of their very limited wants, they are probably the least taxable, and, by reason of their poverty, the least potentially taxpaying community in the world.

Of all the proposals likely to necessitate an increase of fiscal burthens, the most attractive, and therefore in some respects the most dangerous, are those which pertain to educational policy. The past history of education in India is not one on which any reflecting Englishman can look back with unmixed satisfaction. It is, Sir Alfred Lyall said, "a story of grave political miscalculation." That attempts should now be made to rectify the errors of the past is altogether commendable; and that those attempts should take the form of stimulating primary education is both right and natural. In 1911, taking India as a whole, only one male in ten, and only one female

in a hundred, could read and write in any vernacular language. Some reformers, in order to make a rapid impression on the mass of illiteracy which still exists, would go so far as to introduce the purely Western system of making education compulsory. Without attempting to deal with all the aspects in which this drastic proposal may be presented, it will be sufficient, for the purposes of the present argument, to say that a measure of this sort could only be carried out by the imposition of fresh taxation to meet the very heavy expenditure which would of necessity be involved; and that, for the reasons already given, any increase of taxation is greatly to be deprecated. "For financial and administrative reasons of decisive weight," the decennial report says, "they [the Government of India] have refused to recognise the principle of compulsory education." It is greatly to be hoped that there will be no departure from this wise policy. The voluntary basis of education, on which the policy of the Government has so far been based, has produced very satisfactory results. During the ten years under review the number of boys "not reading printed books" in the primary stages of the Public Schools has increased from about 565,000 to 1,185,000, and—which is still more remarkable—the number of girls has risen from 101,000 to 328,000. During the same period the number of boys "reading printed books" has increased from 2,209,000 to 2,897,000, and the number of girls from 252,000 to 458,000. Looking to these facts and to the balance of advantage to be gained and disadvantage to be incurred, there appear to be weighty objections to making any radical change in the existing system.

There is, indeed, an alternative to increasing taxation, if more money is absolutely required.

It is to reduce expenditure. Any economies, provided that they do not impair the military strength of the country or seriously cripple the efficiency of the civil administration, are of course to be welcomed. It is impossible to discuss this matter at any length on the present occasion. Brief allusion may, however, be made to one point as to which Indian opinion is very sensitive, viz. what are known as the "Home Charges."

There can be no doubt that, in the distribution of liabilities between the British and Indian Treasuries, India has a right not merely to just but to generous treatment. The claim to be treated with generosity has recently been much strengthened owing to the fact that, in order to salve the consciences of the British public, India has been forced to abandon the very large revenue which up to the present time has been derived from the export of opium to China. Still less can there be any doubt of the existence of a very prevalent opinion that in these matters India has not been treated either with generosity or even with justice. Sir Valentine Chirol says: "The Indian Nationalist Press has not been alone in describing the recent imposition on the Indian taxpayer of a capitation allowance amounting to £300,000 a year to meet the increased cost of the British soldier as 'the renewed attempt of a rapacious War Office to raid the helpless Indian Treasury.' " Moreover, small economies have at times been made at the expense of India, which have caused an amount of friction and ill-feeling altogether out of proportion to the amount of money saved to the British taxpayer. Some years ago, the cost of a ball given to the Sultan of Turkey in London was most unwisely charged to the Indian Treasury—an incident which afforded for a long period a fertile text for the

sarcasms and vituperation of Indian Anglo-phobes. If what Mr. Ramsay Macdonald says is correct, it would appear that more recently an attempt, which fortunately proved unsuccessful, was made to saddle India with a charge of £7000 for entertaining the representatives and guests from India who took part in the Coronation ceremonies of the late King. Claims on India of this description are absolutely indefensible. Nevertheless, looking at the broader aspects of the question, it cannot be said that India has much of which she can justly complain in this connection. This has been conclusively shown by Sir T. Morison; and even Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who is no indulgent critic of the British administration of India, says that he "has found himself unable to feel much wrath about what is called 'the drain.'"

The "Home Charges" amounted in 1911-12 to about £18,865,000. The main item is £10,769,000 on account of interest and management of the debt. Never has public expenditure been more amply justified. Not only are the railways yielding a return of 5·35 per cent, and the Irrigation works a return of 7·39 per cent, on the capital outlay, but the money spent on these objects has saved millions of lives, has solved the famine problem, and has almost certainly been the main factor in improving the general condition of the country and its inhabitants. The next charge in order of importance is £5,470,000 for non-effective charges and furlough allowances. This is the price which India has to pay for the "Pax Britannica" and all its contingent advantages. Whether the price is or is not excessive may be a matter of opinion; but there can be no manner of doubt that India has received and is still receiving good value for her money.

There remain two other rather more questionable items. The first is £1,016,000 for "army and marine effective charges." It is very right and natural that the details of these charges should be most carefully scrutinised from the Indian point of view, and that the British Government should be called upon to apply a remedy to any grievance which can reasonably be shown to exist. The other item is £1,191,000 on account of stores of all kinds purchased in England. This appears recently to have undergone a marked diminution; in 1901-2 it stood at £1,998,000. Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that the subject has not been more fully treated in the decennial report. All that is said is that the imported stores consist mainly of railway plant, rolling-stock, etc., and that a preference is given to local articles "when the quality is satisfactory and the price not unfavourable." The point is one as to which Indian opinion is somewhat specially sensitive. Mr. Mitra in his *Anglo-Indian Studies* (p. 95) quotes a complaint on this subject made by Sir Rajendra Mookerjee to the effect that, in a specific case, the Government refused to purchase some railway plant locally unless the cost were 5 per cent less than that paid for English goods of the same quality. It is highly probable that this circumstance admits of some satisfactory explanation. Moreover, any one who has had practical experience in dealing with this subject knows that, especially as regards railway plant, it is often by no means easy to decide which of several tenders is really the cheapest. It may, however, be suggested that the India Office would act wisely in taking some opportunity to give full explanations in respect to the operations of the Stores Department.



## XXIII

### REFLECTIONS ON INDIA<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," May 23, 1914*

MR. WADIA'S *Reflections on the Problems of India* is well worthy of study on the part of all who are interested in the sundry and manifold developments of opinion elicited by the contact between East and West. Mr. Wadia is so far Westernised that he is a master of the English language and is thoroughly versed in European literature and ratiocination. At the same time he is Eastern to the core in his profound distrust and dislike of European materialism. "It is time," he says, "that the bubble of Progress was pricked." His dislike of what Mr. Bernard Shaw has called the "goose-cackle about Progress" is, however, based on wholly different grounds from those set forth by the Brahmanical visionaries whom Sir Alfred Lyall personified in his famous essay. Mr. Wadia stands in a category by himself. On the one hand, he is far too practical to allow himself to be involved in a labyrinthine maze of metaphysics. It may, indeed, be inferred from his utterances that he shares, with Lucian and Dr. Jowett, the view that the only use of metaphysical study is to enable the mind to cast off the subject. On

<sup>1</sup> *Reflections on the Problems of India.* By Ardaser Sorabjee N. Wadia, M.A. London : J. M. Dent & Sons. [3s. net.]

the other hand, he spurns the Oriental pseudo-Western, and not only laments over, but derides, the fruitless efforts made by English doctrinaires and their Eastern acolytes to adapt garments, whether of the political or industrial type, made on the banks of the Thames or the Mersey, to the irreceptive bodies of the inhabitants of India. Nothing is more natural than that an independent thinker like Mr. Wadia, who is too occidentally practical to dream dreams, and at the same time too fearless to be hampered by convention, should gravitate towards a school of philosophy which discards commonplace Western shibboleths, and which, at all events, goes some way towards rendering the civilisation of the West adaptable to the mentality of the East. It can be no matter for surprise that he is a warm admirer of Carlyle and Ruskin.

Mr. Wadia weighs the democratic fetishes of the day in the balance, and he finds them all wanting. He rivals Burke in his vigorous denunciation of the fallacy that all men are born equal. Any such idea, he says, is a "most palpable and most delirious absurdity." But it is the "modern fetish of knowledge," of which Mr. Gokhale is such an impassioned apostle, that more especially excites his wrath. Indeed, his treatment of this subject constitutes perhaps the most interesting portion of his work. Many leading natives of India are wholly opposed to a rapid extension of elementary education, and Mr. Wadia is able to quote with great effect the staid official testimony which has recorded that "it is not easy to see how India would benefit by a sudden diffusion of spurious literacy." It cannot, in fact, be doubted that the principle which Mr. Wadia advocates, if capable of being carried out in practice, is infinitely more adapted to the real

requirements of the Indian population than that of which Mr. Gokhale is the chief exponent. Mr. Wadia holds that Indian children should, in the homely and familiar words of the English Church Catechism, be brought up to do their duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call them. One of the main reasons why he is warmly in favour of the maintenance of caste is that it greatly facilitates the execution of this programme. The children of farmers should, he thinks, receive practical instruction in agriculture, and throughout the country small training schools and workshops should be established where technical and industrial instruction should be afforded.

As for industrialism, in the sense in which that word is generally understood, Mr. Wadia thinks it has been a complete failure in England and threatens to become the bane of India. The factory system "has gradually dehumanised the operative into a mere animated tool." Such industrial progress as has been achieved in India, far from being a subject for congratulation, should be a cause of deep regret. When Sir John Hewett expresses a hope that India will eventually "be studded with factories after the manner of flourishing countries of modern Europe," he is aiming at an ideal which is altogether false. On the contrary, every possible effort should be made to maintain hand industries and to resist the introduction of machinery. The wide interval which, as a practical politician, separates Mr. Wadia from many of his countrymen may be gauged by the fact that, whilst they clamour for the protection of Indian manufactures against European competition, he is altogether opposed to a Protective tariff, inasmuch as he considers that it would encourage the local

growth of industrialism. His views ought, therefore, to find favour in Manchester.

Turning to politics, Mr. Wadia tells his countrymen some unpalatable truths. "What is India?" he asks; and in reply he points out that India never has been, and never can be, a united nation—an opinion shared by even so advanced a politician as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald. Moreover, he utterly condemns the policy of the National Congress Party, which aims at preserving British suzerainty, but in a form which would render it wholly ineffective. Mr. Gokhale has said that he "can conceive of nobody so debased as to see any special merit in being ruled by an alien Government." To this blast of patriotism Mr. Wadia replies that to the Sikh or the Mahratta the Bengali is quite as much a foreigner as the Englishman; that all the elements for the creation of a really self-governing community are wanting in India; that the qualities indispensable to rulers of men are to be found in an eminent degree amongst Englishmen, and are conspicuous by their absence amongst Indians of whatsoever race or creed; that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's dictum that "good government can never be a substitute for government by the people themselves" is a mere vapid commonplace wholly inapplicable to the actual conditions of India, and that the rulers of that country should be guided by Pope's oft-quoted charter of autocracy that "whate'er is best administered is best."

It will be seen, therefore, that in his thoroughness Mr. Wadia is an Indian Strafford. He has the courage of his opinions. His conclusions are stated with pitiless and incisive logic. But substantially the policy which he advocates, and in support of which he would call into existence

an *Independent Pro-British Party*, is identical with that which finds favour with most moderate English politicians, and which was enunciated only a short time ago by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords. It consists in the permanent maintenance of effective British rule, the employment of as many Indians in the higher grades of the public service as is compatible with the preservation of its tone and traditions, and the devolution on local Governments of certain functions now performed by the central Government.

There is, however, yet a fourth point in Mr. Wadia's programme to which he rightly attaches great importance. It is "the removal of all invidious distinctions which humiliate Indians in their own eyes and in those of others." It is, indeed, impossible to insist too strongly on the fact that the main barrier which separates the East from the West is not political but social. It is on this rock that the fair hopes of ardent reformers are especially liable to split. They are apt to expect from political changes greater results than any political change can accomplish. The colour bar cannot be removed by any Act of Parliament, by eloquence, however fervid, or by argument, however cogent. Virgil (*Ecl.* x. 38) said :

Quid tum, si fuscus Amyntas ?  
Et nigrae violae sunt et vaccinia nigra.

But though nineteen centuries have elapsed since these words were written, the world has as yet not accepted the principle that the tincture of the human skin is a matter as indifferent as that of the colour of flowers. Time alone can solve this question, if, indeed, it be in any way capable of solution. It is not merely useless, but perhaps

even hurtful, to discuss it. In the meanwhile, it may be noted that difference of colour remains the most formidable obstacle to intermarriage, and that without the possibility of intermarriage there can be no true sentiment of social equality.

Mr. Wadia deals with some of the by-products which are the offspring of the fundamental difference between the white- and black-skinned populations of the world. He states that, of all the causes of recent unrest in India, the most potent is the "irremediable grievance of the superior offensiveness of the ruling race." He is evidently stung to the quick by the humiliations to which his countrymen are at times exposed, and his resentment is very natural. Every one who has held a responsible position in the East knows that his long and patient efforts to establish friendly relations between the governors and the governed may be checked, and even frustrated, by a heedless word uttered or a foolish deed performed by some irresponsible Englishman. The tale, which is sure to be of a nature to present foreign domination in its most odious light, is repeated, and often inaccurately repeated, from mouth to mouth. It runs like wildfire through the native community, and by a process of overhasty generalisation is assumed to be typical of the attitude adopted by all Englishmen to all Easterns. Incidents of this sort unquestionably occur at times, although it must in justice to the Englishman be observed that the fault does not always lie entirely on his side. All that can be said in reply is that, however regrettable such incidents may be, the tendency to attach undue importance to them is to be deprecated. Each case has to be examined and judged on its own merits. But the causes of social separation lie,

in reality, deeper than anything which can be inferred from special episodes of this description. Mr. Wadia, in spite of his power of generalisation, and of his manifest and very laudable desire to discard all racial feeling in dealing with Indian questions, can scarcely be said to have probed the roots of the evil. Even if his defence of the caste system is not absolutely convincing, it may readily be admitted that his arguments are forcible, and that he is on very solid ground when he contends that "the question is not whether the ideal of the caste system is compatible with the spirit of the West, but whether it is in keeping with the spirit of the East." It must not, however, be forgotten that, whatever may be the merits of that system from the Eastern point of view, it constitutes, in addition to the colour bar, a further formidable obstacle to any social amalgamation between East and West. Next to intermarriage, the most potent instrument to ensure social unity in the West is participation in food at the same board. The caste system absolutely precludes the use of this instrument. Moreover, it most unfortunately happens that the Indian Moslem, by long association with Hinduism, has to a great extent adopted a system of social exclusiveness which is not dictated by his creed, and is foreign to his habits in other countries. Neither does this obstacle stand alone. The seclusion of women, which is common to both the Moslem and the Hindu world, acts in a similar direction. Without, therefore, in any way endeavouring to excuse or to palliate the conduct of those Englishmen who behave in a manner which is culpably offensive towards Easterns, it should in fairness be borne in mind that the more general causes which tend to establish a social gulf between the East and the

West are of Eastern rather than of Western manufacture. They are the natural outcome of those religious beliefs and practices which, as Mr. Wadia very truly remarks, "permeate the inner life of India."



## XXIV

### EGYPT AND THE SUDAN<sup>1</sup>

*December 8, 1913*

I HAVE been informed on good authority that a few years ago an English gentleman paid a visit to a high official of the Sudanese Government resident at Khartum, and, as a preliminary to a searching interrogatory on a number of points of great public interest, stated that he had just arrived and that his intention was "to get at the very heart and soul of the people of the Sudan." The official in question was naturally rather staggered at the declaration of a programme of such far-reaching ambition, all the more so because he had himself passed many toilsome years in the country, in the course of which he had made strenuous efforts to understand the habits and aspirations of its inhabitants, but did not feel at all confident of the degree of success which he had attained. He therefore anxiously inquired of the newcomer how long a time he intended to devote to the accomplishment of his self-imposed task. The reply given by this ardent seeker after Sudanese truth was that he proposed to leave Khartum by the train on the following Friday morning.

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Mr. Sidney Low's book entitled *Egypt in Transition*. Smith, Elder & Co.

It may be, albeit I was told the anecdote as an authentic fact, that this is a caricature, but in any case it departs from the reality less than many might, as a first impression, be inclined to think. In truth, the rapidity with which casual visitors to the East occasionally form their opinions, the dogmatism with which they assert those opinions, which are often in reality formed before they cross the British Channel, and the hasty and sweeping generalisations which they at times base on very imperfect data, is a never-ending source of wonderment to those who have passed their lives in endeavouring to unravel the tangled skein of Eastern thought and have had actual experience of the difficulties attendant on Eastern government and administration. The scorn and derision excited by these mental processes have found expression in the creation of an idealised type, under the name of "Padgett, M.P.," who is supposed to embody all the special and somewhat displeasing characteristics of his class.

There is, however, another side to the question. My personal experience rather leads me to the conclusion that what Pericles said of women holds good about British officials in the East, that is to say, that the less they are talked about the better. I have noticed that on many occasions the really good work done has varied in the inverse proportion of the degree of public attention which it has attracted, whether in the sense of praise or blame. Nevertheless, it is certainly desirable, if for no other reason than to serve as an antidote to current fables, that the British public should have accurate information furnished to them as regards the proceedings of their agents abroad. It is equally desirable, even from the point of view of the agents themselves, that those proceedings should be from time to time scrutin-

ised by intelligent and independent witnesses who are not bound by any official ties. Moreover, it sometimes happens that a newcomer, bringing a fresh mind to bear upon the facts with which he has to deal, may notice points which, owing to custom and familiarity, have escaped the attention of residents, and may thus make suggestions of real practical utility. The value of the information thus afforded to the public necessarily depends on the intelligence, the powers of observation, the absence from prejudice, and the care displayed in the collection of data exercised by the informant. In the present instance all who are interested in the affairs of Egypt and the Sudan have been singularly fortunate. Mr. Sidney Low entered on his task already equipped with a wide experience gained in other countries. He evidently spared no pains to ensure accuracy in the statements of his facts. His letters testify to the acuteness of his powers of observation. His pleasing literary style is calculated to attract many who would be repelled by more ponderous official or semi-official utterances. The result is that he has produced a lively and, so far as I can judge, a very trustworthy account of the present conditions of affairs in the Valley of the Nile. I have no hesitation in commending what he has written to the favourable consideration of all who are interested in the subject.

The abundant literature which exists on modern Egypt, coupled with the fact that a steady stream of winter visitors now passes annually through Cairo, have contributed to render the public tolerably familiar with the present condition of Egyptian affairs. On these, therefore, I need not dwell at any length. I wish, however, to repeat an opinion which I have frequently expressed on former occasions, namely,

that by far the most important question connected with Egyptian internal administration at present is the abolition, or at all events the modification, of the Capitulations. The evils of the system, on which Mr. Low dwells in one of his letters, are universally recognised. The difficulty is to find a remedy which shall at the same time be both effective and practicable. I have in my official reports, and more recently in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, made certain suggestions for solving the legislative dilemma which at present exists. I do not attach any exaggerated importance to the particular scheme which I have recommended, but, without attempting to go fully into the subject on the present occasion, I may say that no plan of reform can, I am convinced, be successfully carried into execution unless it steers between two extremes. In the first place, it would be in the highest degree unjust and also impolitic to deprive the Europeans resident in Egypt of their present privileges without providing adequate guarantees against the recurrence of those abuses to guard against which the privileges were originally created. The best guarantee would probably be the creation of machinery which would in some form or another enable European residents in Egypt to make their voices heard before any legislation affecting their special interests was undertaken. There are many ways in which this object may be accomplished, neither have I any sort of wish to dogmatise as to which method is the best; but whatever plan be adopted it will certainly prove a failure unless the general principle is recognised that personal rule, which must for a long time to come be the predominating feature in Egyptian administration, must in this instance be tempered to such an extent as to

enable local European opinion to be brought into council. Equally objectionable would be any attempt to treat all the inhabitants of the Nile Valley as a single or homogeneous political unit, and to amalgamate the machinery for purely Egyptian and for European legislation.

Between the extreme of personal government and that of parliamentary institutions of the conventional type there lies a tolerably wide field for action. The statesmanship of those responsible for the government of Egypt will be shown by the extent to which they will be able to devise a plan not open to the charge of excess in either direction. In the meanwhile there is a distinct risk that in view of the great difficulty of finding a practicable and unobjectionable solution to this question; of the fact that the subject, which is very complicated, is but little understood in this country; and of the further fact that public attention is at present directed to other and admittedly more important topics, matters will be allowed to drift on as they are, and that the present regime will continue without any very substantial change.<sup>1</sup> Such a conclusion would be unsatisfactory and disappointing to those who are interested in the well-being of Egypt and its inhabitants. But, on the other hand, it will be better to drift on as at present rather than to take a step in a false direction.

The public are, however, generally speaking,

<sup>1</sup> It seems probable that this prediction will turn out to be correct for the time being at all events. In his last annual Report, Lord Kitchener, speaking of the Mixed Tribunals, says: "But the main question of organization remains unsolved. Nor am I able to foresee the possibility of effecting any radical improvement in a situation the faults of which are inherent in the existing system of the 'Capitulations.' The fundamental modification of this system has been urged in the annual reports emanating from this Agency for many years past, and it may be hoped that a settlement of the question will not now be much longer delayed."

less fully acquainted with Sudanese than with Egyptian affairs. Mr. Low's letters from the Sudan are, therefore, to be welcomed. They constitute, as I venture to think, the most instructive and interesting portion of his book. It is with very special pleasure that I note that so competent an observer as Mr. Low is able to give a very satisfactory account of Sudanese progress. I trust it will not be thought presumptuous if I supplement his account by stating the main causes which, in my opinion, have contributed towards rendering that progress possible.

Unquestionably, amongst such elements in the situation as are under human control, the first place must be given to the fact that the form of government in the Sudan is singularly adapted to the special condition and requirements of the country. It is probable that, with the exception of a few experts who might be numbered on the fingers of one hand, there are not a dozen people in England who could give even an approximately accurate account of what that form of government is. Neither can the general ignorance which prevails on this subject cause any surprise, for the political status of the Sudan is different to that of any other country in the world. It was little short of providential that at the time this question had to be settled a Minister presided at the Foreign Office who did not allow himself to be unduly bound by precedent and convention. The problem which had to be solved was how the Sudan, without being designated as British territory, could be spared all the grave inconveniences which would have resulted if it had continued to be classed as Ottoman territory. When the cannon at Omdurman had once cleared the ground for political action, it appeared at first sight that politicians

were impaled on the horns of an insoluble dilemma. Lord Salisbury, however, whose memory I shall never cease to revere, said to me on one occasion that when once one gets to the foot of apparently impassable mountains it is generally possible by diligent search to find some way of getting through them.

So it proved in the present instance. It occurred to me that the Sudan might be made neither English nor Egyptian, but Anglo-Egyptian. Sir Malcolm McIlwraith clothed this extremely illogical political conception in suitable legal phraseology. I must confess that I made the proposal with no very sanguine hopes that it would be accepted. Lord Salisbury, however, never thought twice on the matter. He joyfully agreed to the creation of a hybrid State of a nature eminently calculated to shock the susceptibilities of international jurists. The possible objections of foreign governments were conjured away by the formal declaration that no preference would be accorded to British trade. The British and Egyptian flags were hoisted with pomp on the palace of Khartum, and from that time forth Sir Reginald Wingate and his very capable subordinates have been given a free hand.

The second cause to which the success of the Sudanese administration may, in my opinion, be attributed is that, broadly speaking, the Sudanese officials have been left to themselves. There has been absolutely no interference from London. Nothing has, fortunately, as yet occurred to awaken marked parliamentary interest in the affairs of the Sudan. Supervision from Cairo has been limited to guidance on a few important points of principle, to a very limited amount of financial control, and occasionally, but very rarely, to advice on matters of detail which has

invariably been communicated in private and unofficial form. A system of this sort cannot, of course, be made to work satisfactorily unless thorough confidence is entertained in the agents who are responsible for its working. The agents employed in the Sudan have always been very carefully chosen, and they have fully justified the confidence which has been shown in them. They have been mainly, though by no means exclusively, soldiers. The civilian element is, however, being gradually increased.

I may perhaps conveniently take this opportunity of explaining the genesis of the Sudanese Civil Service. In the first instance, the civil work of the Sudan was carried on almost exclusively by officers of the army. This system continued practically unchanged until the commencement of the war in South Africa. It was not modified by reason of its having worked badly, nor because any special predilection was entertained for civilian in preference to military agency. Speaking with a somewhat lengthy experience of administrative work done by both soldiers and civilians, I may say that I find it quite impossible to generalise on the subject of their respective merits—I mean, of course, in respect to ordinary administrative work, and not as regards posts where special legal, educational, or other technical qualifications have to be considered. In the present case my feeling was that a certain number of active young men endowed with good health, high character, and fair abilities were required to assist in governing the country, and that it was a matter of complete indifference whether they had received their early training at Sandhurst, or at Oxford or Cambridge.

But the South African war brought out one



great disadvantage which is an inevitable accompaniment to the employment of army officers in civil capacities. It is that they are liable to be suddenly removed. The officers themselves naturally wish to join their regiments when there is a prospect of seeing active service. The War Office, although I think it at times allows itself to be rather too much hide-bound by regulations, naturally looks, on an occasion of this sort, solely to the efficiency of the troops which it sends into the field. The result is that the head of a Government such as that of the Sudan may suddenly find himself deprived of some of his most valuable agents, and is thus exposed to the risk of having his administration seriously dislocated at a critical moment.

Frequent changes in any administration are at all times to be deprecated. One of the reasons of whatever successes have been achieved in the Nile Valley has been that all such changes have, so far as was possible, been avoided. They are especially to be deprecated at a time when events of importance, such as those which occurred in South Africa, send an electric shock through the whole British Empire, and more or less affect indirectly all its component parts. To any one sitting in a London office the removal of half a dozen young officers and the substitution of others in their place may not seem a matter of vital importance. But the question will be regarded in a very different light by the head of an administration such as the Sudan, who will very fully realise how impossible it is, whether in respect to civil or military appointments, to fill at once the vacuum caused by the abrupt departure of even a very few trained men. As a matter of fact the withdrawal of a certain number of officers from the Sudan to go to South Africa led to

consequences which were serious, and might well have been much more so. It was manifestly desirable to do all that was possible to obviate any such risks in the future. Hence the embryo of a Sudanese Civil Service was brought into being.

I should add that another very potent cause which has contributed to the successful administration of the Sudan is that the officials, both civil and military, have been well paid and that the leave rules have been generous. These are points to which I attach the utmost importance. In those outlying dominions of the Crown where coloured races have to be ruled through European agency, everything depends on the character and ability of a very small number of individuals. Probably none but those who have themselves been responsible for the general direction of an administration in these regions can fully realise the enormous amount of harm—sometimes irremediable harm—which can be done by the misconduct or indiscretion of a single individual. Misconduct on the part of British officials is, to their credit be it said, extremely rare. Indiscretion or want of judgment constitutes greater dangers, and, considering the very great difficulties which the officials in question have at times to encounter, it cannot be expected that they should not occasionally commit some venial errors.

The best safeguard against the committal of any such errors is to discard absolutely the practice of selecting for employment abroad any who for whatsoever reason have been whole or partial failures in other capacities at home. Personally, I regard anything in the nature of jobbing these appointments as little short of criminal; and although my confidence in the benefits to be derived from parliamentary interference in the affairs of our Eastern dominions

is limited, there is, in my opinion, one point as to which such interference, if properly exercised, may be most salutary. A very careful watch may and should be kept on any tendency to job, whether that tendency be displayed by the executive Government or, as is quite as probable, by Members of Parliament or others connected with the working of party machinery. Imperialist England requires, not the mediocre by-products of the race, but the flower of those who are turned out from our schools and colleges to carry out successfully an Imperial policy.

Their services cannot be secured unless they are adequately paid. Of all the mistakes that can be committed in the execution of an Imperialist policy the greatest, in my opinion, is to attempt to run a big undertaking "on the cheap." I am, of course, very fully aware of the financial difficulties to be encountered in granting a high scale of salaries. I can speak with some experience on this point, inasmuch as for the long period, during the early days of our Egyptian troubles, I had to deal with a semi-bankrupt Exchequer. But my reply to the financial argument is that if money is not forthcoming to pay the price necessary to secure the services of a really competent man, it is far preferable to wait and not to make any appointment at all. Apart from the consideration that high ability can or ought to be able to secure its own price, it is not just to expose any European to the temptations which, in the East, are almost the invariable accompaniment of very low salaries; and, although to the honour of British officials it may be said that the cases in which they have succumbed to those temptations are so rare as to be almost negligible, the State is none the less under a moral obligation to place its employés in such positions as to prevent personal feelings

of honour and probity being the sole guarantee for integrity.

Scarcely less important is the question of leave. A period of nine consecutive months is quite long enough for any European to remain in such a climate as the Sudan. After the expiration of that time his physical health and mental vigour become impaired. Moreover, he is liable to get into a groove, and to attach an undue importance to local circumstances, which loom large on the spot, but which are capable of being reduced to more just proportions by change of climate, scenery, and society.

There is one further point to which attention may be drawn. I have already alluded to the desirability of avoiding frequent changes in the personnel of the subordinate staff. The same holds good even to a greater extent in respect to the highest appointments. It almost invariably happens that sound and durable reforms take time in their conception and execution, and that they are slow in their operation. It is an immense advantage if the same individual or individuals who are responsible for initiating the reform can also for a certain period watch over its execution and operation. The continuity of policy gained by the long tenure of office which has been enjoyed by Sir Reginald Wingate has been of incalculable value to the Sudan.

I have now, I think, indicated the principal reasons which have enabled the Sudan to progress in the manner recorded by Mr. Low. Under one condition—and it is a condition of the utmost importance—that progress will, I hope and believe, be steady and continuous. It is that the pace should not be forced.

## XXV

### THE COURT OF PEKING<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," January 31, 1914*

ENGLISHMEN who have resided for long in the East, and who have thus been brought into close contact with the realities of Oriental life, are prone to scoff at the ignorance and impracticable idealism displayed at times by sentimentalists and political doctrinaires. It is not at all unnatural that they should do so. Yet English sentimentalism has achieved many notable successes. It has struck the shackles off the slave. It has inculcated a high moral standard in the treatment of subject races. On the whole, in spite of occasional instances of misplaced enthusiasm, and more frequent instances of misrepresentation and of injustice done to those whose philanthropy has been tempered by actual experience, the balance of advantage both to the nation and to the cause of civilisation may be said to lie with the sentimentalists. It is none the less true that the practical politician performs a most useful function when he applies an antidote to what may be termed the vagaries of the sentimentalist, and still more to those of the political

<sup>1</sup> *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking.* By E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland. London: William Heinemann. [16s. net.]

doctrinaire. Messrs. Backhouse and Bland have endeavoured to supply such an antidote. Their recent work on the Court of Peking, which forms a very fitting sequel to the *Life of the "Old Buddha,"* affords abundant instruction, not only to those who are specially interested in the affairs of China, but to all who are in any way concerned with Eastern politics.

The authors of this work have no new gospel to expound. They merely clothe some time-honoured truths in new and, from a literary point of view, highly attractive garments. They tell us that every nation gets the government it deserves ; that to dub political institutions with the name of Republic no more implies the adoption of Republican principles than the cowl of the monk connotes a love of monastic habits ; that Young China—like Young Turkey, Young Persia, Young India, and Young Egypt—is an alien excrescence ; that neither in China nor elsewhere can political stability or efficiency be expected from any political institutions that do not conform to the deep-rooted sentiments and traditions of the masses ; that the Japanese success was due to the fact that that highly assimilative people were able to graft Western innovations on pre-existing national virtues ; and that Yuan Shih-kai is quite right when he "realizes that China's best hope lies, not in a sudden revolutionary destruction of the old order, but in slow steady growth, by educative processes, which shall enable the nation to adapt itself gradually to its changed environment." Moreover, they very rightly insist not only on the necessity of endeavouring to understand the Chinese aspect of social and political life, but on the many obstacles which stand in the way of its true comprehension. A great German scholar, in dealing with the study of the

classics, recently said that "the history of the past can be understood by no man who cannot transport himself into the souls of men passed away." For a modern Englishman, however, it is far easier to realise the Greek or Roman past than the Chinese present. When we read the dialogue between Hector and Andromache we can at once make a mental bound over three thousand years. We feel that we are in some measure breathing the same social atmosphere as Homer, and that we are in the presence of a moral code which contains the embryo of our existing social system. Far different is the case in dealing with modern Chinese ethics. As we read the pitiful record of murder, lust, intrigue, and rapine set forth in Messrs. Backhouse and Bland's pages, we cannot but feel that here we are dealing with a society separated from us by an abyss which it requires an almost superhuman effort of the imagination to bridge. More especially is it difficult to attain that high standard of freedom from preconceived opinions which bids us remember that "it is impossible for any one who regards polygamy as a form of 'immorality' to study Chinese history with intelligent sympathy." Nevertheless, Messrs. Backhouse and Bland are unquestionably justified in insisting on this point. It is not only in China, but, as the writer of the present article can testify, in other Eastern countries, that polygamy is at times vigorously and quite honestly defended, on the ground that, from a moral point of view, it possesses merits superior to those of monogamy.

These, it may be said, are mere commonplaces familiar to all who have thought over the perplexing problems presented by Eastern politics. But they are commonplaces which deserve constant repetition in order that their truth may

be pressed on the minds of those who possess no such familiarity. Their importance is accentuated by the vivid illustrations drawn from life which are given in the illuminating work now under review. Messrs. Backhouse and Bland, moreover, afford in their own persons an object-lesson to which the attention of the British public may, with the greatest advantage, be directed. It is that sentimentalists cannot claim any monopoly of sympathy for backward races who, in the classic words used by Mr. Gladstone, are "struggling to be free." Throughout their pages may be traced a high appreciation for all that is best in the Chinese national character, and a profound sympathy, which is all the more valuable because tempered by reason and accurate knowledge, with genuine Chinese aspirations.

The history of China abounds in examples of noble men and women who have died rather than be false to their convictions. Their biographies constitute bright oases in the general wilderness of corruption, mendacity, and intrigue depicted by Messrs. Backhouse and Bland. Thus the Ming General, Shih K'o-fa, when taken prisoner by the Manchus, refused high office. He remained loyal to his worthless Sovereign, and to all offers replied, "I ask of you no favour except death." Similarly, in 1841, Wang Ting-lin, Grand Secretary to the Emperor and Grand Councillor, gave advice to the Emperor which was unwise, but was certainly courageous and patriotic. It was rejected, whereupon he "indited a valedictory memorial and hanged himself." The wife of a Mohammedan, Ali Arslan by name, was torn from her husband and taken into the palace of the Emperor, Ch'ien Lung. "The Model Beauty," as she was termed, refused to see the Emperor and armed herself with a



dagger to defend her chastity. Enraged at her conduct, the Dowager Empress summoned her to her residence, which, with singular inappropriateness, was termed "The Palace of Motherly Tranquillity," and told her that she would be allowed "the privilege of committing suicide." She at once hanged herself.

Even more illustrative of Chinese manners and customs is the episode of the Chief Examiner Po Sui. The worst rulers of China have always attached great importance to the examinations for literary degrees being conducted with honesty and impartiality. By a disgraceful intrigue initiated by a Court enemy, Po Sui, who appears to have been an honest and capable man, was unwittingly induced to give certificates to two students who had never passed the examination. The fraud was discovered. His Imperial master then issued a decree in which, after saying, with the canting hypocrisy which appears to have been the predominating feature of Chinese Royal utterances, that "the tears flow down Our cheeks," he ordered Po Sui and all his assistants to be decapitated. It affords some grim satisfaction to learn that the man who plotted his death, Su Shun by name, met with a similar fate two years later.

Instances such as these, which excite either admiration or compassion, abound. But as a general rule the feeling elicited by the perusal of Messrs. Backhouse and Bland's pages is one of horror and disgust. The ferocity at times displayed surpasses anything recorded in the most savage annals of European mediaeval history. In 1812 an attempt was made on the life of the reigning Emperor. The criminal was "put to death by the slow slicing process, after his two sons had been beheaded before his eyes." About

the same time, in connection with an attack on the Palace, the Emperor (Chia Ch'ing) recorded that the men guilty must "of course" all be dismembered at once, save the two leaders, who, after being examined by His Majesty in person, would be "duly punished by the lingering death." At an earlier period one Nien Keng-Yao was convicted of treason. He was allowed to commit suicide, but the Imperial Decree added: "His sons are very numerous; one of them, Nien Fu, resembles his father in character and deeds; let him be decapitated forthwith. Let the rest of his sons over fifteen years of age be banished for life to a malarious region on the remotest frontiers of Yünnan." The account of the massacres which took place on the occasion of the sack of the Tartar city at Sianfu so late as October 1911, is truly appalling. The following also may be cited as an illustrative episode of Chinese history. Li-Tzu-Ch'eng's rebellion in the seventeenth century shook the Ming dynasty to its base. The Emperor, thinking all was lost, decided to commit suicide, and before doing so to slaughter most of the members of his family. The final scene is thus recounted:—


The Emperor summoned the Princess Imperial from the Palace of Peaceful Old Age. She was only just fifteen years of age. Wildly he glared at her, saying: "By what evil fortune were you born into our ill-starred house?" Seizing his sword, he hacked off her right arm, and she sank dying to the floor. He then went to the pavilion of Charity Made Manifest and there killed his second daughter, the Princess of Feminine Propriety. Finally, he sent eunuchs to greet in his name the Empress Consort, and to the senior concubines of his late brother, Hsi Tsung, strongly advising both to commit suicide. Entering the Palace of Feminine Tranquillity, he saw his Consort hanging dead from the rafters, whereat he cried aloud: "Death is best, the only way for us all."

As to official corruption, that canker which eats into the heart of all Oriental Governments, the records of the Near East may be searched in vain for operations on the grand scale adopted by the venal Ministers of China. By one of those caprices so common in the East, which everywhere is so far ultra-democratic that there is always a *carrière ouverte aux talents*, a certain Ho Shen, who was a sergeant of the Palace Guards, rose to high position in the time of Ch'ien Lung, one of the best of the Ming Emperors. He attracted the attention of "The Everlasting Lord" by the utterance of a smart epigram. He amassed a fortune of seventy millions sterling. His property was confiscated, and he was ordered to commit suicide in "a long-winded decree" by Ch'ien Lung's successor, Chia Ch'ing, who was not animated by any sense of duty or by any desire to purify the public service, but who hated Ho Shen and coveted his wealth. Somewhat similar instances have occurred in far more recent times. Li Lien-Ying, who only died in 1911, amassed enormous wealth and caused "a public scandal greater than anything Peking had known since the days of Ho Shen."

Summarising the conclusions to be drawn from three centuries of Chinese history, Messrs. Backhouse and Bland say that "one of the most obvious is to be found in the persistent coincidence of periods of demoralization in the State with the ascendancy of eunuchs at Court." The old Buddha, albeit she did nothing during her lifetime to check the evil, attributed the disasters which occurred towards the close of her reign to this cause.

A recent and apparently well-informed writer in *The Times* asks: "Has there been reform in the Administration; has there been any develop-

ment of resources, any increase of the confidence in the Government which is essential to economic progress ? ” “ To all these questions,” he adds, “ the reply must be in the negative.” Is there, in fact, any real prospect that a society such as that portrayed by Messrs. Backhouse and Bland can be regenerated by a travesty of Parliamentary institutions, or by the nominal adoption of Republican principles ? The chances that any permanent benefits will be derived from the adoption of any such methods are, in truth, infinitesimally small. The only immediate hope of China would appear to lie in the establishment of a strong but just and benevolent despotism.



## CURRENT POLITICS



## XXVI

### EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING ANIMALS<sup>1</sup>

*March 27, 1912*

THIS work, compiled by Mr. Stephen Paget, to whose energy and perseverance all who are interested in scientific research owe a deep debt of gratitude, will, I think, be found useful to that very numerous body of people who, whilst greatly interested in the subject of Vivisection, have neither the time nor the inclination to study the voluminous Report of the Royal Commission, or the bulky minutes of evidence on which that report is based. It is, indeed, most desirable that the class of persons to whom I here allude should be provided with the means of obtaining information on this subject which will enable them, without undue labour and research, to form their own opinions; for it depends mainly on the views held by non-controversialists, representing the mass of public opinion in this country, whether the cause of scientific research is to stand or fall. For some years past public opinion on the subject of Vivisection has been in a state of suspense. On the one hand, a very general belief prevailed of the value of the experimental method in the furtherance of scientific research, accom-

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Mr. Stephen Paget's work, *For and Against Experiments on Animals*. H. K. Lewis.



panied by a strong disinclination to impose any hindrances on the pursuit of knowledge beyond those rendered necessary by the obvious dictates of humanity. On the other hand, a stern determination existed to prevent wanton and unnecessary cruelty being inflicted on the brute creation—a determination which had its origin not merely in a laudable repugnance to the infliction of pain on the animals themselves, but was also due to a belief in the demoralisation which would inevitably ensue in the persons of those who were the agents in its infliction. Were the accusations of callous indifference to suffering which were frequently levelled against the experimentalists true? Could the heartrending accounts of torture inflicted on animals; which were repeated with almost tedious iteration on the one side, and strenuously denied on the other, be substantiated or not? Were the safeguards already provided by the law against wanton cruelty adequate, or did they require amendment? These were the questions on which the public, puzzled and confused by the conflicting utterances of rival controversialists, expected an authoritative statement of opinion from some impartial and independent source.

Before going any further, I wish to make a personal statement on this subject.

My reasons for accepting the post of President of the Research Defence Society some four years ago were twofold.

In the first place, I have an abhorrence of cruelty to animals, and have at times been fortunate enough to help in some small degree in the furtherance of measures tending to obviate or mitigate such cruelty as is now practised. Deeply convinced as I was of the necessity for promoting scientific inquiry, I certainly should

not have associated myself with the Research Defence Society had I not, as a preliminary measure, fully satisfied myself both that the main accusations brought against the experimentalists were wholly devoid of foundation, and, further, that the very eminent and humane men with whom I should be associated were animated with a detestation of anything approaching to wanton cruelty no less profound and sincere than that which I myself entertained.

My other reason for accepting the position of President of the Society was that I felt strongly that the Vivisectionists, and not their opponents, were the true humanitarians; that they were, under circumstances which rendered them peculiarly liable to misrepresentation, fighting a cause in which not only the whole human race, but also the brute creation, were deeply interested; that, on the one hand, their failure to prove their case would result in what Mr. Stephen Coleridge has characteristically termed the "desolating advance of science"<sup>1</sup> being arrested, and that thus we should have to rely on the researches of more favoured scientists in other countries to arrest disease and to stay the hand of death, whilst, on the other hand, their success would connote the decrease of premature mortality and the mitigation of suffering; that it was not merely unjust, but also unwise, that the medical profession should be allowed to stand alone in the defence of a noble cause; and that their efforts to enlighten the public on the true facts of the case might perhaps in some degree be aided by association with those who, like myself, realised the vast importance of the issue at stake, albeit they could bring no special scientific

<sup>1</sup> *The Outlook*, March 23, 1912.

acquirements to bear on the various technical points involved.

The questions which I have propounded above now admit of being confidently answered, not merely on the authority of any individual scientist, however eminent, but on that of a Royal Commission composed of men of unquestionable ability and impartiality, whose opinions have been formed after an exhaustive and prolonged inquiry into every branch of the question. The consciences of lovers of animals—in other words, those of the vast majority of the inhabitants of these islands—may now be at rest. They may support scientific research in the full assurance that in doing so they will benefit themselves, their friends, their relations, and their descendants, whilst at the same time they will not be giving their adhesion to any principles or practices which the dictates of humanity, reasonably interpreted, could condemn. They may profit by the invaluable knowledge acquired in the physiological laboratory without any reluctance due to doubts as to the morality of the methods by which that knowledge has been obtained. They may feel confident that if in some extremely rare instances a disposition exists to display indifference or callousness to the sufferings of animals, any such proclivity will be checked, not only by the general opinion of the members of a profession whose main object in life it is to obviate or to mitigate pain, but also by the hand of the law, which already provides against the occurrence of abuse, and which, by the light of the experience gained during the last thirty-six years, it is now proposed to strengthen in respect to some minor points. In a word, as I stated in a letter which I addressed to the press immediately after the issue of the Report of the Commission,

"broadly speaking, the supporters of vivisection have proved their case." A more careful study of the Report has tended to confirm me in this conclusion. I proceed to give a short summary of my reasons.

The main question of principle which underlies the whole Vivisection controversy is whether experiments on living animals, however conducted, are or are not justifiable. A small body of Anti-Vivisectionists consider that "Vivisection is morally unjustifiable whether painful or painless." Mrs. Cook, who gave evidence as one of the representatives of the Parliamentary Association for the Abolition of Vivisection, stated that "nothing less than the total prohibition of all experiments on animals would satisfy them." I wish to speak with respect of those who hold these opinions. I have not the smallest doubt of their sincerity. But I will not attempt to refute their arguments, which have indeed, as I think, been sufficiently refuted by Sir J. Fletcher Moulton and others. The matter is one of opinion, and I fear that between those who hold these extreme views and the general body of the community there lies an abyss which it is impossible to bridge over. All that can be said is that we must agree to differ. The conclusion of the Commission on this point of ethics will, I believe, commend itself to public opinion generally. It is stated in the following terms: "After full consideration we are led to the conclusion that experiments upon animals, adequately safeguarded by law, faithfully administered, are morally justifiable, and should not be prohibited by legislation."

The point next in importance is to consider how far recent progress in medical science is due

to the knowledge acquired by experiments conducted on living animals. This question is very fully treated on pp. 21-47 of the Report of the Commission. It would extend this Introduction to undue length were I to attempt to summarise the evidence on which the Commissioners formed their opinions. I confine myself, therefore, to stating their conclusions.

They are as follows :

- (1) That certain results, claimed from time to time to have been proved by experiments upon living animals and alleged to have been beneficial in preventing or curing disease, have, on further investigation and experience, been found to be fallacious or useless.
- (2) That, notwithstanding such failures, valuable knowledge has been acquired in regard to physiological processes and the causation of disease, and that useful methods for the prevention, cure, and treatment of certain diseases have resulted from experimental investigations upon living animals.
- (3) That, as far as we can judge, it is highly improbable that, without experiments made on animals, mankind would at the present time have been in possession of such knowledge.
- (4) That, in so far as disease has been successfully prevented or its mortality reduced, suffering has been diminished in man and in lower animals.
- (5) That there is ground for believing that similar methods of investigation if pursued in the future will be attended with similar results.

It is to be observed that Dr. George Wilson, who was a member of the Commission, and who though "not an Anti-Vivisectionist," greatly dislikes vivisection, subscribed to these statements with certain reservations. Notably, he held that "the useful results which have been claimed, or may still be claimed [from conducting experiments on living animals], have been enor-

mously over-estimated"; and in connection with the first of the conclusions stated above he expressed an opinion that "the fallacies and failures are far more conspicuous than the successful results."

As to the value of the knowledge obtained and the practical results which have been achieved by its application, laymen, guiltless of any profound scientific accomplishments, can, indeed, to a limited extent, form their own opinions on the facts and statistics laid before them, but in the main they must rely on authority. Now, there cannot be a shadow of doubt as to the side on which the weight of authority lies. The members of the medical profession who share the views expressed by Dr. Wilson constitute a very small minority. The Commissioners state that "there can be no doubt that the great preponderance of medical and scientific authority is against the opponents of vivisection. This is more markedly so now than was the case before the Royal Commission of 1875." If, moreover, we look not merely to the numerical majority but also to the personalities of the witnesses, it may, I think, be said, without in any way wishing to disparage the weight to be attached to the opinions of Dr. Wilson and those who share his views, that amongst their opponents are to be found the names of the most distinguished men of science in this and in other countries.

I have no doubt that, as stated by the Commissioners, experiments have at times been conducted leading to results which, it was at first thought, would prevent or cure diseases, but which "on further investigation and experience, have been found to be fallacious or useless." But is this argument, taken by itself, condemnatory of the proceedings of the experimentalists?

Far from it. It merely shows the necessity of further and more complete investigation. The pursuit of knowledge in every direction is strewn with the records of false scents which have been followed for a time merely to be abandoned when their falsity was at last recognised. As Prof. Huxley very truly remarked :<sup>1</sup> "The attainment of scientific truth has been effected, to a great extent, by the help of scientific errors." If popular accounts are to be believed, it has, indeed, occasionally happened that some man of genius—an Archimedes or a Newton—suddenly, and even accidentally, hit upon some discovery of vast importance. But, apart from the doubts which hang over the authenticity of episodes of this description, it is to be observed that occasions of this sort are, at best, of very rare occurrence. As a rule, science does not advance by sudden leaps and bounds. More usually, one small forward step leads to another, and it is not till after long, patient, and laborious research, after many disappointments, and after the renunciation of numerous errors, that some valuable truth is at length revealed. It often takes years before the discoveries of pure pass into the domain of applied science. I may give one illustration drawn from the history of industrial progress. It took fifteen years of patient research in the chemical laboratory before Von Baeyer determined the constitution and synthesis of indigo, and another twenty years elapsed before the knowledge thus obtained could be applied, with commercial success, to the extraction of indigo from coal tar.

Even assuming, therefore—as I am far from doing—that the somewhat extreme view advocated by Dr. Wilson is correct, and that, in the

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, vol. i. p. 63.

case of vivisection, "fallacies and failures are far more conspicuous than successful results," I do not find in this plea any adequate reason for abandoning experiments on living animals. Rather should such considerations serve as an additional stimulant to renewed exertion in the sense of discarding past errors and advancing along the lines which offer the most hopeful prospects of obtaining valuable results.

The argument against the adoption of the experimental method based on past and partial failure appears, therefore, to me to be of little or no importance. Amongst the many fallacious weapons in the Anti-Vivisectionist armoury, none, I venture to think, is less cogent than the taunt occasionally levelled at their opponents that, in spite of the very numerous experiments so far conducted, no cure for cancer has yet been found. A more reasonable view would appear to be that researches, conducted with a due regard to the dictates of humanity, should be continued in the hope of eventually finding some alleviation for the pain and devastation caused by this terrible scourge.

The Commissioners appear, broadly speaking, to have accepted the validity of the arguments which I have stated above, for, in spite of their acknowledgment of partial failure in the past, they recognise the "valuable knowledge which has been acquired in regard to physiological processes and the causation of disease" by experimental investigations upon living animals; they think it "highly improbable" that without such experiment this knowledge would have been obtained; they hold that, as a result of these experiments, "mortality has been reduced, and suffering diminished in man and in lower animals"; and they conclude by saying that



“there is ground for believing that similar methods of investigation if pursued in the future will be attended with similar results.”

Enthusiasts in the cause of scientific research may perhaps consider that, in expressing these guarded opinions, the Commissioners have done somewhat less than justice to the remarkable achievements of the experimentalists.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, no sort of real cause for discouragement. Far from it. The Commissioners concede the main points for which the Research Defence Society and their sympathisers have persistently pleaded. Moreover, the value of their verdict is, in my opinion, enhanced by the studied moderation of their language, and by the practical unanimity of their decisions. The plea that the knowledge obtained by vivisection is dearly purchased by a sacrifice of animal life may still, to a certain, though, I trust, to a very limited, extent, hold the field. But we should hear no more of the plea of inutility. The argument that the researches of the Vivisectionists have been barren of result ought to be finally discarded by all save those who are not open to conviction. It has been totally rejected by a large majority of the Commissioners, and is not even really accepted by Dr. Wilson, who does not maintain that the results are of no account, but merely that they have been “enormously over-estimated.”

The next point to be considered is the amount

<sup>1</sup> It is to be observed that the Commissioners necessarily based their Report on the evidence laid before them, and that, at the time when they commenced taking evidence, the remarkable successes recently achieved by the American scientists at Panama had not been fully disclosed. Those who wish for information as regards the saving of life in tropical climates which has resulted from the adoption of the experimental method cannot do better than study Sir Rubert Boyce's very interesting work entitled *Mosquito or Man?* It was written in 1909, and since then further progress has been made.

of pain inflicted on animals by the adoption of the experimental method.

Let me here call to mind the attitude adopted by the Research Defence Society on this important point. I do not think that any member of the Society has ever maintained—certainly I have never maintained—that in no case was pain inflicted. Our view has been that the vast majority of inoculations involve no pain, or none that may not truly be called trivial; that all experiments involving operation are conducted under anæsthetics; that the anæsthesia is effective;<sup>1</sup> that the law already provides safeguards against the unnecessary infliction of pain; that if any additional safeguards could be suggested which would not be unduly or vexatiously restrictive, they should be sympathetically considered; and finally, that in those rare instances where some pain was inflicted, the results achieved justified its infliction.

It must, I think, be a great satisfaction to the general body of the community, as it certainly is to myself, to know, on the authority of the Royal Commission, that the charges of cruelty so recklessly levelled against the Vivisectionists have been wholly disproved. In fact, it may be said without exaggeration that, on this vital point, the case of the Anti-Vivisectionists, when submitted to the test of cross-examination, broke down hopelessly. This does not in any way surprise me, for, as I have already mentioned, had I not been aware of the flimsy character of the evidence on which these accusations were based, I should

<sup>1</sup> It is particularly to be noted that on this subject the Commissioners say: "After careful consideration of the whole question of anæsthetics as applied to experimental investigations on living animals, we are led to the conclusion that by the use of one or other or of a combination of several well-known anæsthetics complete insensibility to pain can be secured."

never have accepted the Presidency of the Research Defence Society.

The principal protagonist of the Anti-Vivisection cause has been Mr. Stephen Coleridge. He has, as the Commissioners state, been "an acute and indefatigable critic" who has devoted "ten years of investigation" to what he considers the abuses which arise under the existing system. He has had at his disposal large sums of money, contributed, it may be assumed, with the express object of enabling him to justify his criticisms. As a result of his investigations, Mr. Coleridge brought twelve specific charges against the Home Office administration of the Act of 1876. I need not give the detail of these charges. Not one of them appears to have been substantiated. The Commissioners, whilst indicating certain points in respect to which they think that the administration of the Home Office may be open to criticism, add that they "are of opinion that, on the whole, the working of the Act has been performed with a desire faithfully to carry out the objects which its framers had in view."

Mr. Coleridge also brought a charge of callousness against the Home Office on the ground that Prof. Schäfer had been authorised to "drown, resuscitate, and drown again" unanæsthetised dogs. On this point the Commissioners say: "Only two unanæsthetised dogs were, however, used, and these were drowned without resuscitation, and, so far as we can judge, suffered no more pain than stray dogs that are destroyed by drowning."

The main charges of cruelty were not, however, advanced by Mr. Stephen Coleridge, but by other witnesses, notably Miss Lind-af-Hageby, Mrs. Cook, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrie, and Mr. Graham. These witnesses were not more success-

ful than Mr. Stephen Coleridge in proving their cases. The Commissioners say : "After careful consideration of the above cases we have come to the conclusion that the witnesses have either misapprehended or inaccurately described the facts of the experiments. . . . So far as we can judge we believe that holders of licences and certificates, with rare exceptions, have endeavoured with loyalty and good faith to conform to the provisions of the law."

Finally, in summing up the tactics adopted by the Anti-Vivisectionists, the Commissioners say : "We desire further to state that the harrowing descriptions and illustrations of operations inflicted on animals, which are freely circulated by post, advertisement, or otherwise, are in many cases calculated to mislead the public, so far as they suggest that the animals in question were not under an anæsthetic. To represent that animals subjected to experiments in this country are wantonly tortured would, in our opinion, be absolutely false." To those who are familiar with the procedure adopted by some of the Anti-Vivisectionists, this carefully worded verdict would certainly not appear to err on the side of excessive severity. I trust, however, it will do something to guard the public against accepting the misrepresentations of the truth which are forced upon them.

I now come to the question of the recommendations of the Commission.

It is to be observed that all their recommendations are in the sense of further restrictions. None contemplate any relaxation of the existing law in the interests of science. The Commission did, indeed, consider the question of whether experiments made with a view to acquiring

manual dexterity, which the law now forbids, should be allowed, but declined to recommend any alterations in the existing law.

The restrictive recommendations are summarised as follows :

- (1) An increase in the Inspectorate.
- (2) Further limitations as regards the use of curare.
- (3) Stricter provisions as to the definition and practice of pithing.<sup>1</sup>
- (4) Additional restrictions regulating the painless destruction of animals which show signs of suffering after experiment.
- (5) A change in the method of selecting and in the constitution of the Advisory Body to the Secretary of State.
- (6) Special records by experimenters in certain cases.

So far as I can judge, these proposals appear to be reasonable. I cannot think that by their adoption the cause of scientific investigation would be seriously hampered. But much depends on the manner of their execution. I consider it, therefore, essential that before any legislation is undertaken or new regulations framed, the advocates of vivisection should be taken into counsel and should have every opportunity afforded to them for expressing their opinions.

Finally, I wish to say a few words on the special question of experiments on dogs, as to which a large section of the public are deeply interested. This subject is treated on pp. 62-63 of the Report. The Commissioners were divided in opinion, but the majority held that "the special enactments now applicable to horses, asses, and mules might be extended to dogs, and also to cats and anthropoid apes."

<sup>1</sup> "Pithing" is the term applied to operations on the brain and spinal cord, which, without destroying life, are held to deaden all sensation.

It is, of course, "logically untenable" to exclude any particular class of animals from being the subject of experiment. On the other hand, almost from the dawn of history<sup>1</sup> dogs have always been regarded as the special friends of man. Nowhere probably does this feeling prevail more strongly than in this country. Without doubt, it is a feeling based on sentiment, but neither scientists nor any other class of persons can afford to neglect sentiment. I should be sorry to see dogs altogether excluded from experiment. I cannot doubt that, by their exclusion, the cause of science would suffer. Prof. Starling, an eminently humane man, said that if dogs were excluded "it would stop all the more advanced observations on digestion, experiments as to the nature of diabetes, and other important cases." Further, the experiments so far conducted on dogs have produced excellent results in the direction of facilitating the treatment of canine diseases. An instance in point is Dr. Copeman's discovery of a vaccine against distemper. Another instance is that the cause of malignant jaundice in dogs has been ascertained, and that the disease can now be treated with far greater prospects of success than heretofore. Moreover, were all experiments on dogs prohibited, the only result, in so far as the dogs themselves are concerned, would be that a few of them, instead of being put to a painless death in the physiological laboratory, would enter a lethal chamber at Battersea or elsewhere. But I think the proposal made by the majority of the Commission to the effect that the legal position of dogs should be assimilated to that

<sup>1</sup> εἰς καὶ κυνῶν ἐρινύες—"There is vengeance in heaven for an injured dog." Gilbert Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 87.

of horses and mules might reasonably be adopted. At present, under Section 5 of the Act of 1876, no special certificate is required in the case of a dog unless it be proposed either to dispense with the use of anæsthetics, or to keep the animal alive for observation after the effect of the anæsthetic has passed off; whereas in the case of a horse, ass, or mule, a special certificate is invariably required, whether anæsthetics be used or not. If the recommendation of the Commission be adopted, this distinction would disappear. A certificate would always be required before conducting any experiment on a dog.

Such, briefly, are the conclusions at which I have arrived after a careful perusal of the Report of the Royal Commission.

Ill-health and advancing years oblige me to resign the Presidency of the Research Defence Society, but I cannot abandon a work in which I have taken the deepest interest, and in which I have been fortunate enough to be associated with men of profound learning and lofty aspirations, without making a final appeal to the main body of my countrymen and countrywomen. I beg them not to be scared by the ugly sound of the word Vivisection. I ask them, before being led away by a very natural but, I firmly believe in this case, a misplaced sentiment, to study the facts for themselves by the light of the information now placed at their disposal. Should they comply with this request, I am confident that any preconceived prejudice against the proceedings of the Vivisectionists will be removed. They will find that the appeal to their love of animals has often been made on erroneous statements of fact, and they will come to the conclusion that, under proper safeguards—which none less than

myself would wish to see abolished—not only may the practice of vivisection be allowed to continue, but that its arrest would be disastrous to the further progress of humanitarian science in this country.



## XXVII

### SOUTH AFRICA <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," November 29, 1913*

POLITICIANS, when they have to deal with the affairs of a foreign country, frequently shed some portion of the opinions which they have formed at home, and adapt their political principles to the new circumstances with which they are brought in contact. Lord Palmerston, for instance, was a Conservative in England and a revolutionist abroad. It would be incorrect to say that Miss Markham is a Liberal in England and a Conservative in South Africa. The conventional phraseology of party politics is, indeed, wholly inapplicable to her case. The impression left on the mind in reading her graphic and deeply interesting account of South African affairs is that we are no longer breathing a stifling party atmosphere heavily charged with prejudice, inapplicable shibboleths, and incongruous catch-words. We feel that we have before us the views of a politician of lively sympathies and acute powers of observation, whose sole desire it is to discard all preconceived opinions and to arrive at the truth. Miss Markham is a democrat, and, moreover, like all persons of vigorous under-

<sup>1</sup> *The South African Scene.* By Violet R. Markham. London : Smith, Elder & Co. [7s. 6d.]

standing and truly liberal aspirations, she is an optimist. She believes that, in spite of many backslidings and failures by the way, democracy is capable of working out its own salvation. But she enters a *caveat* very similar to that of Gambetta when he told his countrymen that anti-clericalism was for home consumption and was not intended for export. She thinks that democratic principles can be cherished as warmly at Pretoria as in London, but that in their application they must undergo considerable modification before they can be adapted for use in South Africa. "When the conditions are novel and difficult," she says, in dealing with the question of the electoral franchise, "we must be prepared to recognize that the principle, and the sound principle, of one land may be the hindrance of another." We are to maintain all that is best in the noble humanitarian spirit of England, but we must carefully avoid following the lead of certain members of Parliament who, "when they are let loose on native questions, display an ignorance which is apt to be colossal." Further, we are to condemn all ignoble party attacks on individuals, such as those which were at one time made on Lord Milner, whom Miss Markham justly regards as the founder of South African prosperity, and whose statesmanlike foresight is now beginning to produce a rich and abundant harvest. Miss Markham is, in fact, a staunch but eminently sane Imperialist. She recognises the grandeur of the British Empire; she willingly accepts the responsibilities which it involves; and she is deeply impressed with the far-reaching powers for good or evil which are vested in those to whose hands the destinies of that Empire are committed.

The Union of South Africa immediately after

the war and the adoption of a Constitution which enabled the representatives of the vanquished party to assume at once the reins of government is, as Miss Markham truly observes, "one of the most astonishing facts in history." She claims that the British abrogation of prerogative was "one of the most striking demonstrations of political wisdom ever made by the Anglo-Saxon race." The main political object which it was essential to attain was that the Dutch should loyally accept the Union. Now the Dutch, although endowed with many fine national qualities, are not a race which readily assimilates new ideas. From the days of Martial downwards the sluggishness of the Batavian mind has been proverbial, so much so that those Boeotians and "dull-witted Thebans," who were exposed to the ironical sallies both of the comedian Aristophanes and the orator Demosthenes, have in later days been termed "the Dutchmen of Greece." Not only the best, but probably the only way to make the inrush of fresh ideas, which was destined to be the inevitable consequence of introducing a higher standard of civilisation, acceptable to these slow thinkers was to place men of their own race at the helm. What has been the general outcome of this bold and generous experiment? Miss Markham is able from former experience to compare the present with the past. "So far as the outward appearance of things is concerned," she says, "the conditions are transformed almost beyond recognition. The change is no less striking as regards the inner spirit of men's lives and purposes." The horizon of the whole population is being enlarged. The Dutch, who were previously shackled by the fetters of a corrupt and effete form of government, are beginning to appreciate

the merits of the higher stage of civilisation to which they are being gradually led. The influence of the mining interests has enormously diminished. Agriculture, which constitutes the true permanent resource of the country, is receiving its due share of attention. Education is advancing with rapid strides. And, with all this forward movement, has there been any real decay of British influence? Miss Markham's buoyant optimism prompts her to answer this question with a decided negative. "As a matter of fact," she says, "the whole complexion of the country to-day is far more English than before the war." Progress has unquestionably received a distinct check owing to the benighted efforts made by General Hertzog to revive racial animosities. But what practical programme has General Hertzog to offer to his countrymen? Absolutely none that can be adopted with any chance of achieving permanent success. In the words which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Macbeth, General Hertzog only tells "a tale full of sound and fury signifying nothing." Miss Markham thinks that Hertzogism is a troublesome but temporary disorder, which will in the end infallibly yield to treatment. As to the language question, there never was a case in which Æsop's fable of the relative effect produced by the sun and the wind on the traveller applied more fully. Self-interest will of a surety eventually secure a predominant position for English, and experience in other countries may be adduced to justify Miss Markham's conclusion that "the more the English resent the use of the Dutch language, the more they grumble at the present bilingual regulations, the more passionately will the Dutch cling to such things."

Miss Markham turns from the aftermath of

trouble left by the combat for supremacy of the two white races to the far more difficult question of the attitude those races should adopt towards the aborigines. "The whole question of the relations between Boers and British," she says, "is trivial, transitory, and unimportant as compared with the vast and menacing question of the relations between black and white. The problem of the native is the crucial problem which has to be met." A by-product of this great issue is the treatment to be accorded to that most embarrassing and useless outcome of Imperialism—the poor white.

Two policies are possible in dealing with the natives of South Africa. These are the policy of stern repression and that of construction. Miss Markham is, of course, an ardent advocate of the latter policy. The general principle involved is in reality scarcely worth the trouble of arguing. Macaulay, albeit the educational system which he initiated in India has produced results which are, to say the least, disappointing, was right when he said that "*propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*" is an ignoble policy and one unworthy of a great nation. It may be added that approval of the counter-policy of construction has taken so deep a root in the public mind as to render its adoption a practical necessity. There is, however, room for wide differences of opinion in respect to the methods best adapted for carrying it into execution. Miss Markham is much too well informed to put forward any assured panacea warranted to solve the multifarious and thorny problems which are constantly arising as the world grows older, and contact between the white and black races brings issues of ever-increasing complexity into prominence. But she enunciates some very sound

leading principles which she considers may serve as sign-posts to guide the constructive politician on his way. Of these, the first and most important, which should serve as the foundation on which all wise reformers should build, is that "whatever the future may hold, for the present the white man must rule." She utterly discards the visionary idea that South African political salvation is to be found in the unqualified introduction of the ballot-box. She points to the disastrous consequences which have ensued in the United States by the "grotesque application of democratic principles *en bloc* to a vast and bewildered slave class, the large majority of whom have not learnt the alphabet of civilisation." She holds—and it is earnestly to be hoped that she is right in holding—that "there can be no difference of opinion among sensible men that the native should be excluded from political privileges until he has given some real proof of his power to use them worthily." She considers it indispensable that some property qualification should be attached to the right of voting. She thinks that "in dealing with native crime, our whole judicial system is out of place," and that "the native requires something far more direct and simple than the English methods of prosecution and defence." In common with all who have been brought in contact with coloured races, she deplores the tendency of the natives to assimilate the worst features of European civilisation, and, in dealing with missionary work, she fully endorses the views of the Commission which sat in 1905, to the effect that nothing but harm can result from the separation of secular native instruction from moral and religious influences. She warmly advocates technical and agricultural training. She has little confidence in the system

of segregating the natives, which has been tried on a limited scale. She sympathises with Lord Selborne's view that by artificial protection the white man may be "mollycoddled out of existence," and she looks forward to the time when the white man in South Africa will no longer consider that unskilled labour is beneath his dignity, and when the black man will be freely admitted to the ranks of skilled labourers. She deprecates uniformity of treatment in language, which recalls the warning given on this point by Sir Alfred Lyall. "No one system," she says, "can possibly meet all the difficulties of the situation." Methods must be made to vary according to local circumstances. Last, but by no means least, she dwells on the great importance of only employing European officials of real ability and high character, such as those engaged by Lord Milner.

These are all wise words, and although possibly Miss Markham's earnest desire that the experiment now being conducted in South Africa should succeed may have led her to take a somewhat unduly optimistic view of the situation, she gives some very solid reasons for holding that, in spite of the period of reaction through which the country appears now to be passing, there is no justification for "undue pessimism." "The future of South Africa," she says, "will evolve on English rather than on Dutch lines, because for all practical purposes the English methods in commerce and government will be more efficient." It is greatly to be hoped, not only in British but also in Dutch and native interests, that Miss Markham's confident forecast of the future will be realised. There is, for the present at all events, no reason for holding that its realisation is impossible.

## XXVIII

### TWENTY-SIX YEARS' FINANCE

*"The Spectator," December 13, 1913*

"NATIONS," Mr. Lecky said, "seldom realise till too late how prominent a place a sound system of finance holds among the vital elements of national stability and wellbeing; how few political changes are worth purchasing by its sacrifice; how widely and seriously human happiness is effected by the downfall or the perturbation of national credit, or by excessive, injudicious, and unjust taxation." There has probably never been a time in our history when this warning was of greater import than at present. Does the fiscal revolution which has been accomplished during the last few years mark the first steps on the road to ruin, or may it, as others hold, be regarded as the inauguration of a new era in which additional strength and stability will be given to the whole body politic by the definite recognition of State Socialism as a principle upon which the financial administration of the country is to be conducted? Posterity will be able to answer this question. In the meanwhile it is desirable that the present generation should be thoroughly well informed of existing facts. From this point of view the able and highly instructive work published by



Mr. Bernard Mallet (Macmillan and Co., 12s. net), entitled *British Budgets*, is to be heartily welcomed. Mr. Mallet scrupulously adheres to that wise and wholesome tradition which precludes a public servant from engaging in political controversy. He merely states the facts. It is for others to draw inferences and conclusions. He takes up financial history at the point where it was left by Mr. Sydney Buxton, and gives a complete analysis of the revenue and expenditure of the State from the years 1887-88 to 1912-13, both inclusive.

The main facts are that the revenue, including payments made to local taxation accounts, has grown from £89,802,000 to £188,802,000, and the expenditure from £87,424,000 to £188,622,000; that is to say, both revenue and expenditure have considerably more than doubled in twenty-six years. All the chief heads of revenue show a large increase, notably the Death Duties and the Income Tax, the cumulated yield of which was £70,054,000 in 1912-13, as compared with £22,724,000 in 1887-88. As regards expenditure, the Army accounts for an annual increase of £9,904,000, the Navy for £32,036,000, and "Social Services" for £30,708,760. The net burden of taxation per head of population has risen from £2:4:9 to £3:11:8. The "Dead-weight Debt," which stood at £735,550,000 in 1887-88, fell to £628,021,572 in September 1900, then rose in consequence of the South African War to £762,630,000 in 1904-5, and stands now (1913-14) at £661,474,000. The tax-paying power of the community has grown enormously during the period under review, but the increase of taxation has been proportionately greater than the increase of wealth. Taxable income of the Income-tax-paying classes amounted to

£866,454,000 in 1911-12 as compared with £507,472,000 in 1887-88. Simultaneously the consumption of tobacco per head of population has risen from 1·48 lb. to 2·05 lb., and that of tea from 5·02 lb. to 6·47 lb. Both are good barometers by which to judge of the prosperity of the community in general.

Mr. Oliver, in a recent pamphlet, very truly remarked that every one necessarily approaches a burning question, such as Home Rule in Ireland, "from the angle of his own standpoint." It may be as well to explain the standpoint of the writer of the present article in respect to the financial policy of the existing Government. He holds that the broad lines of that policy are open, *inter alia*, to the following adverse criticisms: (1) the partial repeal of the Sugar Duty, at an annual cost of £3,500,000, in 1908 was, in view of the heavy charges then impending on the Treasury, wholly unjustifiable; (2) the huge discrepancy between the estimated and actual cost of the Old Age Pension scheme shows that enormous liabilities were incurred with a recklessness to which no parallel can be found in modern times; (3) the general policy adopted by the Government has brought appreciably nearer the prospect that for revenue purposes it may become necessary in the near future to increase indirect taxation; and (4) the decision to pay salaries to Members of Parliament—a measure from which Mr. Gladstone was strongly averse—by a mere Resolution of the House of Commons, was a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Constitution. On the other hand, the development of direct taxation, which had become imperative if social reform, which had been comparatively neglected by the statesmen of the nineteenth century, was to be taken seriously in

hand, has so far been carried out with greater success and less general disturbance than were anticipated. Moreover, although the Insurance Act was conceived and carried with far too great haste, and is open to valid criticism, more especially by reason of the adverse effect produced on the financial position of the Friendly Societies, it ought not, amidst the clang of party strife, to be forgotten that it is based on a thoroughly sound principle, the adoption of which was constantly urged on the Government during the discussions on Old Age Pensions. The total repeal of this Act, even if such a course were possible, would, in the opinion of the present writer, be undesirable.

It will, however, be more profitable, instead of dwelling on past history, to consider what, in existing circumstances, should be the broad lines of the financial policy of the future. This is all the more necessary as there is an imminent danger that sound finance will be sacrificed to electioneering necessities, and that the Treasury, which has, for the first time in our history, fallen into the hands of the leading demagogue of the day, will degenerate into a mere vote-catching machine.

It is perfectly useless to indulge in mournful platitudes over the enormous burden of naval and military expenditure. That burden, heavy though it be, must be borne. It is too frequently forgotten that, as an insurance, the high naval expenditure of recent years has proved eminently successful. The greatest of British interests is the preservation of peace. The Emperor of Austria, who is probably as highly qualified as any living individual to express a valuable opinion on this subject, is credited with the saying that a predominant British Navy is one

of the best guarantees for the peace of Europe. It is notorious that, when the unfortunate Fashoda incident occurred, the overwhelming naval strength of this country was one of the main factors which prevented the outbreak of war. Further, Mr. Mallet rightly draws attention to the fact that the settlement of South African affairs was only rendered possible by the command of the sea enjoyed by Great Britain. Social reform is very important. But adequate provision to preserve the integrity of the United Kingdom against foreign attack and to maintain our naval predominance constitutes by far the most important duty which any government has to perform. It would be little short of criminal to neglect this duty.

According to the classification adopted by the Treasury, the chief result of the changes which have been introduced since 1887-88 has been to increase the percentage derived from direct taxes from 45·3 to 57·6, and to decrease that derived from indirect taxes from 54·7 to 42·4. This proportionate change has been effected, not by any transfer of burdens, but by the creation of fresh burdens, which have been placed almost exclusively on the direct taxpayers. It was inevitable that, if State Socialism was to be recognised as a basis of financial administration, there should be a distinct approach to the principle, which would have been regarded by most of the financiers of the past as a pernicious heresy, that taxation is in itself no evil, provided that the money raised is usefully employed. It is obviously impossible to secure simultaneously the advantages both of the old and of the new system. The price which has to be paid for lavish expenditure on social services is that the ability of the country to meet the

financial strain caused by any unforeseen emergencies is, *pro tanto*, diminished. The point is one of the utmost importance. The main reason why England emerged victoriously from the Napoleonic wars was that her financial resources were able to bear the prolonged strain better than those of her opponent. Preparation for war involves the exercise of financial quite as much as of military and naval foresight. Further, it is to be remembered not only that the financial regime initiated by the present Government has not as yet stood the strain of any national crisis, but also that it has been carried into execution in exceptionally favourable circumstances of an adventitious character. Apart from the possibility of foreign complications, he would be a bold man who, looking more especially to the present condition of the Irish question, would prophesy that no internal convulsion of a nature calculated to present the recent fiscal changes in a wholly new aspect is inconceivable or even highly improbable. The main objection to the policy adopted by the Government is that the fiscal reserves of the country have been seriously impaired. Mr. Lloyd George asked in 1909 why indirect taxes should not be considered as a resource in time of war. On this proposal, Mr. Mallet very justly remarks, "The history of the South African War supplies an answer." Sir Robert Giffen and others used frequently to insist on the point that the only true fiscal reserve is to be found in a resort to direct taxation. They were certainly right.

The only partial remedy which can be applied to the evil indicated above is to reduce debt in ordinary times. The history of the various incursions which have of recent years been made upon the Sinking Fund is given in full by Mr.

Mallet. It is unnecessary to repeat it. It will be sufficient to say that in 1909 Mr. Lloyd George went to the extreme of what was permissible by reducing the fixed debt charge from 28 to 24½ millions, and that in 1912 he was apparently only prevented from diverting the greater portion of the old Sinking Fund to purposes for which it was not intended by the strong opposition which the suggestion encountered in Parliament. Looking to the ever-increasing demands made upon the Treasury, it is not impossible that some such proposal will be revived. If so, it is most earnestly to be hoped that Parliament will reject it. Of all the measures which may be adopted to meet existing financial difficulties, any further reduction of the Sinking Funds, whether old or new, is almost certainly the worst.<sup>1</sup> The force of whatever arguments might previously have been advanced in favour of reducing debt has been enormously enhanced by the policy recently adopted by the Government. If any change is made, the Sinking Fund, far from being diminished, should be increased.

The writer of the present article is of opinion that, whatever criticisms may justly be made on the details of recent measures, the manner in which the burden of taxation is now distributed between the direct and indirect taxpayers is not, on the whole, inequitable. The question, however, naturally arises as to where the process of burdening the direct taxpayers, which has been initiated in so drastic a manner, is to stop. It is somewhat ominous that so responsible an authority as a recent Financial Secretary of the

<sup>1</sup> Since this was written a further raid on the Sinking Fund to the extent of £1,000,000 has been made. The Budget of 1914-15 is distinguished by a full measure of that recklessness and want of foresight which have been displayed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer on many previous occasions.

Treasury should have spoken without condemnation, and even with some degree of qualified approval, of Mr. Snowden's idea that before long the Chancellor of the Exchequer should "propose a Budget of 300 or 400 millions." Mr. Lloyd George has, however, never committed himself to the extreme Socialistic doctrine that the whole burden of taxation should be borne by those who are comparatively wealthy. His view, as expressed in 1911, is that "every member of the community ought to contribute," but "in proportion to his means," and the Prime Minister, in a remarkable speech delivered in the House of Commons on June 11, 1913, by admitting the necessity of maintaining the existing taxes on food for purposes of revenue, virtually gave his adherence to the same principle. A more recent utterance, which seems to indicate an intention to impose a universal Income Tax, points in a similar direction.<sup>1</sup> Public confidence, which has of late been rudely shaken by the acts performed, and perhaps even still more by the language used, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, might possibly in some slight degree be restored if it were known that, in distributing the burden of taxation, the Government would proceed on some fixed and recognised principle which would be capable of defence not merely on electioneering but also on economic grounds. It may, however, be readily admitted that the difficulties of laying down any precise rule as to the manner in which the principle enunciated by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be applied are almost insuperable. Indeed, if anything of this sort were to be attempted, it would be necessary, as a preliminary,

<sup>1</sup> It would appear that any idea of imposing a universal Income Tax has, for the present, at all events, been abandoned.

to inquire into the actual incidence of taxation, a subject which bristles with difficulties. Mr. Mallet frequently alludes to the necessity of instituting such an inquiry, and Lord Haldane suggested in 1904 that a Royal Commission "containing the best statisticians and economists of the country, with some of the first men of business," should be appointed to go fully into the question of the "distribution of the national income and the way in which taxation fell upon it." The suggestion is certainly worthy of consideration, although here, again, the difficulty of arriving at any very precise and definite conclusions has, unfortunately, to be admitted.



## XXIX

### WHAT IS SLAVERY ?

*"The Spectator," January 17, 1914*

SIR ROBERT PEEL stated some seventy years ago that no sound opinions on currency questions could be formed unless a clear and comprehensive answer were given to the question, "What is a pound?" M. José de Almada, the private secretary to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an elaborate defence of the Portuguese administration of the islands of St. Thomé and Príncipe, recently published by the National Printing Office at Lisbon, asks a somewhat similar question. Starting apparently with the assumption, which if not altogether erroneous is certainly exaggerated, that all those who in England take part in anti-slavery discussions allow their emotions to dominate their reason, he asks, "What is meant by slavery in all public meetings and Parliamentary debates?" M. de Almada has a right to expect a definite reply to this very pertinent question.

In dealing with this subject M. de Almada quotes evidence from English sources to show that an Indian coolie in Jamaica does not attach the same signification to the word "slave" as an Englishman or a creole, inasmuch as he frequently addresses his employer in words,

familiar to all residents in India, such as "Protector of the poor! You are my father and mother! I am your slave!" The use of such figurative language proves absolutely nothing. It may be classed with those forms, consecrated by custom, which constrain an English subordinate official, however little he may be distinguished for habits of obedience, humility, or servility, to describe himself in addressing his superior as his "most obedient, humble servant." M. de Almada further tells us that, just as in Egypt the worst evils of the *corvée* system were cloaked under a euphemistic Arabic word signifying "assistance," so the Swahili expression for slave (*Mtumwa*) has "an honourable connection." It merely means "one who can be sent," and does not in the mind of the slave involve any degradation. "Whoever," M. de Almada adds, "is a little acquainted with Spencer's Sociology and Psychology will not be astonished at these quotations." Further, M. de Almada points out, in language which has been used by all apologists for slavery from the days of Demosthenes downwards but which constitutes no adequate defence for the institution, that slaves are generally well treated, that they are often better off as slaves than as free men, and that cases have occurred of manumitted slaves wishing to return to slavery. His general conclusion is that "the evils of the system are more or less everywhere the same, and that many things in the Portuguese colonies are criticised which are practised just in the same way abroad." It will presently be shown that there is one principle of vital importance which is apparently adopted in the Portuguese colonies, but which is absolutely rejected in all British possessions. But in the meanwhile attention may be drawn to the fact that, although

M. de Almada adduces much evidence with a view to proving that, in dealing with indentured labour, Portuguese and British methods are identical, he does not himself make any attempt to define slavery. He is quite justified in the adoption of this course, for in truth any epigrammatic and sufficiently comprehensive definition of the term is well-nigh impossible. As he rightly observes, "European Anarchists and Socialists call 'slaves' the salaried workmen of our factories." From this point of view it may be said that the stage at which compulsion, whether physical or moral, to oblige an individual to work degenerates into the creation of the status of slavery, though an interesting subject for academic discussion at the hands of a sociologist, is of slight importance to the practical politician or administrator. But it becomes a practical problem of the highest importance when the issue is stated in less general terms. When and under what conditions is forced labour justifiable? At what point is it synonymous with slavery, and may it justly incur the odium attached in all civilised communities to that degrading term? These are the questions which in reality lie at the root of most of the controversies upon the modern aspect of slavery.

From time immemorial a distinction has been made between slavery and compulsory labour. Mr. Buckland, in his exhaustive work on *The Roman Law of Slavery*, points out that the expressions *servire* and *operas dare* were not necessarily synonymous with slavery. More than this, as in a very primitive stage of society the institution of slavery may be said to have connoted some degree of progress, inasmuch as it took the place of the wholesale slaughter of war prisoners heretofore practised, so also it may be

held that further progress in the direction of civilisation was achieved when, in the Middle Ages, slavery was transformed into serfdom. It was, however, against the abuses of the *corvée* system, under which the French peasant was under an obligation to give a certain number of days' labour to his feudal lord, that the fiery old "Ami des Hommes" launched some of his most forcible diatribes. The whole system, in its feudal aspect, was, of course, swept away by the Revolution, but was nevertheless speedily, although but partially, resuscitated in another form. It was found impossible to keep the public roads in order without recourse to forced labour. Hence a law was passed in the year X. of the Republic regulating what were called "prestations en nature." Under this enactment, which, with certain modifications, still remains in force, every adult Frenchman is under a legal obligation to render personal service for a period not exceeding three days in one year in order to maintain the public roads of the district in which he resides. This service may, however, be, and generally is, commuted into a money payment. Until very recently laws very similar in character were in force in the United Kingdom. Statutory labour on roads was only abolished in England in 1835, and survived in Scotland till 1883.

If the necessity of resorting to forced labour has been recognised in modern times by such highly civilised communities as those of France and England, it can be no matter for surprise that the system should still exist in countries whose moral and material status is less highly developed. A White Paper was presented to Parliament in January 1908 showing to what extent compulsory native labour was at that time employed in British Colonies and posses-

sions. From this document it appears that in thirty-four Colonies no system of compulsory labour of any kind exists. In 1907, however, it still prevailed in Gambia, Ceylon, the Leeward Islands, the Gold Coast, Uganda, Fiji, British Honduras, Natal, and Cyprus. In each of these cases the conditions of labour are regulated by strict and elaborate laws, which are usually based on immemorial native custom.

Recourse to forced labour in any form, and under whatsoever safeguards, is a manifest evil. Experience has shown that the system is peculiarly liable to abuse. In its practical working it requires to be supervised with the utmost vigilance and watchfulness. Moreover, it has been pointed out by those who are most qualified to speak on the subject that light obligations, ratified by native custom, which have been willingly borne from time immemorial, may be profoundly modified when they are applied to meet the requirements necessarily brought into prominence with the advent of Europeans and the creation of European wants. It is one thing to ask the inhabitants of a Central African village to keep open a narrow forest footpath and to maintain a few rustic bridges adapted to the use of pedestrians. It is altogether another thing to insist on the maintenance of roads and bridges suitable for vehicular traffic. Moreover, the European contractor or engineer, in formulating his demands for labour, is obviously less likely to regulate his requirements in the manner most convenient to the labourers than the headmen of the villages who are intimately acquainted with native customs in such matters as hunting, fishing, and harvesting. Nevertheless, resort to an admittedly vicious and defective system becomes not only justifiable, but also inevitable,

when it can clearly be shown that the whole community will suffer far more from its abandonment than from its adoption. Thus none probably will be inclined to deny that forced labour to maintain the dykes in Holland or the embankments constructed to guard against inundation in the valley of the Nile may be justified on the *salus populi suprema lex* principle.

It is in cases of this sort, and in such cases alone, that forced labour is still permitted in some of the British Colonies and possessions. Here, therefore, is the explanation of British views which M. de Almada seeks. The answer to his question what we mean by slavery is that we reluctantly admit the necessity of compulsory labour in certain cases, and that we do not stigmatise as slavery such labour when, under all possible safeguards against the occurrence of abuses, it is employed for recognised and indispensable purposes of public utility. On the other hand, we regard the system, when employed for private profit, as wholly unjustifiable and as synonymous with slavery.

M. de Almada may rest assured that this view of the case is not entertained merely by those whose opinions are tainted by that bias and excessive humanitarian enthusiasm of which he deprecates the display. It is shared by others whose position and training would naturally lead them to subordinate their emotions to their reason, and whose wish it is not only to judge of the matter impartially, but also, in the case of Portugal, to make every possible allowance for the difficulties with which, through no fault of their own, the Government of a country attached by long ties of political friendship to Great Britain find themselves beset. Thus Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the House of Commons on

August 1, 1907, of certain labourers compulsorily employed in the Congo State, said : " If they are used for the purposes of private profit, instead of being employed solely for the benefit of the State, then their labour is not a tax but slavery."

It would not be fair to attach undue weight to an *obiter dictum* let fall in the course of M. de Almada's pleading, all the more so because his pamphlet has evidently suffered a good deal in translation. The passage about to be quoted may possibly not give a full or adequate representation of his views on the particular point now under discussion. The concluding words in the following sentence are, however, rather ominous, and somewhat encourage the inference that Portuguese and British views diverge on an important point of principle. " Compulsory labour," M. de Almada says, " consists in the obligation of performing certain tasks, such as repairing and building roads, transporting goods in the Custom-house, or agricultural work in private properties." <sup>1</sup> A distinct declaration on the part of the Portuguese Government that they are altogether opposed to the use of compulsory labour for private profit would be welcomed by all friends of Portugal in this country, more especially if it were accompanied by decisive action in harmony with that declaration.

<sup>1</sup> On the publication of this article, M. de Almada wrote to *The Spectator* to explain compulsory labour for private profit does not exist in the Portuguese Islands. It is, however, used as a penalty and as a substitute for hard labour.

### XXX

#### A PEACE BOANERGES <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," March 14, 1914*

DR. DAVID STARR JORDAN, of Stanford University, California, has written a stirring philippic against war, which affords a curious and instructive example of a good cause damaged by exaggeration, by sweeping generalisations based on imperfect data, and by fallacious reasoning. Mr. Trevelyan, in his very sympathetic account of Garibaldi's exploits, says that "no hero should feel himself absolved from the obligation to speak the truth." The same remark applies to an apostle of peace. Dr. Jordan is, however, so carried away by his intense and very laudable desire to establish universal peace that he does not hesitate to garner the most glaring fallacies into his dialectical armoury in order to condemn, not only war, but all those who are in any way concerned with warlike acts. Forgetful of the facts connected with the history of the Civil War in his own country, and of the further fact that the recent war in South Africa was, on the part of one of the contending parties, carried on, not by trained soldiers, but by armed peasants and farmers, he places on the title-page of his book, as a text which his further dissertations

<sup>1</sup> *War and Waste.* By David Starr Jordan. London : T. Fisher Unwin. [5s. net.]



expand, the amazing statement that "where there are no soldiers there is no war; when nobody is loaded, nobody explodes." Dr. Jordan here confounds cause and effect. His criticisms should be directed, not against the instruments which are the outcome of human passions, but against the passions themselves.

Dr. Jordan calls the peace which is preserved by the relative strength of the potential combatants "the Peace of Force." He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Israel Zangwill to the effect that the time-honoured principle of preparing for war in order to preserve peace is "a maxim forged in hell," and, in the face of the unquestionable fact that but a few years ago the predominant strength of the British Navy was the main factor which prevented a rupture between France and England, he tells us that "to call a great navy an instrument of peace is one of the giant jokes of the century." But elsewhere his manifest honesty and sincerity oblige him to recognise that it "may be well to work for the Peace of Force, when nothing better seems possible. . . . It may be better than no peace at all." He wishes, however, to substitute "the Peace of Law," which is to rest on justice, for "the Peace of Force." He looks to the democracies of the world to accomplish this most desirable change. They alone are virtuous. "The waning aristocracies are everywhere for war." "The military leagues of Europe want war and not peace." Dr. Jordan does not give us any example of an English aristocrat who is so steeped in original sin as to desire war for its own sake, neither does he allude to the fact that it was a member of this much-abused class who, as representative of England at Washington half a century ago, soothed and checked the bellicose

tendencies of the American democracy and prevented the calamity of a fratricidal war between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. But he tells us that "the caste spirit, strong in England and dominant in Germany, is ever and in all nations an incentive to war." It is, in fact, now generally assumed that democracy makes for peace. It may be so. The past in this respect affords no very sure guide for the future. The Athenian democracy of the time of Pericles was not peaceful. The aggressive Imperialism of Rome preceded the accession to power of Emperors. The French Jacobins, as Taine has clearly shown, deliberately brought on war with England in order to maintain their own position in France. But it may be readily and joyfully admitted that, so far as can as yet be judged, modern democracies are animated by a different spirit. Time alone can show whether the fair hopes which Dr. Jordan and others entertain in this respect will be justified. In the meanwhile, the practical fact of which an Englishman or a Frenchman, be he aristocrat or democrat, has to take account, is that there is not a German Socialist, however much he may be academically inclined to fraternise with his foreign comrades, who would not unhesitatingly march to war if he received the order to do so. It would be dangerous to cherish any delusions on this vital point.

Dr. Jordan is quite justified in maintaining that the democracy of the United States is very differently placed from any of the European democracies. In arguing this question he does, indeed, lapse into paradox. So convinced is he that preparation for war, far from averting, tends to facilitate a collision, that he maintains that "it is of vital interest to us [the Americans]

that our Navy should never be ready for war." Moreover, although he puts forward a rather Utopian scheme for what he terms "sanitising" the Monroe Doctrine, he evades the real dilemma, which is that the Government of the United States must either, for all international purposes, police Central and Southern America itself, or leave other nations free to act as they think best. But he is on perfectly sound ground when he argues that, for geographical and other reasons, no nation dreams of attacking the United States. He is also probably right in ridiculing the idea that America has anything to fear from Japan, and he treats the whole colour question in a rational and broad-minded spirit which commands respect and sympathy. He thus leads up to the conclusion that the United States may, and should, assume the leadership in a general world-campaign in favour of peace. The idea is noble, but it has to be remembered that nothing which the American people or American statesmen can do or say will alter the facts in respect to those nations whose situation, from various causes, is wholly different from theirs.

A great deal of what Dr. Jordan says applies only to America. He is above all things cosmopolitan. He attacks the Navy League of his own country and the "Armour-Plate Press," which he holds responsible for war scares, with a vigour quite equal to that which he displays when dealing with the prejudiced and effete aristocracies of Europe. But English readers will naturally be most interested in the misdeeds which he imputes to England. In dealing with his statements on this subject, two reflections force themselves on the mind. The first is that, even when he is in the main right, he enormously exaggerates. The second is that he is evidently

very imperfectly acquainted with his English facts. Under the influence of his monomania, for such it really is, Dr. Jordan attributes all the evils in the world to bloated armaments and to the excessive taxation rendered necessary for their maintenance. The fall in the value of gold, which has raised the cost of living throughout the world, is, in his opinion, due to this cause. But perhaps the *reductio ad absurdum* of his method of reasoning is reached when he tells us that " 'the white slave traffic' of to-day is an outgrowth of the standing army." Again, every rational Englishman regrets quite as much as Dr. Jordan the recent increase of naval and military expenditure, but to hold, as he holds, that by reason of that increase we are rushing headlong towards national insolvency is a wholly untenable proposition. The facts which are given in Mr. Bernard Mallet's recent work testify to the contrary. Again, we learn with some astonishment that "in the world at large, the world of dukes and barons, of generals and admirals . . . the ideal of equality before the law does not yet obtain." It would appear that Dr. Jordan surpasses even the present Chancellor of the Exchequer in his anti-ducal proclivities. The latter has never yet maintained that, in the eyes of the law, any difference exists between a duke and a dustman. We are also told that "Imperial England is not the Englishman's land. Those who rule the sea and those who pay the taxes are not on speaking terms with each other." The Indian trade, Dr. Jordan maintains, does not benefit the many, but only the few. He also alludes to the fact, indicated by numerous poets from the days of Anacreon downwards, that

Mars takes the brave  
And spares the coward for a nameless grave,

and forthwith he rushes to the conclusion that "the best of England's workers have died in her wars, leaving a weaker stock to breed from." He tells us that "no English citizen knows how far he is pledged to France, or to what degree he is to be blind to the designs of Russia." "The secret treaty," he adds, "is a relic of the military State." Statements of this sort may give point to the irresponsible rhetoric of a mob orator, but they are scarcely worthy of one writing from a seat of learning. It is necessary to indicate these fallacies, for they are mischievous. They may be, and probably are, believed by a number of ill-informed persons both in England and America. Any operative from Manchester or Preston could, however, tell Dr. Jordan that the more humble classes of society in Lancashire thrive on the Indian trade. Any ordinarily well-informed Member of Parliament could state with accuracy the nature of our engagements to France and Russia, and would deride the idea that we are bound by any secret treaties. If England ever goes to war, it will not be because some occult arrangement has been elaborated in the twilight of the Foreign Office, but because the English democracy wants to fight.

But the main gravamen of Dr. Jordan's charge is contained in the following passage: "There can be no doubt that the most powerful lobby in the world is that employed by the great armament builders of England and Germany. . . . The war scare as promulgated through the 'Armour-Plate Press' of these countries is the chief agency for affecting public opinion and controlling the action of Reichstag and Parliament." If this statement were true, it would indeed be serious; but whatever may be the case in America or Germany, there is happily

every reason to suppose that, so far as England is concerned, it is wholly devoid of foundation. What Dr. Jordan calls a war scare nurtured by "armament pirates" is in this country not a fictitious cry got up by hired journalists or interested manufacturers. It represents the deliberate and well-founded belief of every thinking man in the United Kingdom that, in order to ensure the safety of British overseas possessions and the inviolability of British soil, a navy of predominant strength is for the time being absolutely essential.

A caveat must also be entered against the manner in which Dr. Jordan confounds together the tendencies and aspirations of all the nations of Europe. "English Dreadnoughts," he says, "breed German." He has here confused parent and child. It would be more true to say that German Dreadnoughts breed English. Dr. Jordan puts the saddle on the wrong horse. The idea of "revenge" has died out in France. There is probably not a sane Englishman of any class of society who does not recognise that the greatest of British interests is peace. There is, in fact, only one disturbing element in Europe—namely, the fears excited by the possible future course of German policy. In Germany militarism still reigns supreme. It is impossible to read Prince Bülow's recent work without recognising that Dr. Jordan is not far from the mark when he says that Germany is still "possessed with the mediaeval spirit of military rivalry." It is certain that European thought and action were at one time moving in the direction so earnestly desired by Dr. Jordan, but Prince Bismarck arose and put back the hands of the clock. He introduced the principle that "the State is Force," and, although it may earnestly be hoped that

Dr. Jordan is right when he says that "we shall never see another war among the great nations of Europe," it would, so long as the present phase lasts, be little short of madness for a nation which has so much to lose as England to expose itself to the risks involved in adopting a policy of blind security based on the toleration and continuous friendship of other nations stronger than itself. Napoleon once said that "what one nation most hates is another nation." It was a vile and cynical utterance, and it may not only be hoped but believed that the sentiment which it expresses is moribund. But it would be in the highest degree unwise to disarm until we can feel greater confidence than can at present be entertained that it is altogether defunct.

## XXXI

### WAR AND DIPLOMACY

"*The Spectator*," April 18, 1914

MR. NORMAN ANGELL'S new work, *The Foundations of International Polity* (William Heinemann, 3s. 6d. net), consists of a series of brilliant lectures, delivered to audiences of very various types, in which the arguments and conclusions set forth in his former work, *The Great Illusion*, are enforced and developed. Mr. Norman Angell's case may be thus summarily stated. He thinks, with Mr. Bonar Law, that the occurrence of war indicates a "failure of human wisdom." *Ergo*, if men can be taught wisdom, there will never be war. A commonplace of this sort cannot, as many will certainly suppose, be brushed aside by an appeal to other commonplaces, such as Carlyle's dictum that men are "mostly fools," or the oft-quoted old saw of the sage Oxenstiern that the world is governed with very little wisdom. Against despondent proverbial philosophy of this sort Mr. Norman Angell appeals to the verdict of history. He shows that the highest wisdom of one period has been regarded as little short of insanity by subsequent generations. Wars of religion are no longer possible. Some of the most civilised communities in the world have wholly abolished duelling. No educated man could now be found



to defend torture or slavery. No child is born amongst educated surroundings who would not laugh at the existence of witches. A Colonial policy such as that adopted at one time by Spain, which was based on the false idea that the terms "wealth" and "money" are synonymous, would be scouted by all but the most ignorant. These and other changes, all leading to practical results of the utmost importance, have been effected, not by force, but by the action of public opinion. Mr. Norman Angell holds that the arguments by which war is now often justified are no less defective than those by which fallacies, now wholly abandoned, were at one time defended. He therefore bids pacifists to seek encouragement in reflecting on the movements of thought which have taken place in the past, and to teach the world to be wise by exposing the errors on which existing unwisdom rests.

The case against war is stated with very remarkable ability. Mr. Norman Angell may perhaps at times be accused of lapsing into special pleading. For instance, the fact that during the last forty years only some eight thousand Germans have been actually engaged in war, and that these fought against naked savages in Africa, can scarcely be held seriously to affect the question whether the Germans are or are not "the most military nation in Europe." Neither do the facts that a proportionately large number of Frenchmen pass through the mill of universal military training, and that of late years the French Army has, relatively speaking, seen more petty fighting than the German, afford any very conclusive proof that "France is more military than Germany," if by that phrase is meant that the former endangers the peace of Europe more than the latter Power. But these

are mere *obiter dicta* to which no great importance need be attached. Mr. Norman Angell's main contention is that the view advanced by Baron von Stengel, the German delegate at the first Hague Peace Conference, which is supported by many other high authorities, to the effect that "economic power depends in the last resort on political power," is a palpable fallacy. He supports his opinion by a wealth of very cogent arguments which it would be impossible even to summarise within the ordinary limits of a newspaper article. Here, therefore, it must suffice to say that Mr. Norman Angell's plea that, in the present condition of the civilised world, the mere fact of conquest would in no way tend to improve the economic position of the conqueror appears to be absolutely irrefutable. As an illustration he conclusively proves that, from an economic point of view, Germany would gain nothing, and would almost certainly lose a great deal, if, as a result of a successful war, the British Colonies passed into her hands. More than this, Mr. Norman Angell argues with irresistible force that, so far from its being immoral to base antagonism to war on materialistic grounds, the cause of morality has everything to gain by being identified with that of self-interest. The soundness of Mr. Norman Angell's premisses may, therefore, be readily admitted, but much caution has to be exercised in drawing conclusions from them. He is quite justified in holding that some at least of the exponents of what he terms "orthodox statecraft" have acted on economic principles which cannot be sustained in argument. He is also justified in supposing that, if his plea that mutual co-operation amongst nations is economically far more profitable to all concerned than domination secured at the point of the

bayonet were generally accepted, one potential and very fertile cause of quarrel would be greatly mitigated, and would perhaps be wholly removed. But although he is far too acute a political observer to fall into the Benthamite error of supposing that men's actions are wholly governed by "enlightened self-interest," he appears somewhat inclined to exaggerate the scope of the effect which would be produced by the general acceptance of his own principles. For, in fact, economic considerations have not constituted the sole, or even the main, cause of recent wars. Some allusion is incidentally made to this point in Mr. Morton Fullerton's recent instructive work, *Problems of Power* (pp. 161-163). The argument admits of much further development. Underlying economic causes may possibly be traced in the Russo-Japanese struggle, but the nineteenth-century wars between Italy and Austria, as also the war of 1859 between the latter Power and France, were the outcome of the Italian national movement. The war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria was the first, as the Franco-German struggle of 1870 was the last, step towards the establishment of German unity. The frequent wars between Russia and Turkey have been quite as much due to the solidarity of Slavonic sentiment as to any desire on the part of the former Power to gain outlets for its commerce. The great Civil War in America arose from a twofold cause, the desire to abolish slavery and to maintain the Union intact. Other instances might be cited. In fact, the predominating cause of the great wars of modern times has been the tendency towards the agglomeration of nationalities. Mr. Norman Angell and many others think that the intensity of national feeling is dying out, and that the

cleavage line of the future amongst societies of men will be class interests. It may be so ; but, apart from the question whether the decay of exclusive patriotism would really constitute any moral progress, it is obvious that for all the purposes of the practical politician it must be assumed that, even if moribund, the patriotic sentiment is still for the time being the most active force in the government of the world.

How is it that national movements have, and economic quarrels—though often, as in the recent Russo-German tariff conflict, causing very bitter and even dangerous dissensions—have not caused any actual outbreak of hostilities ? The reason is clear. It is because in the one case the “ War Lords and diplomats,” against whom pacifists of every kind pour forth all the vials of their wrath, have been able, and in the other case they have been either powerless or unwilling, to control the popular forces with which they had to deal. The writer of the present article cannot speak with any authority on the views entertained by “ War Lords,” although he ventures to hazard a conjecture that the principal preoccupation of the leading War Lord of Europe is not how he can best stimulate, but how he can most effectively control, the bellicose spirit of his subjects. But the present writer has had a good deal to do with diplomats, both British and Continental, and, moreover, he was for well-nigh a quarter of a century responsible for the conduct of affairs in a country where the air was heavily charged with international electricity. His main pre-occupation during the greater part of that period was how best to obviate any serious risk of a collision between France and England, and he can conscientiously say that what he always most feared was not deliberate action taken by

the diplomacy of any nation, but rather the occurrence of some chance incident which would excite a whirlwind of national passion, and which, being possibly manipulated by some skilful journalist who would focus on one point all the latent hysteria in France or England, would create a situation incapable of being controlled by diplomacy. Mr. Norman Angell very rightly points out to his countrymen the danger of indulging in hasty generalisations as to what "Germans" or "Germany" think and are likely to do. He is, perhaps, somewhat too optimistic in his estimate of the effective force of antimilitarist opinion in Germany, but he is, of course, quite right in saying that all Germans are not infected with an extreme militarist spirit. But does not Mr. Norman Angell fall into a somewhat similar error, albeit on a far smaller field of thought, when he classes all "War Lords and diplomats" together, and holds that they are collectively "still wedded to the old false theories"? It is true that there are Germans and Germans. It is no less true that there are diplomats and diplomats.

Mr. Norman Angell does not apparently accept the view that a strong navy is an "insurance" against war, and he contests the validity of Mr. Churchill's axiom that the best way to preserve peace is "to be so strong that victory, in the event of war, is certain." What Mr. Churchill presumably meant is that, although there can, of course, be no such thing as certainty of victory, great strength on the part of one nation acts as a wholesome sedative to any other nation which may be disposed to take the offensive. Whatever views may be advanced on this subject by highly skilled dialecticians, such as Mr. Norman Angell, the "average man"—and the writer

of this article makes no claim to be included in any higher category than this—cannot forget that, when the Fashoda incident occurred, the predominant strength of the British Navy was one of the main factors which obviated the calamity of a war between France and England.

These views are not advanced with any desire to depreciate the value of Mr. Norman Angell's arguments, with many of which the writer of the present article is in very hearty sympathy. The pacifists of the school to which Mr. Norman Angell belongs are not only very able, but eminently reasonable. They do not indulge in any Utopian dreams about the possibility of immediate disarmament. They recognise that "so long as German policy rests on the assumption of the supposed economic value of military force, we have to meet that force by the only force that can reply to it." But they look to education and the general spread of more sound economic views to effect a gradual and very wholesome change. The thinking public, including possibly some "War Lords," and certainly many "diplomats," may wish them God-speed in the conduct of their campaign. But until the process of conversion has made considerably more progress than is at present the case, it will be as well, in deciding whether armaments can or cannot be reduced, for Englishmen to remember that there is much worldly wisdom and a good deal of sound political philosophy in Alphonse Karr's classical comment on the proposal to abolish capital punishment: "Que messieurs les assassins commencent."

## XXXII

### CHARITY ORGANISATION<sup>1</sup>

“*The Spectator*,” March 28, 1914

IN Fletcher’s play, *The Pilgrim*, the following dialogue occurs :

ALINDA : What poor attend my charity to-day, wench ?

JULETTA : Of all sorts, madam ; your open-handed bounty  
Makes ’em flock every hour ; some worth your pity,  
But others that have made a trade of begging.

ALINDA : Wench, if they ask it truly, I must give it :  
It takes away the holy use of charity  
To examine wants.

For forty-five years the Charity Organisation Society has been engaged in an arduous struggle to combat the economic heresy enunciated by the heroine in Fletcher’s drama. In 1868–69 a body of social reformers, whose mere names constituted a sufficient guarantee for their ardent philanthropy, banded themselves together in order, if possible, to check the evils caused by the action of other no less ardent but more impulsive and less thoughtful brother-philanthropists. Edward Denison, himself a leading apostle of enlightened humanity, lamented his inability to “get one honest newspaper to write down promiscuous charity.” The history of

<sup>1</sup> *Social Work in London, 1869–1912.* By Helen Bosanquet, LL.D. London : John Murray. [8s. net.]

these efforts has now been admirably told by one who can speak with unquestionable authority on all matters connected with social reform. Mrs. Bosanquet very rightly states in her Preface that the chief interest of her instructive work turns on the discussion of the principles which the Society has persistently sought to translate into action. Of these principles, perhaps the most important is that no good charitable work can be done without preliminary inquiry and careful discrimination between the different classes of those applying for relief. Hence the Society has always held that the systematic visitation of the poor must form the basis for any effective scheme having for its object the dispensation of charity. Visitation was, indeed, practised before the Society came into existence, but it was of a spasmodic and wholly unmethodical description, and often did more harm than good. A clergyman in the East End of London, writing in 1877, said that "a court in his parish might go unvisited from year's end to year's end until some special calamity befell it, such as a police case, etc. Then there was a swoop of rival charitable eagles from all sorts of religious quarters to settle on the body." The character and methods of the early Victorian visitors have been immortalised by Dickens in the person of Mrs. Pardiggle, whose blatant and obtrusive philanthropy was in itself sufficient to defeat its own object and to excite the resentment of the poor. A large number of charitable associations were at work, but there was no co-operation or cohesion amongst them. The liberality of the rich had resulted in the "paralysis of all local self-help." Imposture, mendicancy, and "sheer shameless pauperism" were steadily increasing. "Every possible device had been



adopted for turning charity into an unmixed evil to those whom it affected."

It must here suffice to give a solitary instance of the class of evil which the Society sought to combat. Londoners whose memories can carry them back some thirty to forty years will surely remember the poor children who often accompanied Italian organ-grinders, and whose youth and attractive appearance were commonly exploited to excite the compassion of the charitable. The Charity Organisation Society instituted a searching inquiry into the conditions under which these children were employed. It was elicited that they were the victims of a "traffic as barbarous as any slave-trade." They were bought by persons known as *padroni* (masters) from their parents in Italy, and marched through France, sometimes dying of sheer exhaustion on the way. They were grossly maltreated on arrival in this country, and were, of course, not allowed to retain any of their earnings. In the case of one *padrone* a sum of no less than £12,000 had been amassed from the proceeds of this infamous traffic. As the result of the efforts of the Society the trade was practically suppressed. A number of *padroni* were arrested, and in many cases sent to prison. The children themselves were handed over to the Italian Consular authorities and were sent back to Italy.

The Society, which from the nature of its work was necessarily forced into adopting from its inception an attitude of militancy, also engaged in a vigorous campaign against those associations which, sometimes by reason of negligent management and sometimes owing to fraudulent intent, were undeserving of public sympathy. London was "infested by hordes of fraudulent societies, impostors, and begging-

letter writers ; to clear the field of these was essential to the cultivation of genuine Charity."

The work which the Society undertook was, indeed, colossal. The attempt to direct into one broad and beneficent channel all the petty rivulets which it found meandering aimlessly over the vast Sahara of London pauperism was sure to evoke bitter opposition. It obtained, indeed, the ungrudging support of many whose names were known and honoured throughout the length and breadth of the land—the late Lord Shaftesbury, Mr. Ruskin, Cardinal Manning, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Miss Octavia Hill, and many others. But, broadly speaking, it may be said that every man's hand was against it. The warm-hearted and unthinking philanthropist thought that the principles adopted by the Society were "not according to the true spirit of Christianity, nor the manly and generous character of Englishmen." The attempt to unmask the proceedings of fraudulent individuals and associations, who on false pretences managed to extract and mispend "at least from £300,000 to £400,000 a year from the pockets of the benevolent," naturally evoked the bitter hostility of the very numerous class who were interested in the perpetuation of existing abuses. The rising tide of State Socialism and the fact that the influence of the old orthodox political economists was waning, alike contributed to create a public opinion unfavourable to the reception of those principles which the Society regarded as fundamental. Mr. Mundella declared that "political economy must be corrected by facts," a Delphic utterance which meant but too often in practice that facts were to be distorted by the light of unreasoning sentiment. These combined causes rendered the Society the object of

much vehement and very undeserved obloquy. One writer regarded the Society as the "Scourge of Humanity." A Socialist newspaper declared that "the minions of this 'close corporation,' for it is nothing less, dissect, torture, and mock the distress and misery abounding on all sides," and another newspaper representing the interests of Labour denounced the Society as a "hoary-headed old fraud." Manifestly that indiscriminate charity (*inconsulta donatio*) which has been persistently condemned by thinkers as far back as the days of Seneca is wholly divorced from the more generous virtue which, under the same name, was commended by the Apostle St. Paul.

Neither was the Society free from the embarrassments inseparable from internal dissension. As fresh incidents in the work of social reform developed, difficult questions constantly arose as to the attitude which the Society should assume. The more active members, who generally appear in the end to have gained the upper hand, were persistently in favour of accepting fresh responsibilities and of enlarging the scope of the Society's functions. The more conservative and cautious elements in the Society held back, and, in the words of Lord Napier and Ettrick, feared the opposition they would excite and the enmity they would incur if they were "to take a prominent attitude in the advocacy of social innovations." Even so courageous a reformer as the veteran Lord Shaftesbury declared at one time that he could not "remain a member of a body so fearfully ambitious."

Nevertheless, in spite of external opposition and internal dissension, the Society, under the very able guidance of Mr. Loch, held together, and endeavoured to mitigate the vagaries of a public which, as one of its members put it, was

"full of bad impulses." It would be an exaggeration to say that any very marked success has been achieved in the direction of correcting those impulses. No such success was to be anticipated. A Society which damped the enthusiasm of the benevolent by alleging that, in the words of Canon Barnett, the East of London had been "blighted" by Mansion House Funds, could scarcely expect to win popular favour. Moreover, the Society fell on evil days. It was brought into existence at a time when even stern economists began to recognise that the principles of Individualism, in spite of their unquestionable merits, had occasionally been carried to excess, and when the main error of the Manchester School of politicians, which consisted in an undue neglect of social reform, was becoming daily more apparent. The Charity Organisation Society was, therefore, necessarily to some extent swept along with the flowing tide. It had to accept measures, such as free meals for school children and the indiscriminate grant of old-age pensions, which ran diametrically opposite to its most cherished principles. Nevertheless, the members of the Society held manfully on their way, and it cannot be doubted that in doing so they performed a most valuable public service. They have effected the salvage of some useful fragments which remain from the wreck of political economy. They have prevented the invaluable principles of self-help and self-reliance from being totally submerged by the wave of unreflecting sophistry which has of late years swept over the country. They have achieved some considerable success in promoting methodical inquiry, and in securing co-operation between State assistance and private charity. It is more than probable that as time goes on the beneficent

nature of their action and the soundness of their general principles will receive ever-increasing, albeit tardy, recognition from a public which is somewhat too prone to avow its allegiance over hastily to attractive, but often highly fallacious, dogma. Mr. Loch and his associates may rest well content with the ungrudging eulogy bestowed on their work by one of the most eminent of modern philanthropists. "I would rather," Miss Octavia Hill said, in answering a warm tribute which had been paid to her unceasing exertions on behalf of the poor, "rest any claim for gratitude of the poor I may have on that portion of my work which I share with the much-abused Charity Organisation Society than any other—namely, that I have not shrunk from saying with them, what no one wishes to hear, and which yet is true, that too many of the money gifts to the poor of London just now are doing more harm than good."

## MISCELLANEOUS



### XXXIII

## GREEK IMPERIALISM <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator,"* October 25, 1913

UNLESS Macedonia be included within the limits of ancient Greece, it may appear, at first sight, a contradiction in terms to speak of Greek Imperialism. Etymologically speaking, the word "Imperialism" connotes, or should connote, the existence either of emperors or, at all events, of rulers under some other name, in whom large, if not altogether despotic, powers are vested. Now, if there is one thing certain about the feelings displayed by the ancient Greeks, and more especially by the Athenians, who of all Greeks developed the most typically Hellenic characteristics, it is their intense dislike to despotic government. The idea which Herodotus (iii. 80) entertained of a king was that he was an individual who subverted the customs of his country, violated women, and put men to death without trial. Euripides, who was a hardy Radical, constantly inveighed against "tyrants," under whose rule equality would cease to exist; and Aristotle (*Pol.* iii. 11, 1) could not conceive a king who governed by law. In defiance of etymology, the word "Imperialism" has, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Greek Imperialism.* By William Scott Ferguson. London: Constable & Co. [8s. 6d.]



in common parlance lost its original signification, and is now applied not necessarily to the rule of emperors, but to the spirit of Empire. History, both ancient and modern, shows that this spirit can grow and prosper as vigorously under a republican as under a monarchical form of government. Roman expansion, in its best and most beneficial form, began before the existence of Roman emperors. The British Empire is the outcome of national wants and aspirations, and has been built up often in spite of the personal fears and objections of the rulers of Great Britain. We now, for instance, know that Queen Elizabeth, who ruled when the Imperialist idea first germinated in England, was herself an anti-Imperialist. The advance of democracy has not checked British expansion, neither has the existence of Republican institutions in America prevented the Government of the United States from adopting a policy which may be correctly designated as Imperial.

The world is so accustomed to associate Rome with government and Athens with culture that outside the ranks of historical students it is probable that many at times forget that there was a period when the Athenians were the leading Imperialists of the world. A good deal of discussion has taken place, both in ancient and modern times, as to how long the Athenian Empire can be said to have lasted. All authorities, however, agree in taking the year 477 B.C. as the commencement of Athenian hegemony. It was about that time, according to Thucydides (i. 97), that "the Athenians made immense strides in power." The maintenance of their Imperial position depended wholly on their maritime ascendancy. In 405 B.C. their fleet, which was the creation of one man of genius,

Themistocles, was crushed at Ægospotami. If, therefore, that event be taken as the date of the fall of the Athenian Empire, its duration was seventy-two years.

Inasmuch as the possibility of reconciling Imperial policy with democratic principles and institutions is at present one of the most difficult and important problems of British politics, it might at first sight be thought that the study of the rise and fall of the Athenian Empire would be specially instructive to modern statesmen. We can still learn a good deal from Rome. "Roman history," Mr. Ferrero very truly remarks, "is for ever modern, because every new age has only to choose that part which most resembles it to find itself." The early days of Roman expansion were marked by the application of liberal and statesmanlike principles, some of which hold as good to-day as they did twenty centuries ago, whilst the wide field on which Rome operated and the uniformity of policy which was the outcome of the lack of Roman individualism afford ample opportunities for noting the results attained by the application of those principles. On the other hand, the modern Imperialist has little or nothing to learn from Athens. Athenian policy does, indeed, furnish a certain number of danger signals indicating faults which should be carefully avoided, but circumstances and the trend of political thought have undergone such profound changes since the days of Pericles as to render those special signals scarcely necessary. It may be, as Mr. Ferguson says, that the Imperial experiments of the Greeks "prepared the way for the unification of the ancient world in the Empire of Rome," but they only did so by affording practical proof that Greek aspirations were unattainable, that Greek Imperial policy

was founded on radically wrong principles, and that Greek methods of government were wholly inapplicable to any large, and still more to any scattered, communities of men.

The Athenians endeavoured to reconcile two political ideals which were mutually destructive of each other, namely, the creation of an empire and at the same time the preservation of a fervid but exclusively urban patriotism. Whether, as Fustel de Coulanges supposed, the city-state was an artificial structure based on family and religious associations, or whether its growth was due to other causes, one thing is certain, namely, that at the period when the Athenians grasped at empire, neither practical politicians nor philosophers could adequately conceive any larger political unit than the city. Plato, Mr. Ferguson says, "misread not only the past, but also the future. . . . He tried to mend city constitutions when the world required the creation of large territorial states." A mere statement of numbers is sufficient to show how wholly incompatible this narrow conception of political life was with the creation and maintenance of Empire. The free and franchised population of Attica in the age of Pericles yielded only about fifty thousand males of military age. On the other hand, "the world which Athens under Pericles sought to dominate must have had a population of over twenty millions."

In default of the bond of nationality, which could obviously not exist amongst the non-Hellenic subjects of Athens, and which amongst other Hellenes was submerged by the narrow spirit of urban patriotism, the only tie which could unite the mother-country with its dependencies was the need of protection felt by the Greek city-states. The pages of Thucydides

afford ample testimony to prove that the main preoccupation of the minor city-states was to make such terms with a powerful neighbour as would, at the sacrifice of a certain amount of liberty, enable them to receive protection against attack from some other powerful rival. Moreover, they were practically forced to side either with Sparta or Athens. When the unfortunate Melians humbly suggested (Thuc. v. 94) that they might be "friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side," their request was met with a blunt and brutal refusal from the Athenian envoys, who rigorously applied the principle of the French Jacobin, "*Sois mon frère, ou je te tue.*" Protection against foreign foes constitutes, indeed, to this day one of the bonds which unite the mother-country and the colonies. During the early part of the eighteenth century, when the British colonies in America were frequently threatened by France or Spain, it was a factor of perhaps even greater importance than at present. But it is clear that no analogy can be established between colonies who demand protection and those who, as in the case of the Melians, have protection forced on them. How widely the Athenian conception of empire differed not only from that of modern England but also from the statesmanlike principles adopted by the Roman republic is abundantly proved by the utterances of Cleon. "You should remember," he said to the Athenians in 427 B.C., "that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects who are always conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their mistress; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force."

The Athenian machinery for the government of their empire was no less defective than the principles on which it was governed. The sovereign power was vested in the *Ecclesia*, or General Assembly, and the *Heliaea*, or popular Courts of Justice. The latter delegated their power to the Council of Five Hundred devised by Clisthenes, whom Mr. Ferguson designates as "the harbinger of democracy." Without entering into detail as to the functions and mode of appointment of these two bodies, it may be said that Athenian government and administration were based on the wholly false idea that "one citizen was as competent as another for public office," a theory which found favour with Aristotle, and which was even applied in modern times by that very arbitrary monarch, George III., who, however, albeit he held that "any man was fit for any place he could get," was nevertheless shrewd enough not to admit of the appointment of any candidate for public office unless he was assured of the orthodoxy of his opinions. The only reason why a system so manifestly defective as that created by the Athenians worked even for a short time was that the practice differed wholly from the theory. Under the influence of high character and commanding ability democracy abdicated its rights and prerogatives. "In form," Thucydides said, "their government was a democracy; in reality it was the rule of the ablest citizens." The rule of Demos naturally connotes the existence of demagogues. The Athenian democracy was fortunate for a time in falling under the leadership of a statesman of genius. Pericles, Mr. Gilbert Murray says, dwelt "in austere supremacy," but he could not dispense with that flattery of the Athenians which they expected, and without

which, if Isocrates is to be believed, they were wont to refuse a hearing to any orator. He only, however, used flattery as a means to an end. So long as he was at the helm, Imperialism was controlled by statesmanlike prudence. When his guiding hand was withdrawn, the vices inherent in the system had full play, and the results were disastrous. "It was not democracy itself," Dr. Adolf Holm says, "which was the cause of the many misfortunes at Athens, but the kind of democracy which the Athenian people wanted and maintained—a democracy with no government apart from the people, and in which the people decided every detail as far as possible."

Exclusively urban patriotism was destructive of the growth of sane Imperialism. It was not sensibly modified by the creation of the Amphictyonic Council, which, as Professor Freeman has pointed out, partook of the character of an Ecclesiastical Synod rather than that of a Federal Diet, but the creation of the Ætolian and Achaean leagues in the third century testifies to the growth of the federalising spirit. The idea of federation, however, never really took firm root among the Greeks. "Complete disunion," in Grote's words, still remained "amongst their most cherished principles." Distrust of anything approaching to the one-man rule is clearly shown in the provision made in 255 B.C. that the office of the head of the league could only be held by the same individual for one year. Eventually all these hesitancies, suspicions, and local jealousies were crushed out by the heavy hand of Rome. Not only Greek Imperialism, but also Greek nationality succumbed, and the Hellenes entered upon the task which was in reality more suited to their national genius, namely, that of educating their conquerors.

Rome, it has been truly said, "conquered the world only to give it to Hellas."

Macedonian stands on a somewhat different footing from Athenian or Spartan Imperialism. It cannot be doubted that the man of whom Juvenal, in a passage which has been much misunderstood,<sup>1</sup> wrote :

Unus Pellaeo juveni non sufficit orbis,

possessed the Imperialist spirit. He did not live long enough to enable posterity to judge of what achievements he could have accomplished as a constructive statesman, but so far as we know he was thoroughly imbued with the erroneous idea, imparted to him by his teacher Aristotle, that the city-state, and not the *ethnos*, was the unit on which political life should rest. "Accordingly," Mr. Ferguson says, "he displayed a feverish energy in founding Greek city-states everywhere in the conquered territory, but particularly in the region of the Far East, where urban life had been hitherto lacking. Like mushrooms over-night, towns by the score sprang up behind him on his line of march." Alexander saw, however, the necessity of providing some machinery for giving cohesion to these separate

<sup>1</sup> It is generally thought that Alexander, having conquered the whole of this world, wept because he could not extend his conquest to the stellar regions. Mr. Payne (*History of the New World called America*, vol. i. p. 27) points out that this view is incorrect. The story as it is told by Plutarch in his *Moralia* appears to confirm Mr. Payne's view. The philosopher Anaxarchus told Alexander that there existed an infinity of worlds, upon which Alexander wept, and on being asked by his companions the cause of his grief replied : οὐκ ἄξιον δακρύειν εἰ, κόσμων ὄντων ἀπέλπον, ἐνδὸς οὐδέπω κύριοι γεγόμεναι ; From this it would appear that Alexander lamented, not his inability to conquer many worlds, but his failure to conquer one, and, moreover, that his lamentation was due to his having been told that the world which he knew did not constitute the whole of the globe ; there were, as Aristotle had pointed out to him, other οἰκούμεναι, and it was these he regretted he could not subdue.

entities. The skill with which he appealed to the imagination of men, and which excited the admiration of Napoleon, led him, in Mr. Ferguson's opinion, to resort to self-deification. It was a very common practice in the ancient world for kings and emperors to deify their predecessors. Their feelings on this subject were perhaps not incorrectly set forth in the saying attributed to Zosimus, "sit divus dummodo non sit vivus." But self-deification was, to say the least, unusual. That Alexander committed this act of arrogant folly rests mainly on the testimony of Arrian, who wrote nearly four centuries after Alexander's death. It consists chiefly of the facts connected with his visit to the Oasis at Ammon, the famous prostration (*proskynesis*) at the Baktra banquet, the mutiny at Opis, and the decree demanding divine honours from the Greek cities. Doubts have at times been thrown by scholars of eminence on the validity of this testimony, but the view now most generally accepted appears to be that adopted by Mr. Ferguson, namely, that Alexander was himself the instigator of his own deification. There is nothing absolutely impossible in the idea that a world-conqueror, intoxicated with a belief in his own omnipotence, should adopt such a course. Fournier relates that Napoleon ordered the use of a catechism in the schools of France, in which the prescribed answer to the question, what was to be thought of those who were unfaithful to their duties to the Emperor, was "according to St. Paul, they sin against the ordinances of God, and are deserving of everlasting damnation."



## XXXIV

### NUMBERS IN HISTORY <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," January 24, 1914*

ACCURACY of statement, more especially where numbers are concerned, is a talent which is only developed in highly civilised communities, and which, even in such communities, is rarely practised save by those who have undergone a strict course of mental discipline. When to the slipshod habits of thought prevalent in more primitive stages of society are added the facts that history has, more often than not, been written long after the occurrence of the events which the historian narrates; that even a contemporary and conscientious historian, such as Thucydides, had to rely largely on the conflicting statements of ill-informed or partial witnesses; that, as we recede in point of time, legend and fact are often hopelessly intermixed; that even in modern times experience has shown how rapidly hero-worship generates myths; and that national pride, the tendency to self-glorification on the part of commanders, and other causes are incessantly at work to distort the truth, it can be no matter for surprise that, as critical

<sup>1</sup> *Numbers in History: Lecture delivered before the University of London.* By Dr. Hans Delbrück. London: Hodder & Stoughton, for the University of London Press. [1s. 6d.]

methods improve, scepticism as to the reliance to be placed on ancient historical records and traditions should increase. Niebuhr once said that we knew that a great war took place between the Greeks and the Persians, in which the former gained the victory, but that there our knowledge ended. Dr. Delbrück does not go so far as this; but just as half a century ago Bishop Colenso shattered belief in the verbal accuracy of Biblical history by submitting it to an arithmetical test, so the learned German Professor points out that, in dealing with the history of war, it is essential to form accurate opinions as regards the number of warriors who were from time to time engaged. National pride, to which historians have in some degree pandered, has loved to depict the defeat of hordes of servile Persians at the hands of a small body of Greek freemen, or Austrian and Burgundian hosts humbled by the stout resistance offered by a band of patriotic Swiss peasants. The history of other countries—Prussia, France, and England—abounds in fables of a similar description. There need be no hesitation in accepting the truth of the proposition that the figures given in most of these cases are very untrustworthy and often wholly erroneous. It has been calculated that if, as Herodotus states, the army of Xerxes, including followers, numbered 5,100,000 souls, the last man in the column could not have left Susa before the first had arrived at Thermopylae. It is, to say the least, highly improbable that Attila could have moved from Germany into France with 700,000 men, when even the organising genius of Moltke, aided by highly improved means of locomotion and communication, found it very difficult to move 500,000 men over the same road. Plutarch's statement that, of 3,000,000 Gauls and Germans

opposed to Julius Caesar, 1,000,000 were killed and another million led into captivity, is almost certainly a mere conjecture devoid of any real statistical value. Dr. Delbrück, speaking of the Norman conquest of England, ridicules the idea that William's army was composed of 60,000 or even of 32,000 men, and that Harold had 1,200,000 or, as others allege, 400,000 men at his disposal. He thinks that the Norman force was probably 6000 or 7000 strong—Sir James Ramsay puts it at only 5000—and estimates Harold's army at only 4000.

Dr. Delbrück's criticism is not, however, merely destructive. After adducing irrefragable proof that but slight reliance can be placed on the figures given by ancient historians, he maintains that by a train of circumstantial evidence we can substitute fairly accurate figures in their place. Not only does he put forward the somewhat hazardous conjecture that "15,000 warriors may have been the size of Xerxes' army," but he boldly states that the Greek victories, both by land and sea, were due to the fact that their numbers, far from being inferior, were greatly in excess of those of the Persians. It is only with great diffidence that the verdict of one who speaks with such high authority as the erudite Professor of History at the University of Berlin can be rejected. It is, however, permissible to express some doubt whether, in this particular instance, Dr. Delbrück has fully proved his case. One argument which he advances in support of his conclusion is stated in the following terms :

Xerxes had taken Athens and rested there perhaps a fortnight, until the Battle of Salamis, but his troops did not even advance to Megara, a town only twenty English miles from Athens, and one that it would have been of the greatest importance for the Persians to take. There

can be no other ground for this omission than that the Persian army was too weak to hold both points, Athens and Megara, together.

The writer of the present article ventures, in dealing with this argument, to cite a somewhat parallel case, with the facts of which he happens to be well acquainted. In August 1897 the Anglo-Egyptian force, then operating in the Sudan, occupied Abu Hamed, and subsequently Berber. A long delay then ensued, mainly occasioned by difficulties of transport. The force, which had thus been pushed forward, depended wholly for its supplies on a single line of railway running from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed, a distance of some two hundred and twenty miles. It was quite impossible adequately to guard this long line of communication. It required no very consummate knowledge of strategy to see that if the Dervish leaders at Khartum had at that time sent a flying column across the Bayuda Desert, as they might easily have done, and this column had crossed the Nile somewhere not far west of Abu Hamed and had made a raid, or a succession of raids, with a view to destroying the railway, they would, to say the least, have caused very serious embarrassment to Lord Kitchener. The advisability of this manœuvre was, indeed, so manifest that, if there had been any European military adventurer present at Khartum of the type of those who occasionally appeared upon the scene during the early days of the British conquest of India, he could scarcely have failed to insist on its adoption. Any future historian, applying the method which Dr. Delbrück adopts to explain the failure of Xerxes to occupy Megara, might therefore well be tempted to infer that the reason why the Dervish leaders did not grasp the brilliant opportunity thus

afforded to them must have been that they were too weak to do so. Any such conclusion would, however, certainly be wrong. The Mahdi disposed of a very large and also very mobile force. It cannot be doubted that the reasons for his inaction were not consciousness of his own weakness, but rather overweening confidence in his ability to resist the attack which he awaited at Khartum, coupled with sheer want of intelligence to realise the nature of the temporary advantage given to him by the relative position of the opposing armies. It may be that Dr. Delbrück's explanation of the conduct of Xerxes is correct, but to say that there "can be no other ground" than Persian numerical weakness as compared with Greek strength to explain that conduct would certainly appear to be going farther than the available evidence warrants. It is not merely possible, but highly probable, that there may have been other grounds for Persian inaction of which, after so long a lapse of time, we are unable to take sufficient account.

We tread on firmer ground in looking for other elements, such as superior discipline and generalship, which may often compensate for disparity of numbers, to account for many of the military achievements of the past. Wherein, Dr. Delbrück asks, lay the pre-eminence of Roman arms? "It was," he replies, "in Roman discipline." The enforcement of rigid discipline turned the citizen army of Rome into a force composed of professional soldiers, who, by reason of this transformation, eventually triumphed over Hannibal. Again, Miltiades would not have secured victory at Marathon had it not been that the unruly soldiers of the Athenian army, in which "every man believed himself to be as clever as the general," were for the time

induced to obey the commands of a man of military genius, whose tactics were skilfully adapted to meet the special requirements of the situation. The decay of Roman discipline contributed in no small degree to the downfall of the Roman Empire. This decay was due, Dr. Delbrück thinks, to the facts that belief in the ancient religion of Rome was undermined, that the constant dissensions which arose in connection with the Imperial succession acted as "poison to the State," and that the great economic revolution consequent on the exhaustion of the mines obliged the State to pay their soldiers first in kind and later by grants of land, with the result that "the soldier became a peasant and the disciplined legion ceased to exist."

Skilful generalship has been no less fertile of results than superior discipline. In no respect does the pre-eminence of a commander of genius show itself more brilliantly than when he sees where he can safely violate recognised tactical canons. Clausewitz, in a passage familiar to all who have made a theoretical study of tactics, laid down the rule that the general commanding the weaker of two opposing forces ought not to turn both flanks of the enemy at once, as by doing so he would incur a great risk that his own centre would be broken. The principle is so obviously sound that it must have occurred to all ancient as well as modern commanders, more especially during the period when battles were fought by troops in close formations. Hannibal, however, dared to violate it at Cannae. Though greatly inferior to the Romans in infantry, he was superior to them in cavalry. In these circumstances, he did not hesitate to weaken his centre and to envelop both flanks of the Roman

army, not only with his cavalry, but also with the flower of his light-armed infantry. "All the hope of the Romans had been to press down the enemy with the enormous weight of their solid mass." Hannibal's bold and skilful manœuvre arrested the attack of this huge column, which, Dr. Delbrück thinks, may have been seventy-five deep, and from the moment the onward movement against his centre was checked the battle was virtually won. The slingers, archers, and cavalry on the flanks completed the rout.

Dr. Grundy in his *History of the Great Persian War* says :

The military history of the East and West in the centuries preceding the Christian era is ruled by one great limitation. East could not gain any decisive advantage over West in the West, nor West in the East over East unless the enemy made a fundamental error in tactics. . . . This generalisation may appear to be somewhat wide, but the results of every single battle in which East and West came into conflict support it. There are no exceptions.

The reason why this bold generalisation holds good is that in ancient quite as much as in modern times tactics depended mainly on armament. It was this which made Napoleon declare that tactics should be changed every ten years. Cases have indeed occurred where defeat has been mainly due to the faulty disposition of troops on the field of battle and to nothing else. Instances in point are the defective tactical arrangements of the Carthaginians at the battle on the Metaurus, and the quick appreciation of topographical advantage displayed by Marlborough at Ramillies and by Frederick at Leuthen. But changes such as that of the introduction of the iron ramrod, the breech-loader, and the magazine-rifle have at various times more or less revolutionised

tactics. The main difference between the Eastern and the Western warrior in ancient times was that the former was superior in skill as a horse and the latter as a foot soldier, and that the Eastern, chiefly, Dr. Grundy thinks, by reason of the hot climate in which he lived, never wore defensive armour, but trusted, to a far greater degree than the Western, to the action of slingers, archers, and cavalry. The strength of the Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, lay mainly in their heavy-armed infantry. Greek literature, from Homer downwards, abounds in disparaging remarks about the warrior who flings his dart or missile from afar and refuses to come to close quarters with his adversary. Diomedes, amongst other opprobrious epithets applied to Paris, reproaches him for being an archer. Gibbon (v. 85) mentions the abandonment of heavy armour by the Roman troops in the time of Gratian as one of the causes which led to the downfall of the Empire. It follows, therefore, as a natural consequence, that when the East and the West were brought into collision, victory almost invariably remained with that side which, for topographical or other reasons, was best able to draw advantage from the special aptitudes in which it excelled. At Carrhae, for instance, the situation favoured Eastern, and at Himera in Sicily, Western tactics. In both cases the result was equally decisive.



## XXXV

### ELOQUENCE AS A FINE ART<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," January 3, 1914*

LORD CURZON, in dealing with an art in which he himself excels, defines eloquence as "a vehicle of persuasion." Such being the case, it follows as a natural consequence that the manner in which this vehicle may be employed must vary infinitely according to the occasion which evokes its use. The speaker, in conformity with a very sound rule laid down by Aristotle, has to consider, not so much the train of thought which has led him to certain conclusions, as the arguments most calculated to convince his audience that those conclusions are correct. This distinction has at times been unduly neglected both by speakers and by politicians and administrators who have had to use public speech in order to explain their actions or motives. Thus, when Lord Wolseley was engaged in fighting the Mahdi, he prepared a proclamation which he intended to issue to the inhabitants of the Sudan. His views were expressed in a few terse and pregnant sentences which, it was thought, were eminently calculated to impress the Sudanese population. The proclamation was translated

<sup>1</sup> *Modern Parliamentary Eloquence.* By Earl Curzon of Kedleston. London: Macmillan and Co. [2s. 6d. net.]

into Arabic and submitted to a competent and very friendly Moslem. His opinion was that Lord Wolseley had not made sufficient allowance for the difference between his own mentality and that of his audience, and that, albeit the Arabic translation was grammatically faultless, not a single inhabitant of the Sudan would have the least idea what the proclamation meant. Accordingly, he drafted an alternative document. It conveyed substantially the same ideas as those which Lord Wolseley wished to promulgate, but in the language of Isaiah rather than in that of a British Commander-in-Chief. In this case, the pitch had to be raised in order to harmonise with the national temperament of the audience. Occasions may arise when it has to be lowered. For instance, when the Anglo-French forces at Varna were about to proceed to the Crimea, Marshal St. Arnaud issued to his troops a general order conceived in the most approved "forty-centuries-looking-down-upon-you" style. "Soldats!" it began, "l'heure est venue de combattre et de vaincre." Simultaneously, Lord Raglan issued a general order requesting "Commissary-General Filder to take steps to insure that the troops should all be provided with a ration of porter for the next few days." The Napoleonic oration and the promise of porter proved alike effective. The English and French troops stormed the heights of the Alma with equal gallantry.

A book was published in 1818 entitled *Eloquence Militaire*. In this work no mention is made of Nelson's Trafalgar signal, which is one of the most striking instances recorded in history of appropriate eloquence, but a general order, said to have been issued by an English general at Cadiz in 1702, is cited. "Anglais,"

the translation runs, "qui mangez de bon bœuf et de la bonne soupe, souvenez-vous que ce serait le comble de l'infamie que de vous laisser battre par cette canaille d'Espagnols qui ne vivent que d'oranges et de citrons." The author adds: "Nous ne ferons point de réflexions sur l'éloquence qui mesure l'honneur et la gloire par la différence du *beafsteack* [*sic*] et du citron." These illustrations are sufficient to show that, in dealing with a question opening up such wide possibilities as the use and abuse of eloquence, the transition from the sublime to the ridiculous may at times be very rapid.

Lord Curzon also lays down the principle that, although eloquence "ought always to spring from thought, it has no necessary connexion with truth." The validity of the proposition may be accepted in this sense, that supreme eloquence may be, and often has been, used to make the worse appear the better cause. It is, moreover, especially valid under the system of party government, for that system, as Sir John Seeley has pointed out, develops amongst political partisans a remarkable degree of skill in "quarrelling by rule." These rules are so far recognised by those whom party leaders address as to enable them to allow a very liberal discount in the acceptance of partisan statements. But it is none the less true that mere dialectical skill and the employment of appropriate language cannot of themselves veil the fallacies of special pleading. Pindar's advice that we should forge our words on the anvil of truth still holds good. Lord Curzon alludes to Mr. Gladstone's famous Bradlaugh speech, in which he thundered forth a splendid quotation from Lucretius, as one that "touched the highest point of exalted sentiment and intellectual reasoning." The tribute is unquestionably well deserved.

Yet it may safely be conjectured that what impressed the minds, if not of Mr. Gladstone's hearers, at all events of his readers, most was not so much the oratorical display as the pathetic irony of a situation which obliged a Minister of deep religious convictions to afford strong support to what, on a somewhat superficial view, seemed the cause of irreligion. Lady Russell entered at the time in her Journal that "it was the triumph of all that is worst in the name of all that is best."

In judging of the effect produced by eloquence, every one is almost inevitably prone to generalise from the effect produced on himself by such eloquent speeches as he may have heard. The writer of the present article has heard Mr. Gladstone, not only at his best, but also at his worst—that is to say, when he was dealing with foreign affairs—and as he listened he could not help reflecting that mere verbiage, albeit dignified by the name of eloquence, is a very poor substitute for statesmanship. He has heard two of the most eloquent non-English orators of modern times—Keshub Chunder Sen and Père Didon—and on each occasion he came away after listening to their discourses with the impression that there was little worth remembering under the flowery periods and graceful diction of either orator. He has also heard John Bright, and he has felt that the earnestness and strength of conviction which lay behind his simple but deeply impressive oratory enforced attention to his arguments, even on the part of those who were little inclined to agree with him. Truth, therefore, though not necessarily connected, is intimately associated with eloquence, and especially with the most effective forms of eloquence.

No one is more qualified than Lord Curzon

to explain to his fellow-countrymen why it is that the grand style, which Chatham, Burke, Canning, and others inherited from their remote ancestors, the Attic Rhetoricians and Roman Orators, has at last decayed. It can scarcely be said to have been killed by democracy, for the Athenian example shows that the highest oratory and an extreme form of democratic government may co-exist. Nevertheless, the tendency of modern democracy certainly is to raise the general standard of attainments in all directions, but to discourage examples of conspicuous merit. Madame Roland said that what struck her most when democracy killed privilege in France was the astounding mediocrity of those who achieved political prominence. "*Elle passe,*" she said, "*tout ce que l'imagination peut se présenter et cela dans tous les degrés.*" Of all the special causes enumerated by Lord Curzon as fatal to the survival of the grand style the modern practice of reporting speeches is perhaps the most important. So competent a judge as Lord Rosebery has declared that "eloquence and stenography are not of congenial growth." Undue attention to the niceties of style and irrelevance were the besetting sins of the Roman and, although to a less extent, of the later Greek orators. "The broadest characteristic of modern oratory," Professor Jebb says, "as compared to ancient, is the predominance of a sustained appeal to the understanding." On the whole, the world has perhaps been a gainer by the change. We may, with scarcely a pang of regret, dispense with modern Quintilians. Their absence leaves us more free to centre our thoughts on the gist of the speaker's argument, to the exclusion of the appropriateness of the language in which it is couched. Possibly, however, the change has

been accompanied by some disadvantages. Mr. Bodley has told us that "foreign observers are struck with the fact that in the English Parliament, to which they all look, the decay of eloquence has been coincident with the gradual breakdown of the Parliamentary machine. . . . A high standard of style is a check on rash verbosity; and the obligation to express thought in well-fashioned speech deters from the slipshod facility of unstudied chatter." But the Parliamentary machine has not yet quite broken down, although it is perhaps more rickety than of yore. It is consolatory to know on the high authority of Lord Curzon that we need not "mourn over the bier of old-world eloquence," but that rather we may, with healthy optimism, look forward to the revival of an improved and sublimated art. He does well, however, to remind us that the eloquence of contemporary demagogues "requires to be purified of much dross before it can be certified as fine gold."

Few probably of those who have to listen to many speeches in the course of the year have not reflected that many of them need not have been delivered at all, and that of the residue a large proportion might advantageously have been reduced to at least one-half of their actual length. On this subject Lord Curzon gives us ground for hope. He says that "the present length is modesty itself compared with the performances of our ancestors." But there is still abundant room for improvement. Modern speakers should be merciful to their audiences. They should remember the tale recounted by Herodotus (iii. 46) how when the Samians, who had been exiled by Polycrates, applied for aid to Sparta, they were told that their speech was so long that the first half was forgotten before the second

half had been brought to a conclusion. Patience under these inflictions was, however, regarded by so acute an observer of English character as M. Taine as one of the proofs that Anglo-Saxons are eminently qualified for self-government. Although it is melancholy to reflect that political liberty can only be acquired at the cost of suffering bores gladly, there may perhaps be some force in M. Taine's argument.

Not the least valuable part of Lord Curzon's lecture consists of appreciations of contemporary speakers. He sums up their special characteristics in a few singularly felicitous phrases. Amongst English speakers, he very rightly gives the palm to Mr. Gladstone. He commends the intellectual power of the late Duke of Argyll and the satire of Sir William Harcourt. His sketches of Lord Salisbury and the Duke of Devonshire are altogether admirable. The former was "a philosopher meditating aloud." The latter was "unready in speech," but "by his robust and steadfast common sense and incorruptible honesty" eventually became "one of the most powerful and persuasive speakers in either House of Parliament." Lord Randolph Churchill is described as, tomahawk in hand, "sweeping off the scalps of friends and foes with gleeful ferocity." The "imperturbable self-possession" of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the merits of the "inspired prose" delivered by Lord Morley—"the last exponent of the classical literary style"—are fully recognised. As to Lord Rosebery, it is said that "there is hardly a gift predicable of the orator with which nature or study has not endowed him." Mr. Balfour, who cares more for substance than for form, is unsurpassed as a Parliamentary dialectician, and "runs the risk of becoming eloquent in spite of himself."

Mr. Asquith's utterances are remarkable for their lucidity and succinctness. Mr. Bonar Law can speak for an hour without a single note. Mr. Winston Churchill has a special talent for "adapting himself to the needs of the moment." Mr. Parnell "gave an impression of almost daemonic self-control and illimitable strength." Mr. Redmond is a "master of Parliamentary plausibility," and Mr. Timothy Healy possesses an "unsurpassed gift of corrosive humour and almost diabolical irony." As to the late Lord Peel, "thunder clothed his brow," and he was the "quintessence of dignified grandeur."

The best compliment which can be paid to Lord Curzon is to say that, in spite of the plea for condensation set forth by the writer of the present article, he, in common without doubt with many of Lord Curzon's readers, would have wished that his illuminating address delivered at Cambridge last November had been longer.



## XXXVI

### POLITICS AND HISTORY <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," January 10, 1914*

ANYTHING which Lord Morley writes is sure to open out a wide field for reflection and discussion. The reader, and still more the reviewer, is tempted at every page to digress and to deal with some one or more of the numerous subjects of interest mentioned incidentally in his illuminating address recently delivered to the students of the Manchester University. How far, for instance, did Rousseau contribute to the advance of that ill-defined onward movement which Westerns are accustomed to call Progress, and which vast numbers of thoughtful Easterns identify with Retrogression? Burke denounced him. Napoleon, as was natural in one who was the incarnation of everything most opposed to idealism, said to Roederer, "C'est un fou, votre Rousseau. C'est lui qui nous a menés où nous sommes." His most recent biographer, M. Faguet, states that he was principally distinguished for a total absence of moral sense, and adds, "J'entends par manque de sens moral l'absence de toute règle de conduite, *et du besoin d'en avoir une.*" Maine, on the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> *Notes on Politics and History : a University Address.* By Viscount Morley, O.M. London : Macmillan and Co. [2s. 6d. net.]

albeit little disposed to look to abstract ideas as a safe guide in government, held that Rousseau's vivid imagination and genuine love for his fellow-creatures condoned all his sins. He may, in fact, be treated as a demoniac mischief-maker or as a supreme benefactor of the human race. It all depends upon the angle from which his career and influence are regarded. Or, again, has M. Aulard really cast Taine down from his historical pedestal? May Sainte-Beuve's well-known criticism on the work of Guizot be applied in his case, or are we, with Lady Blennerhassett, to think that, as an historian, Taine still holds the field, and that the history of Napoleonic times cannot be thoroughly understood without a profound analysis of that Napoleonic psychology which during an eventful period of history constituted the mainspring of European politics? These temptations must be resisted. It is not possible, within the limits of an ordinary article, to deal with more than a very few features in the vast field over which Lord Morley ranges.

The driving power of most of the political movements of modern times has, as Lord Morley points out, been mainly furnished by the desire to acquire national autonomy. There is, in reality, nothing very new in this movement. Nascent aspirations towards the creation of nationalities were, indeed, crushed out by the heavy hand of Rome. The Caesars in their efforts to grasp at world-power encountered nowhere any very serious resistance save from the stubborn Jew and, although to a less degree, from the Egyptian. But these aspirations were resuscitated when the dominion of ancient Rome crumbled to the ground. They constituted, together with the long-drawn contest between the Vatican and the temporal power, one of the

main causes which led to the eventual downfall of the Holy Roman Empire. The principle of nationality has been prolific of by-products. It has not brought peace, but a sword. Its genealogy may be traced through the blood-stained centuries. It gave birth to a high-strung and exclusive patriotism, to the necessity of armaments for self-defence which were often turned to purposes of aggression, to heavy taxation in order to support those armaments, and to jealousy in commercial relations. It was exploited by Napoleon. It was used for more noble purposes by others, such as Washington, Cavour, and Bismarck. Moralists may ponder over whether the propagation of the national idea has or has not added to the sum total of human happiness; whether the heroism, self-sacrifice, and nobility of character which patriotism has at times evoked constitute a sufficient compensation for the hecatombs of lives which have been offered up on the national altar; whether, for instance, it was worth while to sacrifice the lives of one hundred and twenty-eight thousand Germans to achieve, and of one hundred and thirty-nine thousand Frenchmen to resist, the consolidation of Germany. The practical politician, on the other hand, has to accept the facts as they stand. He has to acknowledge, however reluctantly, that, as Lord Morley puts it, "the recruiting sergeant now holds the international scales." Accordingly he builds "Dreadnoughts," and sees to it that the country with whose destinies he is associated has an adequate supply of Maxims.

Concurrently with this *Weltanschauung*, to use the expressive German phrase which Lord Morley has adopted, the idea of man's duty towards his neighbour has been lagging along—

like Prayer, in the fine metaphor of Homer, limping painfully behind Sin—and endeavouring to temper the asperities of the spirit of domination. It is not an entirely new conception. “We find glimpses of it here and there among Greeks and Romans.” It was not by a mere mythological freak that *ἱκετήσιος* and *ξείνιος*—protector of the suppliant and the guest—were included among the cult-titles of the Greek Zeus. Their adoption connoted that a special sanctity attached itself to strangers, suppliants, and old people. Neither, as we are sometimes rather too prone to believe, was it an entirely Christian conception. The all-pervading charity of the non-Christian East has found abundant expression in literature, as, for instance, in the beautiful apologue in which Abu Ben Adhem justified his claim to be recorded amongst those who “loved the Lord” on the ground that “he loved his fellow-men.” It is difficult to generalise about the public opinion of the ancient world. It has been well said that Greece was “a nation of opinions without a public opinion.” But so far as can be judged from the utterances of the most advanced thinkers, the conception of men’s duty to their neighbours was at best never extended beyond the individual compatriot or social equal. Some faint protests were, indeed, muttered by Job, Plato, Seneca, and others against the institution of slavery, but the idea that any regard should be had to a moral code in the dealings between countries and communities was never in the smallest degree entertained. In this respect the philosophy of Aristotle was very much akin to that of the immortal Pickwick, who advised Mr. Snodgrass, when there were two crowds, to shout with the larger. Aristotle laid it down as a principle for

universal guidance that States should keep peace with the strong and make war on the weak, and he observed that the Athenians never felt the smallest qualms of conscience as regards enslaving a neighbouring and perhaps unoffending community. Nobility consisted in being avenged on one's enemies, "for requital is just and the just is noble."

It is only in far more recent times that the counter-principle that political action should in some degree be brought under the control of moral duty began to be enunciated. Under the influence of philosophers such as Comte, philosophic statesmen such as Burke, and practical politicians such as John Bright, that idea was slowly and laboriously making some headway, and was receiving recognition from the most elevated contemporary thought. Then, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a set-back was experienced. Germany finally cast off the mantle of Romanticism and became Realistic. There was a reversion to the principles of Aristotle and of Machiavelli. Bismarck, who, as M. Laveleye has pointed out, was largely inspired by the Socialist Lassalle—a fanatic for German unity and an ardent apostle of the principle that might is right—dominated Europe, and the historian Treitschke propounded the mischievous theory that, as Germany had settled accounts with Austria and France, it was both natural and logical that she should be brought into collision with England. This last settlement, he thought, would be "the lengthiest and most difficult" of all, but was none the less absolutely necessary.

If for no other than historical reasons, Lord Morley has done well to draw attention to the immense development which of late years has

taken place in the application of the maxim that "the State is Force." It is probable that few of those who are under sixty years of age can fully realise the profound change which in this connection has passed over European thought during the last forty years. The most important world-events during the latter half of the nineteenth century were the consolidation, first of Italy, then of Germany. The story of Italian liberation must ever be one of undying interest. Lord Palmerston said that it was "the most extraordinary and romantic recorded in the annals of the world." Lord Morley thinks that the achievement of Italian unity is the most important fact in European history since the Peace of Westphalia. The consummate mixture of reckless audacity and opportunist pliability displayed by Cavour must for ever remain a prominent object-lesson in statesmanship. But Cavour merely altered European geography and brought a new factor into European politics. He did not change European thought. He believed in ideas. Bismarck, at all events until, as the result of the *Kulturkampf*, he had to go to Canossa, only believed in cannon. It is probable that his acts, coupled with a few pithy but by no means irrefutable apophthegms, have done more to mould the thoughts of the present generation than all the philosophy and advice which have emanated from the Council chamber, the pulpit, or the study. Those whose memories can go back so far as 1870 can call to mind the high hopes which were then excited. Carlyle thought that the triumph of Germany over France was "the most beneficent thing that had happened in the universe since he had been in it," and he went on to explain "how Sathanas went forth breathing boasting and blasphemy and

hell-fire, and St. Michael, with a few strokes of his glittering sword, brayed the monster in the chest"—all of which shows, in John Bright's time-honoured phrase, that great thinkers can sometimes think very wrong. That earnest Liberal, Sir Robert Morier, wrote to his friend Stockmar: "What untold heights of civilization may not the world attain with a German Empire preponderant over the destinies of Europe—if only there is as much wisdom in the upper stories of the building as there has been valour and self-sacrifice in the lower." These fair hopes were doomed to disappointment. The peace concluded with France was not a German but a "Bismarckian" peace, and Lord Dalling, surveying the whole scene with the eye of a trained diplomatist, was able to record that the principal change effected was that in future "Europe would have a master instead of a mistress."

Since then, Bismarckism has, to some extent, been further developed. A school of German thought has arisen that defends war, not only by reason of its necessity in order to attain certain national objects, but also by reason of its desirability, even when unnecessary, in order to strengthen the national character. Thucydides indulged in some rather similar sophisms, but even the Greeks, generally speaking, did not go so far as some German militarists. They cursed Ares and dubbed him "the god of toil and trouble." But there is a brighter side to this gloomy tale. Great Britain stands forth as the champion of fair dealing amongst nations, and recent experience has shown that that championship has not been in vain. Let it, however, be borne in mind that a champion must be doughty. If we wish our voice to be heard in the councils of armed Europe, we also must be armed.

Limitations of space preclude the possibility of dealing with the application of the principle that "the State is Force" in the domain of the internal legislation of nations. It may, however, be said that it is year by year becoming clearer that there is no sort of necessary connexion between democracy and individual liberty, and that with the decay of political economy there will be a strong tendency to undermine national self-reliance. Lord Morley cautiously remarks that "whether Socialism can be the assured key to progress is still a secret," but he makes a further observation which may be welcomed as an indication that he doubts whether, at all events in any extreme form, it is a key which will unlock the door. Progress, he says, "depends on the room left by the State for the enterprise, energy, and initiative of the individual." That is unquestionably the great problem of the future. Posterity will be able to decide how far State Socialism, which has come amongst us to stay, can be reconciled to co-existence with all that is best in Individualism.

Lord Morley was naturally precluded from speaking to the students of the Manchester University about that dread rock which looms large in the track of democratic progress—to wit, unsound finance. It would be interesting to learn what he has to say on the subject.



## XXXVII

### FRANCIS RAKOCZI <sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," March 21, 1914*

It is probably no libel on the historical knowledge possessed by most Englishmen to say that their acquaintance with past Hungarian history is at best very vague. They generally know that at one time Hungary constituted the bulwark of Europe against the advance of the Ottoman Turks; that Soliman II. inflicted a crushing defeat on the Hungarian army at the battle of Mohacz in 1526; that eventually the hosts of Kara Mustapha swept past the Hungarian rampart and encamped under the walls of Vienna, and that the timely arrival of John Sobieski saved European civilisation and altered the course of history. They have heard the story, which, whether true or mythical, is certainly pathetic, of how, during her life-and-death struggle with Frederick the Great, Maria Theresa appeared before the Diet at Pressburg with her child in her arms, and how when she said, "Ab omnibus derelicti ad Hungarorum priscam virtutem confugimus," Hungarian chivalry was roused and answered with the shout that the Hungarians would be true unto death. They know that

<sup>1</sup> *Hungary's Fight for National Existence.* By Ladislas Baron Hengelmüller. London: Macmillan and Co. [10s. 6d. net.]

Hungary was for long a constant thorn in the side of Austria; that Marshal Haynau's drastic methods for maintaining order were resented by the draymen in a London brewery; that the Russian General Paskevich was able to write to the Tsar Nicholas in 1849, "Hungary lies at the feet of your Imperial Majesty"; that Kossuth received some encouragement from that staunch Conservative in domestic and revolutionist in foreign affairs, Lord Palmerston, and was entertained in London by the Lord Mayor; and that as a consequence of the war of 1866 it became incumbent on Austria to make terms with the Hungarians and to agree to the arrangements known as the *Ausgleich* or Compromise. Further, all lovers of music know that the Hungarian patriot, Rakoczi, gave his name to a stirring march which to this day charms the ear and quickens the pulse of his countrymen.

The publication of Baron Hengelmüller's work on the Hungarian rising of 1703-1711, which is really a biography of Francis Rakoczi II., affords a good opportunity for adding to this somewhat slender stock of knowledge. Lord Bryce and Mr. Roosevelt are very fully justified in recommending this book to the special attention of English and American readers, for the story is one of special interest to the English-speaking race. The Hungarians fought for constitutional liberty and freedom of religion. Rakoczi was a Hungarian Cromwell, Leopold II. an Austrian Stuart. Moreover, English and Dutch diplomacy took an active part in endeavouring to reconcile the Austrian Emperor with his rebellious subjects. The House of Commons addressed Queen Anne on the subject. The negotiations were mainly conducted by George Stepney, that very minor poet, who described James II. as a "stronger Hercules,"

and whose verses were not quite sufficiently bad to justify his exclusion either from a final resting-place in Westminster Abbey or from Dr. Johnson's roll of poetical fame.

The fundamental fact, which was the pivot on which Hungarian history turned towards the close of the seventeenth and the commencement of the eighteenth centuries, was that Hungary, from her geographical position, lay between the German hammer and the Turkish anvil. In Hungary so intense was the hatred of the Germans that a disposition was frequently manifested to look to the Turks for protection. In Austria so vivid an idea was entertained of the danger which would result from a free Hungary that it was at times even doubted whether, in Austrian interests, a Turkish conquest of the country was not to be preferred to Hungarian independence. It would be unjust to pass a twentieth-century verdict on the seventeenth-century methods by which the Austrian Government sought to enforce Hungarian allegiance. They must be judged according to the standard of the times. The spectre of Irish misrule rises up to stay the hand of any Englishman who would cast a first stone at Austria. But even judged by that deplorably low standard, it must be admitted that Austrian methods were extremely bad. Historians have often remarked on the harm done, more especially in the latter part of the eighteenth century, by semi-lunatic sovereigns. The Emperor Paul of Russia, King Christian of Denmark, Queen Marie of Portugal, Gustavus IV. of Sweden, Charles IV. of Spain and his brother, Ferdinand of Naples, are cases in point. Rudolf II. of Austria (1552-1612), though in some respects a man of culture and ability, was tainted with insanity. He did everything, Baron

Hengelmüller says, "to drive Hungary and Transylvania to despair." After his death somewhat wiser counsels prevailed. In 1647 religious liberty was accorded. Nevertheless, the long reign of Leopold I. (1640-1705) is marked by a series of revolts, the result of unwise and oppressive government. Power fell into the hands of Prince Lobkowitz, who appears to have been an Austrian Richelieu without the genius of the French statesman, and of Baron Hoher, a man of humble birth and a typical representative of the class of which Continental bureaucracy has been so prolific. Baron Hengelmüller describes him as "a stupendous worker, incorruptible, inaccessible, faithful and discreet, but rough, slow, and dull." Such a man was sure to be "the staunchest enemy of Hungary's constitution and historical rights." These were followed by Cardinal Kollonicz, a very remarkable man, who, more than any other contemporary statesman, left the stamp of his individuality on Austria-Hungarian history. He was a reforming Churchman. He abounded in "zeal, charity, courage, and self-sacrifice." He befriended the widow and the orphan. He saved witches from the stake. He wished to destroy privilege, and to make the landowning nobles pay their share of taxes hitherto paid only by the peasants. His ideal was "to make Hungary an orderly, docile, and well-governed province of an Austrian Empire, and to bring it back to the Catholic faith." All history is there to prove that the fine qualities and misplaced zeal of a man of this sort are quite as capable of creating a revolution as the deliberate oppression of tyrannical rulers. The rise of Francis Rakoczi II., Prince of Transylvania, wrecked Kollonicz's plan.

Rakoczi was born in 1676. His mother was

the heroic Helena Zrinyi, who on the death of her first husband, Francis Rakoczi I., married Prince Imre Tököli, that illustrious rebel who carried hatred to the Germans so far as to afford material assistance to Kara Mustapha on his march to Vienna. In his childhood Rakoczi was separated from his mother and sent by Cardinal Kollonicz to a Jesuit College in Vienna, in the hope that the influences to which he would there be subject would eradicate all patriotic proclivities. The Romans tried the same process in the case of Demetrius the Saviour, and failed; neither have latter-day attempts made in a similar direction by the British Government been much more successful. At sixteen years of age he was allowed by the Emperor to choose whether he would remain in Vienna or return to Hungary. Kollonicz, of course, wished him to remain "for the continuation of his studies." His sister, however, who, although educated in an Ursuline convent, had married against the Cardinal's will, and had thus put that eminent prelate "in a towering rage," pointed out to him that "metaphysics and Austrian law would be of small use to him in his future life." Convinced by these arguments, Rakoczi returned to Hungary. He at first showed little disposition to adopt an anti-German attitude, but after the lapse of a few years his future career was determined by the friendship he contracted for Count Nicholas Bercsenyi, a man of great power and ability who was the life and soul of the insurrection which subsequently ensued. Bercsenyi convinced Rakoczi that the Hungarians were ripe for rebellion, and only waited for a leader with an historic name, such as his, to place himself at their head. Accordingly Rakoczi wrote a letter to Louis XIV. divulging his plan. It was con-

fided to a Belgian officer in the Imperial service named Longueval, who treacherously handed it over to the Austrian authorities. Rakoczi was arrested and imprisoned, but escaped to Poland. In the meanwhile the Hungarian peasants had risen. Rakoczi felt himself bound in honour to stand by them. He therefore crossed the border and placed himself at the head of a few hundred half-naked marauders armed with sticks and scythes. Prompt action on the part of the Austrian authorities would probably have at once quelled the movement. But a century later Rivarol said that Austria had always been "en arrière d'une année, d'une armée et d'une idée." So it proved on the present occasion. Rakoczi was joined by the Hungarian magnates. His disorderly rabble soon grew into a formidable army. War was then carried on with very varying vicissitudes. At one time the Hungarian Count Karolyi alarmed the burghers of Vienna by bringing his raiders to within a few miles of their walls. At another time the Austrian Baron Heister carried fire and sword over the fair plains of Hungary. Attempts were from time to time made to come to terms, but from the fact that when representatives of either side met exaggerated importance was attached to trumpery questions of etiquette and precedence, and that one of the Austrian Commissioners found time to complain of the bad Latin of his Hungarian associates, it may be conjectured that neither side was very earnestly desirous of peace. Eventually a conference took place in the summer of 1706, which at one time looked as if it would be productive of good results. The negotiation, however, failed, ostensibly because the Emperor absolutely repudiated the claim of Rakoczi to be independent

Prince of Transylvania. But the real reason must be sought elsewhere. Hungary had by this time become the battlefield of European diplomacy. It was manifestly in the interests of England and Holland that Austria should make peace with the Hungarians in order to be able to employ all her forces against Louis XIV. Moreover, the English envoy, Stepney, was a warm sympathiser with Hungary. He fully realised the necessity of peace both in English and Continental interests. Stepney appears to have anticipated Carteret a little later in the eighteenth century and Morier in the nineteenth century, for it was said of him that "no Englishman ever understood the affairs of Germany so well, and few Germans better." It was equally in the interests of the French to keep the Hungarian sore open. Louis XIV.'s policy was, in fact, very crafty. He helped Rakoczi with money and encouraged him with fair words, but he was careful not to commit himself too far. He persistently refused to guarantee the independence of Transylvania. His political action is described as "blowing the horn in order to excite the pack," and nothing more. At one time Rakoczi appears to have wavered. The despatches of Des Alleurs, the French representative in Hungary, were "full of complaints and fears about the desire of Rakoczi's generals and troops to come to peace." The cause of peace was also favoured by Bercsenyi. But eventually trust in French help prevailed. Finally Count Wratislaw, on taking leave of Rakoczi, said: "Well, my Prince, you are putting your faith in France, which is the hospital of Princes who have come to grief through her broken pledges and promises. You will increase their number and die there."

Baron Hengelmüller's story breaks off with the failure of the 1706 negotiations. Subsequently (1708) Rakoczi's force was routed at Trensen. In 1711 he quitted Hungary, never to return. He died at Rodosto, in Turkey, in 1735. In 1907 the Emperor of Austria wisely and generously allowed his remains to be transferred, at the expense of the State, to his native country. It is greatly to be hoped that Baron Hengelmüller will carry out his design of completing this interesting and little-known page of history up to the Peace of Szatmar in 1711.



## XXXVIII

### THE MORMONS<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," April 11, 1914*

It is somewhat difficult for those who, in the language of the Latter-Day Saints, are called "Gentiles" to treat Mormonism seriously. To them the founder of the Mormon creed appears to be either an impostor or a lunatic, and the creed itself a farrago of nonsense devised to cloak immorality. Messrs. Bland and Backhouse, however, in their recent interesting work on the Court of Peking, have warned us that, if we wish to understand the Chinese, it is above all things necessary to detach ourselves from all Western modes of thought and standards of action. Notably, they urge that it is impossible for any one who regards polygamy as a form of "immorality" to study Chinese history with intelligent sympathy. The same remark holds good about Mormonism, but with this qualification, that the more the intelligence is enlightened by a knowledge of the facts, the more is anything approaching to sympathy dispelled. The facts, however, are from several points of view worthy of study. They show how impossible it is to fathom the

<sup>1</sup> *Brigham Young and his Mormon Empire*. By Frank J. Cannon and George L. Knapp. London: Fleming H. Revell Company. [6s. net.]

depths of human credulity. They constitute a singular instance of the impotence of a highly civilised society to deal effectively with the growth of a movement which cuts at the root of some of the most fundamental principles on which its own civilisation rests. It is certainly a strange by-product of modern progress that a half-crazy impostor, followed by a resolute, self-seeking adventurer, should have been able to brave the public opinion, the Legislature, and even at one time the armed forces, of a highly civilised and powerful community such as that existing in the United States of America; that they should have succeeded in establishing a form of government tainted with the worst features of a cruel and despotic theocracy in the heart of a Republic; that the principles of the Mormons, which outrage every canon of decency and of morality, both public and private, although abrogated in appearance, should still be maintained in fact; and that no fewer than some four hundred thousand individuals should now be adherents of the Mormon faith. In spite, therefore, of the abundant literature which already exists on Mormonism, the book written by Messrs. Cannon and Knapp may be read with interest and instruction. The title which they have chosen—*Brigham Young and his Mormon Empire*—at once arrests attention, inasmuch as it brings prominently into view the striking political anomaly involved in the existence, not of an *Imperium in Imperio*, but of an *Imperium in Republica*.

Most people who have given any attention to this subject know that in the year 1830 an inhabitant of the State of New York, named Joseph Smith, who was wholly illiterate and subject to epileptic fits, published the *Book of Mormon*, which he alleged to be a translation

of an ancient scripture, revealed to him by an angel, and written in a lost language on golden plates. The origin of this imposture was indicated in 1843 by Mr. Henry Caswall, Professor of Divinity at Kemper College, Missouri. Professor Caswall stated that a certain Solomon Spaulding, who was born in Connecticut in 1761, wrote an historical romance entitled *The Manuscript Found*, based on the idea, with which he was possessed, that the aborigines of America were descended from some of the tribes of Israel. He died in 1816. His manuscript passed into the hands of his widow, who remarried. How the authors of the *Book of Mormon* became subsequently possessed of it is not quite clear. It is certain, however, that all the historical portions of Joseph Smith's work, which purported to be a revelation, are merely a transcript from Spaulding's original romance.

Smith's first and most important revelation was quickly followed by others. For instance, one revelation told him that he need not be in any hurry to pay his bills; another directed his followers to lend him money, and prescribed when and where he was to pay it back; a third ordered a convert to sell a tannery and hand the proceeds of the sale over to the Mormon Church. It may be well asked how it came about that a religion based on such manifest self-interest and imposture took root and was accepted by thousands of more or less educated people. The explanation is supplied by the special social conditions existing amongst the community to whom Smith preached. Professor Caswall quotes a remarkable forecast made by the poet Southey a year or more before Smith issued his *Book of Mormon*. "Were there another Mohammed to arise," Southey wrote, "there is

no part of the world where he would find more scope, or fairer opportunity, than in that part of the Anglo-American Union into which the elder States continually discharge the restless part of their population, leaving Laws and Gospel to overtake it if they can; for in the march of modern colonisation both are left behind." This prediction was speedily fulfilled. The mass of the population of the Mississippi Valley had been almost wholly neglected by the hierarchies of the Christian Churches. Hence they "were religious without having an organized religion; they were hungry for spiritual guidance without knowing how to get it." They therefore turned eagerly to the numerous sects—Disciples of Christ, Cumberland Presbyterians, Hicksite Quakers, Millerites, and others—which sprang up on all sides. Amidst this schismatic chaos, Mormonism arose and readily found a hearing. Many also joined the Mormon ranks for utilitarian rather than for spiritual reasons. They welcomed the protection against the outside world which the powerful Mormon organisation was calculated to afford. "They were Saints by day and horse-thieves by night."

Messrs. Cannon and Knapp think that if Mormonism had been treated with kindly indulgence, or with the contempt which it certainly deserved, the theocracy would have died a natural death without any further efforts on the part of the community. As, however, invariably happens, persecution gave strength to the Mormon cause, and the brutal murder of the dreamy visionary, Joseph Smith, by a Missouri mob placed the control of the movement in the hands of "a grimly practical captain with despotic temper and a will of flint." Brigham Young, his biographers state, was "one of the

most remarkable men ever born on the Western Continent." The ambiguous epithet "remarkable" may, in fact, very fitly be applied to this rough, coarse-minded, but singularly able despot. His career excites the interest which the world always bestows on any display of undaunted courage, fixity of purpose, and indomitable will. But in no other respect does he excite the least admiration. The story of Brigham Young's relations with the other sex is disgusting. He married some half a dozen or more of Joseph Smith's widows, and denounced the prophet's first wife, Emma, who abhorred polygamy, as "the damnedest liar that ever lived." His methods of government were barbarous. He relentlessly persecuted, and even encouraged the murder of, those who in any way resisted his authority. He was responsible for the massacre of a party of half-starved immigrants at Mountain Meadows, and he allowed a ruffian named Lee, who was the principal agent in this ghastly act, to remain for years a Bishop of his Church. Under the pretence of disposing of property for the benefit of the whole community, he amassed a huge private fortune. "Long before his death there had ceased to be any definite line between the properties which Brigham held for himself and those which he held for God Almighty; and in such cases of uncertainty he usually gave himself the benefit of the doubt." Whatever may be thought of the morality of the methods which he adopted, it cannot be denied that they were eminently successful. The "Lion of the Lord" possessed a Napoleonic power of organising and an amount of shrewd common sense which formed a good substitute for statesmanship. He was wise enough to see that it was better and cheaper to feed the Indians than

to fight them. He saw clearly enough the evils which the rush for gold in California was likely to produce, and he discouraged his followers from taking part in it. When he was invited to oppose the extension of the Union Pacific Railroad westward, he expressed his views in characteristically vigorous language. "Damn a religion," he said, "that can't stand one railroad." His sermons to his flock consisted largely of exhortations to build fences, clear out irrigation canals, and devote their attention to the quality of the bulls and rams from which their stock was bred. He only once, and then reluctantly, indulged in a "revelation." The greater part of this curious document reads like the general order of a commander about to embark on a campaign, although at the close a certain amount of Biblical cant was added by his more zealous associates in order to satisfy the spiritual aspirations of his followers. He clamoured for admission to the Union, and at the same time administered to his adherents an oath pledging them to undying hostility towards the Government of the United States. War was declared against him. It ended in the "unmitigated humiliation of the Federal Government, and in almost unmixed triumph for the Mormon kingdom." A legal crusade undertaken against him met with no better success. So early as 1853 he said, "I am and will be governor, and no power can hinder it, until the Lord Almighty says 'Brigham, you need not be governor any longer.'" He successfully asserted this principle to the day of his death. Messrs. Cannon and Knapp sum up his career in the following words :

Brigham Young had passed a thousand dangers. He had been threatened by an army and prosecuted by the law. For more than twenty years the mass of the people

in the United States had expected to see him imprisoned or executed as a traitor. And he died at a good old age in his bed, surrounded by a worshipping court in the capital of an empire which he had built and which he maintained to the hour of his death in the heart of a Republic.

In considering this strange history it is difficult to say which excites more astonishment—the impudence of the rebel, or the supineness and inefficiency of the executive Government which tolerated his proceedings. The greatest sinner appears to have been President Buchanan, but it may be urged in his defence that during his lifetime the rights and duties of the Federal Government were but ill understood or defined.

The present head of the Mormon kingdom is Mr. Joseph F. Smith. He has sworn to abstain from polygamous living, and since he took this pledge he has begotten twelve children by five different wives. Messrs. Cannon and Knapp, who manifestly strain at impartiality and studiously avoid any overstatement of their case, add :

To the best of their ability, his faithful subjects have followed his example. . . . Probably there are more plural wives in the Mormon kingdom now than ever before. . . . Throughout the whole range of political activities in that kingdom, the present polygamous ruler is supreme and almost unquestioned. The legislatures of a dozen States are influenced by his will. Governors court his favour. Visiting Presidents of the United States give to him as much deference as they receive. And national parties carefully avoid offence to his authority.

It can scarcely be regarded as other than a blot on the system of government in the United States that such a monstrous excrescence as that described by Messrs. Cannon and Knapp should not only thrive and prosper, but should also be courted by “Gentile” politicians.

## XXXIX

### THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE<sup>1</sup>

*"The Spectator," May 16, 1914*

MR. ALISON PHILLIPS has unquestionably performed a most meritorious public service. He has afforded to the historical student a clue by the use of which he may guide his footsteps through an international maze of singular perplexity. There are few chapters of modern history less generally understood than that which deals with the period between Napoleon's abdication in 1814 and the meeting of the European Congress at Verona in 1822. To the casual reader this period appears a mere welter of international egotism. The different members of the European family, when, by the fall of their great common enemy, they had been relieved from the necessity of maintaining a strained concord, engaged in a wordy warfare with each other, and gave a loose rein to their long-suppressed mutual jealousies and somewhat unworthy ambitions. Yet, amidst much that was of mere ephemeral interest, the logomachy of these eight years produced certain diplomatic conceptions which were destined to exert an abiding influence on the future policy of nations. . The Holy Alliance was not altogether

<sup>1</sup> *The Confederation of Europe.* By Walter Alison Phillips, M.A.  
London : Longmans & Co. [7s. 6d. net.]



stillborn. It produced at least two offspring, one of which, being a remote descendant, bore some faint resemblance to its parent stock, whilst the other, whose advent on the European stage was more immediate, was conceived with the express object of serving as a check on the author of its own being. The Hague Arbitration Tribunal is the direct, though tardy, outcome of the idealism of the then Emperor of Russia, even if its indirect genealogy cannot in reality be traced back to the pious cobbler through whose mystic agency Mme. de Krüdener "found salvation" in 1806. As for the more immediate offspring, Mr. Phillips, in a very lucid and interesting chapter, has drawn renewed attention to a fact, too frequently forgotten, on which he had dwelt in his previous writings—namely, that the Monroe Doctrine, which is still a very active and important force in international politics, owes its genesis to the determination of the Government of the United States to prevent the principles of the Holy Alliance, in however modified a form, from crossing the Atlantic, and to nip in the bud any prospect that the idealism of a "Confederation of Europe" would be hyper-idealised into a "Confederation of the World."

Nor do these few sentences at all adequately summarise the nature of the public service rendered by Mr. Phillips. He has done whatever an historian can do to redeem British diplomacy from many unjust aspersions which have been thrown upon it in the past, and from a taint of which it is, perhaps, not even yet quite free. To unprejudiced minds he ought to inspire some degree of confidence in the British diplomacy of the present and the future. The stern moralist is the natural and traditional enemy of the diplomatist; neither is his enmity devoid of

some justification. No reproach can be made against a diplomatist for stoutly defending the interests of his own country. It is his mission in life to do so. When Canning made his famous but empty boast, he was unmindful of the fact that it was the growth of Anglo-Saxon influence in the North, and not the destruction of Latin European rule in the South, that would ultimately redress whatever balance there was to be redressed between the Old and New Worlds. He was wrong in his forecast, but he did his duty. He was thinking, as Mr. Phillips has truly pointed out, exclusively of British interests. The satirist of the *Anti-Jacobin* was not at all likely to allow his policy to be influenced by any cosmopolitan altruism. No diplomatist who acts on similar principles can be blamed, albeit, as Mr. Norman Angell and politicians of his school of thought generally hold, he may take a mistaken view of what the true interests of the country are. It is not, however, the aims but the methods supposed to be adopted by diplomatists that have usually formed the subject of moral animadversion. Mr. Phillips, in another of his writings, has said that in the past a diplomatist was generally considered to be "an *ex-officio* liar," and he has quoted Bayle in justification of the opinion current at one time that Ambassadors thought it their main duty to "invent falsehoods and go about making society believe them." In truth, the pages of Sorel and other writers abound in evidence to show that the practices and traditions of mediaeval diplomacy survived in full vigour at least up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Possibly they are not even yet altogether defunct on the continent of Europe. But they have long since fallen into complete desuetude in so far as British diplomacy is concerned.

There was certainly nothing Machiavellian about that typical British diplomat, the late Lord Lyons. Mr. Phillips has now continued a task which was commenced by Mr. Fortescue in another field of history. He has redeemed the reputation of past British diplomacy by presenting in its true light the action of a great statesman and diplomatist whose conduct has been persistently distorted and misrepresented by partisan writers. Most educated Englishmen are familiar with Byron's invectives against Lord Castlereagh. Relatively few have probably been at the pains of inquiring how far those invectives were deserved. So far from being a retrograde politician, who shared to the full the absolute opinions of Metternich, Castlereagh was in reality in advance of his time. The following very remarkable passage from a Memorandum presented to the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle bears a striking resemblance to views which, but a few years previously, had been advanced by Rousseau :

"The idea of an *Alliance Solidaire*," Castlereagh wrote, "by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government and possessions within all other states from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised, the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing could be more immoral, or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused."

In fact, throughout the whole of the negotiations at Paris, Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau,

Laibach, and Verona, the sturdy common sense, the fixity of purpose, and the enlightened advocacy of sound political principles which distinguished the British negotiators stand out in strong contrast; both to the shifty devices by which Metternich endeavoured to rejuvenate the moribund dynastic diplomacy of the past, and to the rapid transitions from the extreme of autocracy to that of unpractical idealism by which the Imperial pupil of the Jacobin La Harpe was wont to distract the councils of his bewildered allies. Canning's name has gone down to posterity as the leading champion of nationalities, and the Emperor Alexander was in his day called the "liberator of mankind"; but, apart from the fact that Canning's South American policy was dictated not so much by a wish to ensure the freedom of the South American populations as by a desire to prevent the aggrandisement of France, nothing is more certain than that the main principles of his policy were inherited from his predecessor. Both Castlereagh and Wellington were quite willing that England should enter into a limited alliance with the Continental Powers for the accomplishment of certain definite and specific objects. They absolutely refused to be associated with any vague scheme which, however little any such intention might be avowed, was really intended to lead up to intervention in the internal affairs of every State of Europe and the destruction of popular liberties. Mr. Phillips says, truly enough, that the Holy Alliance was not in its conception a conspiracy against popular liberty. But it soon drifted into such a conspiracy. It is, indeed, almost hopeless to understand all the contradictions in the ill-balanced mind of its Imperial author. Unquestionably, the original idea of the Emperor Alexander was to "organize

humanity." Metternich, of course, thought that this was a mere hypocritical mantle intended to cloak schemes of far-reaching ambition, and it may well be that, although at one time the Emperor had fully satisfied himself that Napoleon was Antichrist and the Beast, he may at other times have indulged in hopes that he might in his own person realise the Napoleonic dream of universal power. But Castlereagh was probably more right when he gave the Emperor credit for sincerity of purpose. "It is impossible," he wrote, "to doubt the Emperor's sincerity in his views, which he dilates upon with a religious rhapsody. Either he is sincere, or hypocrisy certainly assumes a more abominable garb than she ever yet was clothed in." However this may be, there can be no doubt that as time went on the Emperor's Jacobinical proclivities evaporated, whilst his autocratic tendencies became crystallised. He was deeply affected by the murder first of Kotzebue and then of the Duc de Berri. One of his own regiments revolted. He forthwith searched the Scriptures, and found in the story of Nebuchadnezzar and of Judith and Holofernes clear indications of the conduct which he ought to pursue. He discovered that there were "two kinds of revolutions." They were "legitimate when initiated from above, illegitimate when enforced from below." He was all in favour of liberty, but it must be "liberty limited by the principles of order." The maxim was sound enough in itself, but in this case it was a mere euphemism intended to excuse junction and co-operation with the retrograde Metternich. The whole career of this strange man is a standing warning against allowing empty philosophic platitudes to take the place of sound statesmanship in dealing with affairs between nations.

Castlereagh was practical and really liberal. The half-crazy Emperor was not, as Napoleon, when the Tilsit honeymoon was over, called him, "un Grec du Bas Empire," but he was a dreamer whose liberality was merely skin deep and was discarded at the first shock it received. Nations will generally be more happy when governed in the spirit shown by the Castlereaghs of history than in that displayed by the Alexanders.

## INDEX

- Abu Ben Adhem, 329  
 Acton, Lord, 74  
 Adams, Major, 175  
 Airey, General, 131  
 Alexander, Emperor, 353  
 Alexander of Macedon and world dominion, 308  
 Ali of Yanina, Byron on, 124  
 Ali of Yanina, Hobhouse and Holland on, 125  
 Almada, M. José de, 270  
 American resentment against England, 14  
 Amphictyonic Council, 307  
 Amphil, Lord, 6  
 Anæsthetics, use of, 247  
 Angell, Mr. Norman, 285  
 Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, 153  
 Aristotle on war, 329  
 Armour-Plate Press, 280  
 Artois, Comte d', 135  
 Athenian Empire, 302, 305  
 Auckland, Lord, and Lord North, 25  
 Bagehot on Whigs, 69  
 Bannerman, Sir Henry Campbell, 209  
 Barnave and Marie Antoinette, 111, 114, 115  
 Barnett, Canon, 297  
 Barthou, M., on Mirabeau, 95  
 Bassi, Ugo, 183  
 Belfort Bax, Mr., on Christianity, 164  
 Bennigsen, General, 177  
 Beugnot and the emigrants, 133  
 Beugnot on Louis XVIII., 115  
 Biron, Duchesse de, 105  
 Bismarck, Prince, and Lord Clarendon, 13  
 Bismarck, Prince, and the German Parliament, 167  
 Bismarck, Prince, Austrian and French policy, 20  
 Bismarck, Prince, diplomacy of, 4  
 Bismarck, Prince, misrepresentations of English policy, 21  
 Bismarck, Prince, on Socialism, 33  
 Bismarck, Prince, opinion of Napoleon III., 19  
 Bismarck, Prince, resentment at England's desertion of Frederic, 54  
 Blowitz, M., and Lord Lyons, 11  
 Bolton, Duke of, 24  
 Bonar Law, Mr., on war, 285  
 Bowen, Sir George, 43  
 Bradstreet, General, operations in Canada, 53  
 Brigham Young, 343  
 Bright, John, eloquence of, 321  
 Buller, Mr. Charles, 83  
 Bülow, Prince, 149, 157  
 BULWER, EDWARD, 40-46  
 Bulwer, Edward, as Colonial Minister, 43  
 Bulwer, Edward, and Disraeli, 42  
 Bulwer, Edward, his novels, 44  
 Bulwer, Edward, his stilted oratory, 43  
 Bulwer, Edward, his versatility, 45  
 Butrinto, 127  
 Byng, Chatham's defence of, 49  
 Canning, Mr., 351  
 Capitulations in Egypt, 217  
 Carlyle, his scheme of philosophy, 47  
 Carlyle and political economy, 195  
 Carlyle on the Franco-German War, 331

- Caste system in India, 212  
 Castlereagh, Lord, 352  
 Caswall, Professor, 344  
 CAVOUR, 183-190  
 Cavour, 331  
 Cavour and Bismarck, 188  
 Cavour and the Church, 187  
 Cavour and the Crimean War, 188  
 Cavour, diplomacy of, 4, 5  
 Cavour, political principles of, 187  
 Chainitza, sister of Ali Pasha, 125  
 CHARITY ORGANISATION, 292-298  
 CHATEAUBRIAND, ARMAND DE, 132-138  
 CHATHAM, EARL OF, 47-55  
 Chatham, Earl of, his character, 48  
 Chatham, Earl of, his defence of Byng, 49  
 Chatham, Earl of, his hatred of the House of Bourbon, 52  
 Chatham, Earl of, his oratory, 50  
 Chatham, Earl of, his system, 53  
 Chatham, Earl of, victories subsequent to 1757, 53  
 Chinese Court, 342  
 Chinese manners and customs, 230  
 Chinese suffragists, 141  
 Chirol, Sir Valentine, on Indian Home charges, 203  
 Churchill, Mr. Winston, 290  
 CLARENDON, LORD, 33-39  
 Clarendon, Lord, and Franco-German War, 20  
 Clarendon, Lord, and Prince Bismarck, 13  
 Clarendon, Lord, a typical Whig, 34  
 Clarendon, Lord, Austrian sympathies, 38  
 Clarendon, Lord, knowledge of German, 37  
 Clarendon, Lord, views on the Civil War in America, 38  
 Clarendon, Lord, views on the Indian Mutiny, 39  
 Clausewitz, 315  
 Clifford, Sir Hugh, 87, 92  
 Cobden, Mr., 34  
 Colenso, Bishop, on Biblical history, 311  
 Coleridge, Mr. Stephen, 248  
 Collot d'Herbois, 105  
 Colonies, British, forced labour in, 273  
 Communism and Collectivism, 165  
 Condorcet, M. de, 140  
 CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE, THE, 349-355  
 Corday, Charlotte, 102  
 Corfu, 129  
 Corneille, epigram on Richelieu, 145  
 Corruption in China, 232  
 Corvée system in Egypt, 271  
 Corvée system in France and Scotland, 273  
 Creevey on Wellesley, 56  
 Crimean War, proclamations during, 319  
 Curzon, Lord, 318  
 Demetrius the Saviour, 338  
 Denison, Mr. Edward, 292  
 Didon, Père, 321  
 Diplomacy, British, Mr. Phillips on, 350  
 Diplomacy, public opinion of, 5  
 Disraeli and Bolingbroke, 64  
 Disraeli, English style, 68  
 Disraeli, friendship with Lord Lyndhurst, 65  
 Disraeli, hatred of Whigs, 65  
 Disraeli, his literary tastes, 42  
 DISRAELI, THE YOUNG, 63-69  
 Dogs, experiments on, 250  
 Drake, epitaph on, 79  
 Dreyfus and the Church, 123  
 Durham, Lord, 83  
 Dutch national characteristics, 256  
 Eden, Miss Emily, 36  
 EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 214-225  
 ELOQUENCE AS A FINE ART, 318-325  
 Emigrants, French, ingratitude to England, 133  
 Englishmen, rudeness to natives in India, 211  
 EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING ANIMALS, 237-253  
 Eylau, battle of, 173  
 Eylau, Napoleon at, 175  
 Faguet, M., on feminism, 144  
 Fashoda incident, the, 291  
 FEMINISM IN FRANCE, 139-146  
 Feminism in France, M. Joran on, 140  
 Fersen, Count, 110, 114  
 Feuquières, Marquise de, 106  
 Fletcher's *Pilgrim*, 292  
 Fleury, General, epitaph on Second Empire, 19



- Fortescue, Mr., on Whig historians, 24
- Fouché and political assassination, 135
- FOUQUIER TINVILLE, 102-108
- Fouquier Tinville and the Nantes conspirators, 108
- Fouquier Tinville, early education, 108
- Fouquier Tinville, his portrait, 104
- France, family life in, 143
- France, municipal life in, 143
- Franklin, duplicity of, 29
- Free Trade in Germany, 168
- French bureaucracy, 121
- FRENCH CIVILISATION, 117-123
- French institutions, stability of, 119
- Fullerton, Mr. Morton, on causes of war, 288
- Fustel de Coulanges, M., 304
- Gambetta and Lord Lyons, 11
- Gambetta and Mirabeau, 96
- Garnett, Dr., *Life of Wakefield*, 81
- George III., American policy of, 26
- George III. as an electioneering agent, 29
- George III., character of, 28
- German militarism, 283
- German national character, 118, 159
- German parties, 158
- German policy towards France and England, 152
- GERMANY, HOME POLICY OF, 157-172
- Gibbon on Lord North, 25
- Gladstone, Mr., frequent resignations of, 35
- Gladstone, Mr., speech on Bradlaugh, 320
- Gladstone, Mr., treatment of foreign affairs, 14
- Gloucester, Duchess of, 23
- Goethe on Mirabeau, 96
- Gokhale, Mr., 207
- Goltz, Field-Marshal von der, 176
- Goschen, Lord, and the Home Rule Bill, 33
- Granville, Lord, on caution, 4
- Granville, Lord, on position of Foreign Secretary, 8
- GREEK IMPERIALISM, 301-309
- Greville, Charles, on Wellesley, 56
- Grey, Sir Edward, and Lord Lyons, 9
- Grey, Sir George, in New Zealand, 89
- Grundy, Dr., on the Persian War, 316
- Guérard, M., on French civilisation, 117
- Halévy, M. Elie, 146
- Hammond, Mr., forecast in 1870, 22
- Hanotaux, M., on English character, 119
- Heister, Baron, 339
- Hengelmüller, Baron, 335
- Hero, meaning of word, 184
- Hertzog, General, 257
- Hewett, Sir John, 208
- Highlanders, enrolment of, 53
- Hill, Miss Octavia, 298
- Hobhouse and Holland, on Ali of Yanina, 125
- Holland, Lord, on Wellesley, 57
- Holm, Dr. Adolf, on Athenian democracy, 307
- Holy Alliance, 333
- Höpfner on the Polish campaign, 175, 179
- Hunt, Mr. Thornton, opinion of Wakefield, 81
- Huxley, Professor, 244
- Ignatieff, General, and Lord Lyons, 12
- IMPERIAL GERMANY, 149-156
- Imperialism, definition of, 301
- Incidence of taxation, 269
- Income Tax, 268
- India and currency legislation, 194
- India, density of population, 193
- India, educational policy, 201
- India, home charges, 203
- India, industrial progress, 197
- INDIA, REFLECTIONS ON, 206-213
- India, stores department, 205;
- India, taxation in, 199
- INDIAN PROGRESS AND TAXATION, 193-205
- Italian organ-grinders, 294
- Italy and England, 185
- Joran, M., on feminism in France, 140
- Jordan, Dr. David Starr, 277
- Junius on Wedderburn, 31

- Karr, Alphonse, 291  
 Keshub Chunder Sen, 321  
 Kollonicz, Cardinal, 337
- LABOUCHERE, HENRY, 70-78  
 Labouchere, Henry, and Chamberlain during the Home Rule Crisis, 74  
 Labouchere, Henry, and the forger Pigott, 71  
 Labouchere, Henry, and the South African War, 72  
 Labouchere, Henry, as a lobby politician, 73  
 Labouchere, Henry, quarrel with Chamberlain, 78  
 Lamb, Lady Caroline, 41  
 Lameth, 110  
 Layard, Miss Eden on, 37  
 Leave Rules in the Sudan, 225  
 Lecky, Mr., on finance, 261  
 Legouvé, M. Ernest, 145  
 L'Estocq, General, 176  
 Leuthold, the poet, 118  
 Lewis, Sir George Cornwall, and the Colonies, 88  
 Lincoln, President, opinion of *The Times*, 14  
 Loughborough, Lord, 30  
 Louis, Baron, 112  
 Louis XVI.'s flight to Varennes, 63  
 Louis XVIII., 115  
 Louis XVIII., ingratitude to emigrants, 134  
 Lucas, Mr., history of Lord North, 24  
 Lucas, Mr., opinion of Charles Fox, 25  
 Lucy, Sir Henry, on Labouchere, 73  
 Lyall, Sir Alfred, 260  
 Lyndhurst, Lord, 65  
 LYONS, LORD, 3-22  
 Lyons, Lord, and Gambetta, 11  
 Lyons, Lord, and M. Blowitz, 11  
 Lyons, Lord, and M. Thiers, 10  
 Lyons, Lord, and Mr. Seward, 17  
 Lyons, Lord, and Papal Nuncio, 12  
 Lyons, Lord, and party system, 10  
 Lyons, Lord, and Sir Edward Grey, 9  
 Lyons, Lord, American opinion of, 7  
 Lyons, Lord, appointment to Constantinople and Washington, 7  
 Lyons, Lord, Mrs. Wilfrid Ward on, 9, 11
- Lyons, Lord, opinion of Napoleon III., 19  
 Lyons, Lord, private character, 13  
 Lyons, Lord, work at Paris, 8
- Macdonald, Mr. Ramsay, on Indian Home Charges, 204  
 Macedonian Imperialism, 308  
 Macphail, Mr., on British Colonial policy, 88  
 Mallet, Mr. Bernard, 262, 281  
 Mameli, 183  
 Manzoni on Cavour, 187  
 Marathon, battle of, 314  
 MARIE ANTOINETTE AND BARNAVE, 109-116  
 Marie Antoinette and the Emperor Leopold, 113  
 Markham, Miss Violet, 234  
 Martineau, Harriet, on Bulwer, 45  
 Marx, Karl, economic error of, 165  
 Maxwell, Sir Herbert, 35  
 Metcalfe, Sir Charles, 80  
 Military and naval expenditure, 264  
 Military eloquence, 319  
 Milner, Lord, 235  
 MIRABEAU, 95-101  
 Mirabeau and Marie Antoinette, 100  
 Mirabeau and the States-General, 97  
 Mirabeau, his death, 101  
 Mirabeau, his eloquence, 98  
 Mirabeau, his principles, 99  
 Mirabeau, Marquis de, and Louis XVI., 98  
 Molesworth, Sir William, correspondence with Wakefield, 81  
 Monroe doctrine, the, 280  
 Montmorency, Duchesse de, 106  
 Morier, Sir Robert, 332  
 Morison, Sir Theodore, 196  
 Morley, Lord, address at Manchester University, 326  
 Morley, Lord, on Socialism, 333  
 Morley, Lord, on "The State is Force," 151  
 MORMONS, THE, 342-348  
 Moulton, Sir J. Fletcher, 241  
 Moustier, M. de, 11  
 Mundella, Mr., 295
- NAPOLÉON AND ALI OF YANINA, 124-131  
 Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander, 355

- Napoleon and Prussia, 174  
 Napoleon and Talleyrand, 137  
 Napoleon III., M. Guérard on, 120  
 Newfoundland fishery question, 54  
 Newton, Lord, 4  
 Newton, Lord, opinions on Free Trade, 22  
 Norman Conquest of England, 312  
 NORTH, LORD, 23-32  
 North, Lord, and Lord Auckland, 25  
 North, Lord, and the coalition of 1783, 31  
 North, Lord, George III.'s opinion of, 28  
 North, Lord, Gibbon's opinion of, 25  
 NUMBERS IN HISTORY, 310-317  
 Nuncio, Papal, and Lord Lyons, 12  
  
 "Old Buddha," 227  
 OLD PRUSSIAN ARMY, THE, 173-179  
 Oliver, Mr., on Home Rule, 263  
 Oxenstiern, 285  
  
 Padgett, M.P., 215  
 Parga, 127, 130  
 PEACE BOANERGES, A, 277-284  
 Peel, Mr., settlement in Western Australia, 82  
 Peel, Sir Robert, 270  
 PEKING, THE COURT OF, 226-233  
 Pericles, 306  
 Pétion, 112  
 Phillips, Mr. Alison, 349  
 Phrosine, the Lady, 124  
 Pitt and the French Revolution, 109  
 Poincaré, M., on feminism, 144  
 POLITICS AND HISTORY, 326-333  
 Porter, Miss Jane, 36  
 Prevesa, battle of, 128  
 Pultusk, battle of, 173  
  
 RAKOCZI, FRANCIS, 334-341  
 Rintoul, Mr., and Wakefield, 84  
 Robespierre and Madame de Staël, 103  
 Rockingham Whigs, 51  
 Roman history, 303  
 Roman law of slavery, 272  
 Rosebery, Lord, on eloquence, 322  
*Round Table*, extract from, 6  
 Rousseau, 326  
 Runnymede letters, 67  
 Russell, Lord, opinion of Lord North, 24  
 Russell, Sir William, 14, 15  
 Ruville's *Life of Chatham*, 48  
  
 Sainte-Beuve, on Mirabeau, 96  
 Salisbury, Lord, and the Sudan, 220  
 Salisbury, Lord, opinion on peers voting, 10  
 Sand, George, on feminism, 141  
 Seneca on indiscriminate charity, 296  
 Shaftesbury, Lord, 296  
 Shaw, Mr. Bernard, on progress, 206  
 Sianfu, sack of, 231  
 Sieyès and Robespierre, 103  
 Sieyès on feminism, 140  
 Sinking Fund, 267  
 Smith, Joseph, 343, 348  
 Sobieski, John, 334  
 Socialism in England, 172  
 Socialism in Germany, 162, 165, 168, 170  
 Sombreuil, Mlle. de, 103  
 SOUTH AFRICA, 254-260  
 Sovereigns, semi-lunatic, 336  
 Spartans on eloquence, 323  
 Staël, Madame de, on Mirabeau, 96  
 Stephen, Sir James, 85  
 Stepney, George, 335, 340  
 Storks, Sir Henry, 90  
 Stratford, Lord, 6  
 Sudan, objection to frequent changes, 223  
 Sudan, system of government, 220  
 Sudanese expedition, 313  
  
 Taine, 327  
 Taxation, direct and indirect, 265  
 Thorold, Mr., *Life of Labouchere*, 70  
 Tocqueville, de, on the influence of France, 117  
 Tory democracy, foundation of, 66  
*Trent* affair, 7  
 TWENTY-SIX YEARS' FINANCE, 261-269  
  
 Vatican and Liberalism, 122  
 Vatican, appointment of English agent to, 12  
 Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, 186  
 Virgil, *Eclogues*, 210  
 Vivisection, public opinion on, 237  
  
 Wadia, Mr., 206  
 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 79

- Walpole, Sir Robert, and the taxation of the Colonies, 26  
 WAR AND DIPLOMACY, 285-291  
 Waterloo, battle of, 121  
 WELD, SIR FREDERICK, 86-94  
 Weld, Sir Frederick, policy towards natives, 91  
 WELLESLEY, MARQUIS OF, 56-62  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, breach with Lord Melbourne, 58  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, 59  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, his arrival in England, 60  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, his hatred of Mr. Perceval, 58  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, his liberal sentiments, 57  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, his vanity, 60  
 Wellesley, Marquis of, quarrel with East India directors, 58  
 WHAT IS SLAVERY? 270-276  
 Wilkes, Captain, and the *Trent* affair, 16  
 Wilson, Dr. George, 242  
 Wolseley, Lord, proclamation in the Sudan, 318  
 Xerxes and the Persian expedition, 311  
 Yuan Shih-kai, 227  
 Zabern incident, the, 155  
 Zosimus, 309

THE END

